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ENHANCING AUTONOMY FOR BATTERED WOMEN:
LESSONS FROM NAVAJO PEACEMAKING
Donna Coker
In this Article, Professor Donna Coker employs original empirical research
to investigate the use of Navajo Peacemaking in cases involving domestic vio-
lence. Her analysis includes an examination of Navajo women's status and the
impact of internal colonization. Many advocates for battered women worry that
informal adjudication methods such as Peacemaking ignore domestic hierarchies
of power and thus facilitate the batterer's ongoing violence against the victim.
Those who endorse the use of Navajo Peacemaking and other systems of restora-
tive justice believe that such processes are better equipped to cut through the
batterer's denial and victim blaming and are more likely to marshal resources for
the victim than are formal methods of adjudication. Coker argues that both formal
and informal methods of adjudication should be assessed for the likelihood that
they will realize change in the material and social conditions that foster battering.
Coker's study of Peacemaking finds that it may be autonomy enhancing for some
battered women because it effectuates such change. Peacemakers may disrupt
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social and familial supports for battering through confrontations with both the
batterer and his family. Women's material resources may be improved through
nalyeeh (reparations) from the abuser's family and through connections to com-
munity social services. Peacemakers use traditional Navajo stories with gender
antisubordination themes that may change the way in which the batterer and his
family understand the batterer's relationship with the victim. Further, unlike the
normative practices of many legal and social service organizations, Peacemaking
may avoid the cultural and legal focus on the necessity of a woman's commit-
ment to separating from her abuser. Similarly, peacemakers do not discount
women's various competing loyalties and thus do not demand that women choose
their identity as "battered woman" over that of other competing identities. Further,
Peacemaking avoids the "responsibility versus description dichotomy" of Anglo
adjudication by creating a forum in which the oppressive systems that impact the
life of the batterer, including systems of racism and colonization, are recognized
without minimizing the harm done the battered woman and without blaming her
for the batterer's violence. While Peacemaking offers benefits for some battered
women, Coker warns that Peacemaking also presents problems: Some women
are coerced into participation, agreements are difficult to enforce, and some
peacemakers have a promarriage bias that discourages separation. Coker concludes
by suggesting an informal adjudication method that draws on the strengths of
Peacemaking but that corrects for the coercion problems and strengthens antimi-
sogynist norms. In an Appendix, Coker discusses the limitations of her empirical
work that concern the generalizability of her findings (the "empiricism problem")
and the difficulties of crosscultural study (the "imperialism problem").
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW: BATTERING
AND ANTISUBORDINATION
Navajo Peacemaking' is a form of what is sometimes called "informal
adjudication."2 As part of the effort to revitalize Navajo common law and
1. 1 distinguish Navajo Peacemaking from other similar forms of informal adjudication. Formal
Peacemaking programs exist in several Native American tribes. See Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and
Conscience: The Dynamic Challenge of Lawyers' Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 821,
821 (1996). Ho'oponopono, an indigenous form of dispute resolution among native Hawaiians, as well
as practices among aboriginal people in Australia and New Zealand, may share similarities to Navajo
Peacemaking. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECON-
CILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 166-67, 194 (1999) (describing ho'oponopono); John
Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control, in JUST BOYS
DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND CRIME 189, 192-96 (Tim Newbum & Elizabeth
A. Stanko eds., 1994) (explaining that community group conferencing borrows in part from indige-
nous justice practices); Frederick W.M. McElrea, The New Zealand Youth Court: A Model for Use
with Adults, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 69 (Burt Galaway & Joe
Hudson eds., 1996).
2. I include within informal adjudication both civil mediation and criminal restorative
justice alternatives such as victim-offender mediation, family or community group conferencing,
and sentencing circles. A great deal of feminist and other critical scholarship deals with media-
tion. See infra notes 26, 27. The feminist scholarship related to restorative justice has for the most
part focused on particular processes, and several scholars have criticized the use of such processes
in domestic violence cases. See, e.g., Stephen Hooper & Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and the
Restorative Justice Initiatives: The Risks of a New Panacea, 4 WAIKATO L. REV. 101 (1996); Loretta
Frederick, Why Restorative Justice Issues Are Significant to Us at This Time (n.d.) (unpublished
electronic document, on file with author); Rashmi Goel, Use of Sentencing Circles in Domestic
Violence Cases in Canada (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Kathleen Daly's
work in republican justice provides a notable exception, as does Martha Minow's preliminary work
in examining feminist responses to violent atrocities. See generally Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1;
Kathleen Daly, Criminal Law and Justice System Practices as Racist, White, and Racialized, 51 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 431 (1994) [hereinafter Daly, Criminal Law and Justice System Practices]; Kathleen
Daly, Men's Violence, Victim Advocacy, and Feminist Redress, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 777 (1994)
[hereinafter Daly, Men's Violence]; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist
Responses to Violent Injustice, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967 (1998). This Article attempts to further a
feminist analysis of restorative justice methods through a close examination of Peacemaking, a process
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traditional Navajo adjudicatory processes, Peacemaking's importance within
the Navajo Nation has grown in recent years.3 Peacemaking has also been
the focus of international4 and national attention as a form of alternative
dispute resolution and, more recently, as a form of restorative justice.6 This
Article builds on original empirical research' to investigate the use of Navajo
Peacemaking in cases involving domestic violence! My study of Peacemaking
practice draws on reviews of Peacemaking Court files9 in Window Rock,
frequently described as an example of restorative justice. See, e.g., Robert Yazzie & James W.
Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of Equality and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTER-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 157, 172. My work follows the concerns that are central
to Daly-the intersection of race, class, gender, and state power in understanding crime-and
follows Minow's concerns regarding the ability of feminist theory to address society's appropriate
response to violence.
3. See infra notes 558-564 and accompanying text (asserting that the movement for
Peacemaking is part of a political effort to maintain and expand the judicial autonomy and national
sovereignty of the Navajo Nation).
4. Scholars and legal practitioners from around the world have visited and studied the
Navajo Peacemaking courts. See Raymond D. Austin, Freedom, Responsibility, and Duty: ADR and
the Navajo Peacemaker Court, JUDGES' J., Spring 1993, at 8, 11.
5. See, e.g., Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hozhooji Naat'aanii: The Navajo Justice
and Harmony Ceremony, 10 MEDIATION Q. 327 (1993); Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolu-
tion and Promissory Obligations: Continuity and Change in the Largest Native American Nation, 18
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1993); James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America
in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 55, 72 (1997) (describing visits from
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) experts from New Mexico to study Peacemaking). Many
Navajo writers reject the "alternative dispute resolution" category, noting that Peacemaking is
actually a form of "original dispute resolution." See id. at 55-56.
6. See, e.g., Marianne 0. Nielsen, A Comparison of Developmental Ideologies: Navajo Nation
Peacemaker Courts and Canadian Native Justice Committees, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTER-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 207; Mark S. Umbreit, Humanistic Mediation: A Trans-
formative Journey of Peacemaking, 14 MEDIATION Q. 201 (1997); Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2.
7. To the best of my knowledge, this Article is the first attempt to gather empirical data
regarding the use of Peacemaking in domestic violence cases. In the Appendix, I discuss some of the
limitations of my methodology and analysis. See infra Appendix.
8. My focus is on Peacemaking as an intervention in cases of domestic violence, but my
observations regarding Peacemaking have implications beyond this focus. First, Peacemaking prac-
tice provides a partial.response to criticisms of informal adjudication that focus on the inability
of such processes to address the effects of private hierarchies of power. These private hierarchies
are particularly pronounced in domestic violence cases but are also at play in many other circum-
stances. My examination of Peacemaking may also expand the critique of formal adjudication
articulated by ADR and restorative justice proponents. This expansion is accomplished largely
through the use of insights from critical theory: feminist theory, critical race theory, and critical
race feminist theory.
9. The peacemaker files I examined generally contained: (a) a description of the peti-
tioner's complaint; (b) intake notes, including interviews with the petitioner (and sometimes with
other family members or supporters who accompanied the petitioner); (c) court documents, includ-
ing referral orders in court-referred cases; (d) other legal documents (e.g., domestic violence pro-
tection orders); and (e) the peacemaker's (often summary) notes of the session and notes of the
resolution (adopted as a minute order in court-referred cases). Occasionally, the file contained follow-
up documentation. My review of Peacemaking files is designed solely to examine the plausibility
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Navajo Nation (Arizona) and in Shiprock, Navajo Nation (New Mexico),'"
observation of a Peacemaking session in Window Rock,' and extensive inter-
views with peacemakers, 2 peacemaker liaisons, family court judges, 3 justices
of claims made by both detractors and supporters of the use of Peacemaking in domestic violence
cases.
The Shiprock Peacemaker Division saw 177 cases in 1996. See Donna Coker, Notes from
Shiprock File Review (Apr. 21-22, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shiprock File Review].
Of these cases, I selected 31 cases that contained domestic violence markers. (I also reviewed a
number of non-domestic violence cases for comparison.) Cases were identified as domestic violence
marker cases if the file was labeled "domestic violence" (usually meaning the case was a referral
from a family court domestic violence protection order proceeding), "family or marital dishar-
mony," "family or marital counseling," "divorce," "child custody/visitation or modification of
custody/visitation," or "alcohol counseling," or if the file was transferred from a criminal court
hearing. See id. For purposes of this study, I defined domestic violence as those cases of violence
or threat of violence between two adult sexual intimates or former sexual intimates. Of the 31 cases
that I reviewed in Shiprock, nine involved verified violence and an additional two contained facts
that strongly indicated violence, including threats of violence. See id.
In Window Rock, peacemakers heard 192 cases in 1996. See Donna Coker, Notes from
Window Rock File Review (Apr. 23-24, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Window Rock
File Review]. I reviewed 70 domestic violence marker cases, of which 11 were confirmed domestic
violence cases. Thus I reviewed a total of 22 confirmed or probable domestic violence case files. I
reviewed the files in chronological order. Though my review was not exhaustive and involved only
two Peacemaking Divisions, the small number of domestic violence cases was consistent with the
reports I received from family court judges, prosecutors, and anti-domestic violence advocates
that very few of these cases were being heard in Peacemaking. However, the small number was
somewhat inconsistent with reports from peacemakers who seemed to feel that they were seeing a
significant number of cases involving domestic violence. See Interview with Crownpoint Peace-
makers, in Crownpoint, Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 15, 1997) (notes on file with author); see also
Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 80-83 (describing the use of Peacemaking in domestic violence cases).
10. I follow the Navajo Nation's official method for referring to locales within the Navajo
Nation. See NATION CODE tit. 1, § 501(a)-(c) (Equity 1995) (stating that all entities of the Navajo
Nation are to use the designation "'Navajo Nation' in describing the lands and people of the
Navajo Nation," and that "all correspondence ... of all divisions, agencies, etc., of the Navajo
Nation, [are directed to] use the designation 'Navajo Nation,"' so, for example, letterheads "should
read 'The Navajo Nation, Window Rock, Navajo Nation (Arizona) 86515').
11. See Donna Coker, Notes on Window Rock Peacemaking Session (Apr. 24, 1997) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Notes on Peacemaking Session].
12. I interviewed a group of peacemakers in Crownpoint, Navajo Nation (New Mexico): Joe
Dennison, Sr., Raymond Gem, Nina Largo, Cecilia ). Nez, Annie Tsosie, and Peacemaker Liaison
Imogene Long. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9. In Window Rock,
I interviewed Peacemaker Liaison Anita Roan, see Interview with Anita Roan, Peacemaker Liason
for Window Rock, in Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 15, 1997) (notes on file with
author), and Peacemaker Ruthie Alexis, see Interview with Ruthie Alexis, Window Rock
Peacemaker, in Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 24, 1997) (notes on file with author).
In Shiprock, I interviewed Peacemaker Liaison Leo Natani. See Interview with Leo Natani,
Peacemaker Liason for Shiprock, in Shiprock, Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 21, 1997) (notes on file
with author).
13. 1 interviewed Family Court Judges Mae Horseman, see Interview with Mae Horseman,
Family Court Judge, in Crownpoint, Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 15, 1997) (notes on file with
author), and Marilou Begay, see Interview with Marilou Begay, Family Court Judge, in Shiprock,
Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 21, 1997) (notes on file with author).
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of the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation,14 the coordinator of the Peace-
maker Division, 5 the solicitor general of the Navajo Nation,16 as well as anti-
domestic violence advocates working in the Navajo Nation. 7
Navajo Peacemaking is a process in which a Naat'aanii (peacemaker),
familiar with Navajo common law and traditional Navajo stories, guides
disputing parties to develop a resolution." A Peacemaking session includes
members of the extended families of the disputants and may also include
community members with relevant expertise (e.g., alcohol treatment coun-
selors and social workersl"). Peacemakers understand Peacemaking as a spiri-
14. I interviewed Chief Justice Robert Yazzie, see Interview with Robert Yazzie, Navajo
Nation Supreme Court Chief Justice, in Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 23, 1997) (notes
on file with author), and completed an extensive interview with Justice Raymond Austin, see Inter-
view with Raymond Austin, Navajo Nation Supreme Court Justice, in Window Rock, Navajo
Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 23, 1997) (notes on file with author).
15. 1 had extensive conversations with Philmer Bluehouse, Coordinator of the Peacemaker
Division of the Navajo judiciary. I also attended a training session that Bluehouse conducted for
local teachers regarding Navajo cosmology and Peacemaking. See Interview with Philmer Bluehouse,
Coordinator of the Peacemaker Division of the Judiciary Branch of the Navajo Nation, in Window
Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 20, 1997) (notes on file with author).
16. I had extensive conversations with James W. Zion, Solicitor General of the Navajo
Nation, in person, by mail, and by e-mail.
17. I conducted phone interviews with Cecelia Lowe, Counselor, and Diane Thompson,
Director, of Ama Doo Alchini Bighan, Inc. ("Mother and Child Home, Inc.") (A.D.A.B.I.), an
anti-domestic violence project in Chinle, Navajo Nation (Ariz.), Genevieve James, a consultant
at Mending the Sacred Hoop, and Chris O'Shea, an attorney who assisted in drafting the Navajo
Nation Code statute regarding domestic violence protection orders. See Telephone Interview with
Genevieve James, Consultant, Mending the Sacred Hoop (Apr. 17, 1997) (notes on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Chris O'Shea, San Juan County Legal Services Attorney (Mar. 1997).
I conducted personal interviews with several anti-domestic violence advocates. See Interview with
Peggy Bird, former Director of the Native American Family Violence Prevention Project of DNA
People's Legal Services and currently faculty/attorney/consultant with Mending the Sacred Hoop,
and Jennifer Skeet, former staff attorney for the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation and current
staff attorney for the Legislative Council of the Navajo Nation, in Shiprock, Navajo Nation, N.M.
(Apr. 22, 1997) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Peggy Bird and Jennifer
Skeet]; Interview with Gloria Champion, Director of the Shiprock Home for Women and Children,
in Shiprock, Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 22, 1997) (notes on file with author); Interview with
Cheryl Neskahi-Coan, Director of the Family Harmony Project, and Helen Muskett, counselor
with the Family Harmony Project, in Shiprock, Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 16, 1997) (notes on file
with author) [hereinafter Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett] [hereinafter,
collectively, Interviews with Battered Women's Advocates]. I also interviewed Donovan Brown,
chief prosecutor for the Navajo Nation, and Sharon Tsingine, deputy prosecutor for Window
Rock. See Interview with Sharon Tsingine, District Prosecutor for Window Rock, and Donovan
Brown, Chief Prosecutor for the Navajo Nation, in Window Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 23,
1997) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Sharon Tsingine & Donovan Brown].
18. I describe this process in much greater detail infra Part I.C.
19. See Notes on Peacemaking Session, supra note 11 (observing a Peacemaking session in
which a hospital social worker participated).
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tual process in which the primary purpose is the restoration of h6zh6, roughly
(but inadequately) translated as "harmony."2°
A significant body of scholarship, much of it written by members of the
Navajo judiciary and the solicitor general for the Navajo Nation, describes
Peacemaking's use in domestic violence cases.2 In general, this literature
argues that non-Native22 adjudication would be improved by the application
of Navajo concepts of justice and the Navajo process of Peacemaking.23
Peacemaking proponents argue that Peacemaking, unlike Anglo adjudica-
tion, allows parties to reach the underlying problems, diminishes the ability
of the offender to deny and minimize his abuse or his responsibility for the
abuse, and provides support for the victim.24
20. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 79 (describing h6zh6 as the goal of Peacemaking and
defining h6zh6 as "the wholeness of all reality and the connections of everyone and everything"). For
further discussion of h6zh6, see infra notes 313-314 and accompanying text.
21. There are many published accounts of the use of Peacemaking in domestic violence cases.
See, e.g., Austin, supra note 4; The Honorable Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping: Technology and
Traditional Indian Law, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 95 (1997) [hereinafter Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeep-
ing]; Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2; James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho' Sokee'-Stay Together
Nicely: Domestic Violence Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407 (1993). For general
discussions of Peacemaking, see Phil Bluehouse, Navajo Tradition and Peacemaking Courts, in NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON TRADITIONAL PEACEMAKING AND MODERN TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS
(sponsored by the Indian Law Support Center and the Native American Bar Association) (1992),
An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, in PEOPLE OF THE SEVENTH FIRE 161 (Dagmar Thorpe ed.,
1996), The Honorable Robert Yazzie, 'Hozho Nahasdlii'-We Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo
Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117 (1996) [hereinafter Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii], The
Honorable Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175 (1994)
[hereinafter Yazzie, Life Comes from It], Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, James W. Zion, Harmony Among
the People: Torts and Indian Courts, 45 MONT. L. REV. 265 (1984), and Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5.
22. I use the terms "Indian," "American Indian," "Native American," and "Native" inter-
changeably throughout this Article. The term "Indian" has been adopted by many indigenous
people who reside within the geographic borders of the United States. See WARD CHURCHILL,
FROM A NATIVE SON: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INDIGENISM, 1985-1995, at 457 (1996). Churchill
uses such terms as "American Indian," "Native American," "first American," and "original Ameri-
can" interchangeably, noting that "[slo long as no one resorts to such anthropological monstrosities
as 'Amerindian' or 'aborigines'-or the marxian lexicon involving 'primitives' and 'preindustrials'-
we tend to be rather semantically contented people." Id. "Indian" is the term used most frequently
by people in the Four Comers area (where the Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado borders
meet). This area, frequently referred to as "Indian Country," is the location of the Navajo Nation.
See also Alan R. Velie, Indian Identity in the Nineties, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 190 (1998).
Velie prefers the term "Indian," because it is the term that most Indians use, "at least in 'Indian
Country'. . . and other states with large Indian populations. On the 'rez'-that is among working
class Indians on reservations-'Indian' is virtually the only term ever used." Id.
23. See Austin, supra note 4, at 48 (writing that the Navajo Peacemaker Court may provide
a model for ADR); An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 21, at 167 (arguing that the
adversary system of justice is unfair and uses force with force).
24. See Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 183.
The involvement of relatives assures that the weak will not be abused and that silent or
passive participants will be protected. An abused victim may be afraid to speak; his or her
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Many feminist anti-domestic violence scholars and activists have been
understandably skeptical of the use of informal processes such as Peacemaking
in domestic violence cases.25 The concerns are that informal methods of adju-
dication may ignore domestic power hierarchies and thus facilitate the bar-
terer's ongoing violence against the victim, resulting in unfair and coerced
"agreements."26 Informal processes may create an occasion for the batterer,
his family, and perhaps even the victim's family, to blame the victim for the
batterer's anger, violence, or both." Further, a focus on the particular needs
relatives will assert and protect that person's interests. The process also deals with the phe-
nomenon of denial where people refuse to face their own behavior.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 81-82.
25. None of the battered women's advocates in the Navajo Nation whom I interviewed
endorsed Peacemaking as it is currently practiced as an intervention in domestic violence cases.
See Interviews with Battered Women's Advocates, supra note 17. Some advocates believed that with
appropriate safeguards and training, Peacemaking might be appropriate for some women, while
others believed that either because of changes in Navajo culture that serve to undermine its
effectiveness or because of the inherent power imbalance between batterer and victim, Peace-
making could not be reformed to meet the needs of battered women. Similar criticisms have been
made of other informal adjudicatory processes. See, e.g., Curt Taylor Griffiths & Ron Hamilton,
Sanctioning and Healing: Restorative Justice in Canadian Aboriginal Communities, in RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 175, 187 (noting that with regard to
the use of restorative justice processes, "[alboriginal women [in Canada] have voiced concerns
about the high rates of sexual and physical abuse in communities, and have questioned whether
local justice initiatives provide adequate protection for violence and abuse victims and whether
the sanctions imposed are appropriate"); Goel, supra note 2, at 26 (describing a sentencing circle in
which the domestic violence victim was outnumbered and the focus was on the offender and how
to help him, not the impact of the abuse on the victim and her children, and noting that the
victim spoke only three times, always in response to the judge's questions, and only to acknowledge
the concerns and wishes of the community leaders (citing Mary Crnkovich, Report on a Sentenc-
ing Circle in Nunavik, in INUIT WOMEN AND JUSTICE: PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER ONE 19, 21
(Pauktuutit Inuit Women's Ass'n, 1995))). See generally Hooper & Busch, supra note 2 (asserting
that family group conferencing as well as other restorative justice approaches are ill-advised in cases
involving domestic violence).
26. See, e.g., Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117 (1993). By and large, restorative justice proponents have
not been feminist or other critical scholars. See Minow, supra note 2, at 969. I do not mean to
suggest, however, that there is no feminist support for the use of informal adjudication in domestic
violence cases. See generally Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1; Daly, Criminal Law and Justice System
Practices, supra note 2; Daly, Men's Violence, supra note 2. For feminist criticisms of mediation, see
Hilary Astor, Swimming Against the Tide: Keeping Violent Men Out of Mediation, in WOMEN, MALE
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 147, 158 (Julie Stubbs ed., 1994) ("[Mediation] places fewer barriers
between the perpetrator and the target of his violence. It offers opportunities for continued contact
with the target of his violence where she may be unprotected and where violence and coercion
can continue."); Fischer et al., supra; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment
of Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317 (1990); Lisa G. Lerman,
Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
27. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2158; Grillo, supra note 26, at 1582-83; Hart,
supra note 26, at 320; Lerman, supra note 26, at 104. A number of mediation programs have devel-
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of individual victims and batterers may fail to represent society's substantial
interest in preventing domestic violence."
The debate between advocates of formal and informal methods of inter-
vention in domestic violence cases fails to address some of the concerns that
are of greatest importance to many battered women. 9 These concerns illumi-
nate Peacemaking's potential benefits for some battered women." The most
important of these concerns is the ability of domestic violence intervention
strategies to realize change in the material and social conditions that foster
battering. Material conditions are implicated both in women's vulnerabil-
ity to battering and in understanding why some men batter women they
purport to love.3'
The prevalence of violence in women's lives is both reflective of women's
subordinate status and constitutive of that status. Widely held misogynist
beliefs offer rationales for individual acts of battering.32 The phenomenon
of violence in women's lives contributes to women's marginalization eco-
nomically,33 politically, and socially both through the effects of battering on
oped methods designed to deal with the concerns raised in domestic violence cases. See generally
Allan Edward Barsky, Issues in the Termination of Mediation Due to Abuse, 13 MEDIATION Q. 19, (1995);
Jessica Pearson, Mediating When Domestic Violence Is a Factor: Policies and Practices in Court-Based
Divorce Mediation Programs, 14 MEDIATION Q. 319 (1997). For a discussion of concerns regarding
Peacemaking expressed by battered women's advocates in the Navajo Nation, see infra Part II.
28. See Astor, supra note 26, at 163 (explaining that because mediation "embodies the
qualities of the private..-"intimate, confidential, consensual, caring"-it reinscribes domestic vio-
lence as a private problem).
29. I do not, argue that Peacemaking is always and for all purposes superior to formal adju-
dication or that formal adjudication is always and for all purposes superior to Peacemaking. In theory
and in practice, each process has both benefits and pitfalls. Some aspects of Peacemaking, conducted
with procedural safeguards that I will describe, may better meet some needs of some battered women
than do formal processes such as civil protection orders and criminal prosecutions. Also, Peace-
making illuminates some of the difficulties that face women in the predominant legal domestic
violence interventions (civil protection orders and criminal adjudication), and aspects of Peace-
making practice provide partial responses to some of the problems they face in other informal
adjudication practices.
30. See infra Part I.C.
31. My analysis gives no primacy to legal interventions but presumes that legal strate-
gies, like other strategies, should be subjected to a rigorous weighing of costs and benefits. In some
respects, this is an argument for the primacy of process, for regardless of their names, programs are
better if they make more resources available to more women. See Kathleen Waits, Battered Women
and Their Children: Lessons from One Woman's Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 29, 74-75 (1998) (arguing
that "process counts" because "[t]he depression, guilt, and low self-esteem observed in some battered
women are often by-products of the ineffective, disempowering responses from the people to whom
victims turn for help").
32. See generally David Adams, Treatment Models of Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis,
in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 176 (Kersti Y116 & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
33. See generally Jody Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: The Unexplored Bar-
rier to Employment, 3 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 29 (1995) [hereinafter Raphael, The Unexplored
Barrier] (describing how abusive men sabotage the efforts of women to move from welfare to work);
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women's physical and emotional health34 and through the effects on women's
ability to pursue career and educational opportunities.35 The aim of domestic
violence intervention, therefore, should be liberation,36 and the question to
ask of any proposed intervention is whether it can, for some women, pro-
vide resources that enhance the possibility of liberation and increase women's
37
autonomy.
Jody Raphael, Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare
Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201 (1996) [hereinafter Raphael, Feminist Theory of Welfare
Dependency]; Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: A Major Cause of Homelessness, Special Issue, 25
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421 (1991) (explaining that battering is a significant cause of homelessness
among women).
34. See generally MARY ANN DUTTON, EMPOWERING AND HEALING THE BATTERED
WOMAN (1992) (arguing that women's experiences of abuse are mediated by their life situation);
JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 175-96 (1992); Lenore E.A. Walker, Battered
Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1992) (describ-
ing the post-traumatic stress that some battered women experience as a result of abuse).
35. See, e.g., Raphael, Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, supra note 33, at 205 (describ-
ing the impact on health care resources and on lost work productivity).
36. Liberation does not necessarily mean the woman will choose to leave the batterer.
Rather, interventions are more or less liberating depending on whether they put material, spiri-
tual, and social resources in women's hands. See infra Part 1.C.3 (discussing how prominent domestic
violence legal interventions frequently emphasize separation from the batterer and offer little
support to women who "fail" to separate).
37. By liberation and autonomy I do not mean to connote the classical liberal understandings
of liberty, or at least I do not mean only that. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT,
NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (1990) (asserting that
positive liberty, often referred to as "autonomy, " involves something more than the absence of
interference by others that is associated with negative liberty). Rather, I refer to the social condi-
tions required for the maximization of individual choice, recognizing that one of the requisite
social conditions is that of community and that individual choice is never truly individual, but rather
relational. This relational nature of choice may be especially true in the lives of many women.
As Martha Mahoney notes, "[tiheoretical work on motherhood can help reveal the ways agency is
not merely either individual or collective in the traditional, political sense, but also shared .... The
struggles of women with children are not comprehensible within any idea of agency that looks
only to any woman's atomistic needs and actions." Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression?
Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE
DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 59, 68-69 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk
eds., 1994). Increasing women's autonomy, therefore, envisions a positive version of both the
state's obligations to its citizens and the individual's obligations to her neighbors. See Kenneth
Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan's Plea, the Empty State, the City of Richmond, and the
Profession, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989, 996 (criticizing the "idea that rights, of whatever status, must
be purely negative barriers to others' actions, rather than affirmations of obligatory response").
Autonomy is expanded by the creation of social conditions that, to the greatest extent possible,
provide care for others and are likely to foster caring and ethical behavior towards others. See NEL
NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 79-80
(1984) (describing how morality requires both the "natural caring" feeling when we care for someone
because we want to and the commitment to care, the "I must," which draws on our "best picture[s]
of ourselves caring and being cared for") [hereinafter NODDINGS, CARING]. Thus, "moral evil
consists in inducing, sustaining, or failing to relieve ... conditions [of pain, separation, and help-
lessness]." NEL NODDINGS, WOMEN AND EVIL 229 (1989) [hereinafter NODDINGS, WOMEN AND
EVIL]. I do not minimize the importance of negative rights or formal equality. Braithwaite and
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While battering is a phenomenon of gender subordination, it may also
be a function of racism, poverty, and conquest." If feminist anti-domestic
violence work is to be liberatory, it must recognize the importance of these
intersections in women's lives.39 Ignoring the importance of these oppressive
structures in the lives of battered women results in interventions that
Pettit describe "dominion," a republican and negative sense of liberty that I believe to be necessary
but not sufficient for expanding battered women's autonomy. See BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra,
at 85. (I confess to finding "dominion" to be an unfortunate choice of terms, both because of its
association with monarchical rule and because The Dominion, as every Trekkie knows, are the
bad guys in Star Trek: Deep Space Nine.) Braithwaite and Pettit define dominion as "the social status
you perfectly enjoy when you have no less a prospect of liberty than anyone else in your society
and when it is common knowledge among you and others that this is so." Id. In addition, "you
must have the largest prospects of liberty compatible with that [of] equality." Id. Dominion, with
its embedded concept of equal treatment and maximum noninterference, is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for expanding autonomy for battered women. If I am hungry, the fact that
everyone else is also hungry does not diminish (by much) the ways in which starvation limits my
autonomy. Finally, it must be recognized that promoting autonomy requires a political commit-
ment to social justice. "This political commitment requires people in privileged places to examine
their own position .... [It] requires self-examination, not empathy[, and the] willingness to join
in political solidarity with their fellow citizens to create more egalitarian institutions that will
erode the positions of privilege that they now enjoy." Dorothy E. Roberts, Sources of Commitment
to Social Justice, 4 ROGER WMS. U. L. REV. 175, 196 (1998) (footnote omitted).
38. See infra Parts I.A, I.C.l.b.
39. As critical race feminist scholars have demonstrated, such an understanding is impor-
tant in evaluating the effectiveness of domestic violence interventions for women of color. See,
e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
The problem is not simply that women who dominate the antiviolence movement are
different from women of color but that they frequently have power to determine, either
through material or rhetorical resources, whether the intersectional differences of women
of color will be incorporated at all into the basic formulation of policy.
Id. at 1265. For example, the implicit understanding of "client" that informs funding decisions
and service program delivery is frequently white. An example of this understanding is found in
Crenshaw's now well-known story of a monolingual Spanish-speaking woman who was denied
housing in a battered women's shelter because of her inability to participate in the English-
language group counseling sessions. See id. at 1262-64. The shelter's emphasis on a woman's psy-
chological needs in response to battering creates an implicit normative description of "battered
woman." This normative battered woman faces no significant oppression other than that of batter-
ing; hence her primary problems, after safety, are psychological. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 595 (1990) (describing the "nuance
theory" in "dominance feminist theory" that presumes the commonality of all women while describ-
ing differences as "a matter of 'context' or 'magnitude,' that is, nuance"). "The problem with nuance
theory is that if black women are defined as 'different,' white women quietly become the norm, or
pure, essential woman." Id. The assumption in such a program is that services designed for
"battered women" are there for those who "but for the battering" would not need services at all.
Mahoney describes this kind of reasoning in the compromises in the welfare reform legislation.
See Martha Mahoney, Presentation at the American Assocation of Law Schools National Meeting
(Jan. 1997). Thus the struggles and context that define the lives of women of color and poor
women are not the focus of intervention because they have already been understood as problems
separate from the battering experience.
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ultimately fail the women whose lives are most affected by those structures:
poor women and women of color.40
It is also important to recognize the relationship of battering to poverty,
racism, and conquest in the lives of some men who batter.4 Feminist schol-
arship must explore this connection for several reasons. Interventions that
recognize oppressive structures in the lives of battering men may discourage
some men from battering. Further, both men and women experience racist
and economic oppression. To ignore racist and economic oppression in the
lives of men who batter is to ignore their importance in the lives of battered
women. Finally, recognition of oppressive structures in the lives of batterers
is important because many battered women seek that recognition.2
40. The concern that formal adjudication fails to meet the needs of poor women and women
of color is hardly new. Nor is the criticism that many reform efforts designed to serve battered
women fail to place the needs of poor women and women of color at the center of analysis. See, e.g.,
Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1262-65. See generally Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas
by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 231 (1994) [hereinafter Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas]; Jenny Rivera, Intimate Partner
Violence Strategies: Models for Community Participation, 50 ME. L. REV. 283 (1998) [hereinafter
Rivera, Intimate Partner Violence Strategies]; Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the
Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y
463, 505 (1996) [hereinafter Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act] ("While some supporters
have argued that mandatory arrest is itself an empowering mechanism, the lack of information on the
experiences of women of color with mandatory arrest policies, belies reliance on prior evaluations
of mandatory arrest practices and procedures." (footnote omitted)). For further discussion, see gen-
erally Angela Browne, Reshaping the Rhetoric: The Nexus of Violence, Poverty, and Minority Status in the
Lives of Women and Children in the United States, 3 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 17 (1995), Lisa
R. Green, Homeless and Battered: Women Abandoned by a Feminist Institution, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
169 (1991) (arguing that battered women's shelters employ essentialist understandings of "battered
woman" to refuse assistance to homeless women who are battered), Peter Margulies, Representation
of Domestic Violence Survivors as a New Paradigm of Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and
Voice, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071 (1995) (describing the failure of poverty law programs to focus
on assisting battered women), and Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Vio-
lence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1311 (1991). This elision of context and the existence of an implicit battered woman norm that
is white and (often) nonpoor may be most apparent in legal interventions. A strange disjuncture may
exist between the lives of many women assisted (or seen) by legal institutions and the framework
that legal actors in those institutions bring to understanding the women they see.
41. Despite the disproportionate number of men of color and poor men charged with misde-
meanor domestic violence, much of judicial training on domestic violence speaks in gender-only
terms. This focus fails to explore the role that antipoor bias and racism might play in the lives of men
who batter. It also fails to explore the role poverty and racism play in the criminal justice process-
ing of domestic violence cases. See, e.g., Raphael, Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, supra
note 33, at 226 (arguing for the importance of assisting poor men in efforts to assist poor battered
women). See generally Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the Welfare
Reform Debate, 19 LAW & POL'Y 205 (1997).
42. Recognition of interlocking systems of oppression is also important if the battered
women's movement is to build alliances with other progressive political work. See generally Mary
Louise Fellows & Sherene Razack, The Race to Innocence: Confronting Hierarchical Relations Among
Women, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 335 (1998) (arguing that hierarchal systems of oppression are
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In this Article, I engage in two simultaneous levels of analysis of Peace-
making: an empirical study of the current practice and the meaning of that
practice for battered women in the Navajo Nation, and an examination of
the theoretical possibilities of Peacemaking practice both within the Navajo
locale and elsewhere.43 Drawing on the insights of feminist and critical race
feminist44 scholarship, I argue that Peacemaking's process may provide bene-
fits for some battered women that are largely unavailable in formal adjudica-
tion.45 First, Peacemaking has the potential to disrupt social and familial
interlocking and mutually supporting). Such progressive political work includes economic justice
work, Native American rights work, and antiracism work. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 40, at
1078-81 (finding that New Left poverty scholars ignore the relation between women's material
resources and gender oppression within families); Meier, supra note 41, at 205 (arguing for a syn-
thesizing of the battered women's movement's focus on interpersonal justice with the antipoverty
movement's recognition of the larger social causes of poverty). Formal criminal processes are success-
ful for some women, while informal processes work for others. In addition, the two are not mutually
exclusive. See infra note 411 and accompanying text (noting that domestic violence protection orders
are sometimes maintained while Peacemaking takes place).
43. As Carole Goldberg points out, it is dangerous to assume that a practice so dependent
on a Navajo world view can be transplanted elsewhere. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Overex-
tended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REv. 1003 (1997).
I do not argue that Navajo Peacemaking as practiced can simply be lifted and used in a different
locale. While Peacemaking's application to other settings is not the focus of this Article, it may
be that some of the benefits of Peacemaking could be realized in other settings. This underscores
a central theme of this Article: It is a mistake to assume that universal practices will work in every
locale or for every woman. That is not to say that commonalities do not exist or that people from
different locales cannot learn from each other. But local advocates must examine their particular
political and cultural dynamics, as well as the needs of the women in their community, to determine
the interventions that are likely to work best. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Supreme Court
of the Navajo Nation as well as James Zion, solicitor general for the Navajo Nation, have argued
for Peacemaking's generalizability to other contexts. See, e.g., An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse,
supra note 21, at 169; Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii, supra note 21, at 124; Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra
note 21, at 178-79; Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 425-26. Others have argued that community
group conferencing, similar in some respects to Peacemaking, is an appropriate process for domestic
violence cases. See generally Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1.
44. While critical race feminist theory might be described as an example of feminist theory
or as an example of critical race theory, I think it important to distinguish it from the two. Critical
race feminist analysis "emphasize[s] conscious considerations of the intersection of race, class, and
gender by placing them at the center of analysis." ADRIEN KATHERINE WING, CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM: A READER 4 (1997). This approach is a correction to the way in which the concerns of
women of color are sometimes overlooked in critical race theory analysis and are equally missing
in some feminist discourse. See id. at 3.
45. This is not an argument against the use of formal adjudication or against the use of crimi-
nal procedures. Indeed, some peacemakers rely on the availability of such mechanisms to encourage
offender cooperation. See infra note 504 and accompanying text. Formal adjudication is an impor-
tant resource for some battered women. See, e.g., JoAnn L. Miller & Amy C. Krull, Controlling
Domestic Violence: Victim Resources and Police Intervention, in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEM-
PORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 235, 244, 251 (Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L.
Jasinski eds., 1997) (explaining that in a study of the effects of women's resources on domestic
violence recidivism after police intervention, the majority of women reported that police inter-
vention made them feel safer and made the barterer fear future consequences of his violence).
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supports for battering by addressing both systemic and personal-responsibility
aspects of battering.46 Second, the use of Peacemaking may benefit some
battered women through the use of traditional Navajo stories. Navajo stories
with gender antisubordination themes may change the way in which the
batterer and his family understand battering,47 and they thus have the poten-
tial to restructure familial relationships that support battering." Third, unlike
the normative practices of many legal institutions that routinely process
domestic violence cases, Peacemaking may avoid the cultural and legal focus
on the necessity of a woman's commitment to separating from her abuser49
and the tendency towards gender essentialism in legal strategies to end domes-
tic violence."0
In Part II, using data from Peacemaking files as well as interviews with
peacemakers, family court judges, and Navajo Nation anti-domestic vio-
lence advocates, I examine Peacemaking in light of criticisms that are often
directed at methods of informal adjudication. I group the problems bat-
tered women face in informal adjudication into four types:, the coercion
problem, the cheap-justice problem, the normative problem, and the
communitarian/social-change problem. The coercion problem refers both to
forced participation in informal adjudicatory processes (e.g., mandatory
mediation) and to coercive tactics used within processes. The cheap-justice
problem refers to the tendency in informal adjudication, particularly in
restorative justice processes such as victim-offender mediation and family
46. See infra Part I.C. 1.
47. See infra Part 1.C.2.
48. Peacemaking may have other potential benefits that I do not fully address, including its
spiritual nature. The Peacemaking process begins with a prayer that invokes divine assistance and
imbues the process with a seriousness and sacredness that may encourage honest and sincere behavior
by its participants. See An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 21, at 165; Interview with
Raymond Austin, supra note 14 (explaining that prayer is used in Peacemaking because prayer
helps to purify one's mind so that one can focus on the problems at hand). I do not suggest that
spiritual concerns are limited to the Native American context. See Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice
as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 40-43 (1997) (describing the traditionally
important aspect of spirituality in African American communities and its relevance in community
involvement in crime control and reintegration of the offender).
49. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 61-63 (1991); see also Mahoney, supra note 37, at 73-81.
50. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1257, 1260; Harris, supra note 39, at 585-86;
Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P. Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of Indigenous
Women in the United States, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69, 88-96 (1995) (criticizing feminist criticisms
of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), for their failure to recognize the importance
of tribal sovereignty to Indian women).
51. By "informal adjudication" I refer collectively to practices for resolution of grievances
other than Anglo-styled courtroom practices, including mediation that originates in civil disputes
as well as restorative justice processes in criminal cases.
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group conferencing, to overemphasize the value of offender apology.52 The
normative problem, most often described in critiques of mediation, refers to
the interplay of two processes: the presence of unspoken informal rules that
shape participant behavior and the ideology of mediator and norm
neutrality.53 These two phenomena separately and in combination implicitly
normalize (or "domesticate"54) battering behaviors. While many scholars
have discussed the problems with coercion, cheap justice, and norms, the
communitarian/social-change problem is seldom addressed in critiques of
informal adjudication.55 I refer here to the difficulty of connecting individ-
ual acts of oppression (i.e., battering) with the community's responsibility
both for maintaining battering behavior and for fashioning remedies for the
victim.
I conclude that the current practice in Navajo Peacemaking provides
partial answers to the cheap-justice and normative problems and is some-
what successful in addressing the social-change problem. Current Navajo
Peacemaking practice presents significant coercion problems for some bat-
tered women, however, and this is particularly true in self-referred cases."
These coercion problems may be ameliorated by some procedural remedies
that I propose. 7 Finally, drawing on Eric Yamamoto's model for intergroup
race apologies as well as Peacemaking theory, I suggest the shape of an ideal
52. See infra Part II.B.
53. See infra Part II.C. Both separately and in combination these two phenomena implicitly
normalize battering behaviors. The informal rules that stress future orientation, compromise, and
problem solving tend to punish battered women who insist that recognition of battering is relevant
to both the process of mediation and the substantive agreements reached. The ideology of mediator-
and norm-neutrality forecloses the possibility that the mediator will overtly label battering as bad
behavior or insist on its moral relevancy to the issues at hand.
54. See Sara Cobb, The Domestication of Violence in Mediation, 31 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 397 (1997).
55. Thus, Peacemaking may suggest a process that, as Elizabeth Schneider argues, is needed
in feminist theory: simultaneously appreciating both the particular situation of battered women
and the 'general,' linking violence against women to women's subordination within society and
to more general social problems of abuse of power and control." Elizabeth M. Schneider, Par-
ticularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 527 (1992).
Restorative justice literature emphasizes the importance of community involvement in the
criminal process but seldom identifies the nature of that involvement or the role of community in
crime creation and maintenance. Cf. Paul McCold, Restorative Justice and the Role of Community,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 85, 89 (arguing that
the restorative justice emphasis on individual offenders and victims "may divert attention from the
root causes that continuously produce [crime]").
56. See infra notes 377-406 and accompanying text. Self-referred cases are those that are
initiated directly by a petitioner rather than referred by court. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 3.1, 3.2, in
JAMES W. ZION & NELSON J. MCCABE, NAVAJO PEACEMAKER COURT MANUAL 104-05 (1982)
(providing that any person who has been "injured, hurt or aggrieved by the actions of another" may
request Peacemaking).
57. See infra notes 407-411 and accompanying text.
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informal adjudication process for domestic violence cases. In an Appen-
dix following the Conclusion, I address two limitations of this research:
imperialism-related concerns and empirical concerns.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN PEACEMAKING
A. Women, Gender, Conquest, and Domestic Violence in the
Navajo Nation
The material, psychological and spiritual circumstances of Navajo
people-circumstances that are a direct result of colonization-are related
to both the occurrence of domestic violence and women's responses to such
violence.58 Colonization has diminished Navajo women's social and eco-
nomic status. This diminishment in status combined with material depriva-
tion and the subordination of Navajo cultural and political life creates
social conditions that foster domestic violence.
U.S. policy has diminished the status of Navajo women through both
direct and indirect means. Direct attacks on women's status include govern-
ing policies that privilege male tribal members over female members59 and
federal aid to religious institutions that promote male authority.' Indirect
attacks on women's status include land management policies that diminish
58. 1 do not argue that colonization's effects provide a total explanation for the occurrence
of domestic violence. Indeed, the relationship of domestic violence to subordination is very difficult
to delineate. Nor am I arguing that the Navajo context is unique vis-a-vis women's status or the
experience of violence against women. Navajo women continue to enjoy a much higher social
status than do many women in the world, and, as I discuss later, traditional Navajo culture is largely
based on notions of gender egalitarianism and is matrifocal. This is not an argument that Indian
people or Navajos, in particular, are peculiarly vulnerable to the existence of domestic violence.
In fact, domestic violence appears to be widespread throughout the world. See infra note 184. For
a more thorough discussion of Navajo gender relations, see generally EMILY BENEDEK, BEYOND
THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE WORLD: A NAVAJO WOMAN'S JOURNEY (1996), LOUISE LAMPHERE,
To RUN AFTER THEM: CULTURAL AND SOCIAL BASES OF COOPERATION IN A NAVAJO
COMMUNITY (1977), Nancy Bonvillain, Gender Relations in Native North America, 13 AM.
INDIAN CULTURE RES. J. 1 (1989), Rose Johnson/Tsosie, Our Testimonies Will Carry Us Through,
in SURVIVING IN TWO WORLDS: CONTEMPORARY NATIVE AMERICAN VOICES 93 (Jay Leibold
ed., 1997), and Mary Shepardson, The Gender Status of Navajo Women, in WOMEN AND POWER IN
NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 159 (Laura F. Klein & Lillian A. Ackerman eds., 1995).
59. See infra Part L.A (discussing legislation and policies that diminished Navajo women's
status).
60. Religiously affiliated boarding schools, for example, received federal funding to "educate"
Navajo children. Much of the training in many of these schools related to "appropriate" gender
roles. See PATRICIA PENN HILDEN, WHEN NICKELS WERE INDIANS: AN URBAN, MIXED-BLOOD
STORY 167 (1995) (noting that fully half of the prescribed boarding school curriculums was
devoted to teaching appropriate gender roles).
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the economic importance of women's work,61 education policies that result
in the devaluation of clan and kin relationships, and policies that burden or
outlaw native religious practices in which women often play significant
leadership roles. The result is greater reliance on federal assistance, fre-
quently unavailable or underpaid wage labor, and a disruption in the family
and clan relationships that define obligations and often serve to protect
62
women.
Traditional Navajo culture is a "partnership society '63 in which "com-
plementary [gender] roles arise from the deepest traditional beliefs tribal
people hold about how they were created and should function in the
universe."' 4 The political and social manifestation of this belief in gender
complementariness, as evidenced by the relatively important status of women
and children, was particularly troubling to early European colonizers, who
61. For example, U.S. federal land allotment policies required that male heads of house-
holds hold title to family lands. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life
of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 301 n.56 (1998).
The term "allotment" refers to the late nineteenth century policy under which reserva-
tion land was allotted to individual heads of families, with the excess or "surplus" lands
not needed for allotment opened to settlement. In this way, the policy was designed
both to encourage tribal people to assimilate by breaking their attachment to communal
land ownership and turning them into farmers and ranchers and by making tribal land
available for settlement by non-Indians. Although this policy was repudiated in the
Indian Reorganization Act, over 27 million acres of tribal land was lost to tribal or Indian
ownership. As a result, the majority of residents of some reservations are non-Indians.
Id. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (tracing the
history of allotment).
62. See, e.g., Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 411-13 (explaining that clan relationships and
a matrilocal tradition of living ensured a balance of power between men and women who lived
together).
63. See Shepardson, supra note 58, at 174; see also Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 9 ("[Among
the Navajo,] [glender equality in labor, prestige and social valuation was consistent with mutual
interdependence and fluidity in roles. Intra-familial violence was minimal. Women were pro-
tected by the presence of their kin within the settlement."); Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 412
(explaining how traditional Navajo matrilocal living arrangements, "women's property ownership
and control, [and] the mother's determinative role in tracing ancestry" are evidence of gender
equality in traditional Navajo culture).
64. Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 50, at 93; see also CLYDE KLUCKHOHN &
DOROTHEA LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO 311 (rev. ed. 1974) ("[Elverything exists in two parts, the
male and the female, which belong together and complete each other."); An Interview with Philmer
Bluehouse, supra note 21, at 162 ("We believe that there is a male and a female existence in
everything, that within protons, neutrons, electrons or even within emptiness, those dual beings
exist."). While some would describe male-female complementariness as the central paradigm for
Navajo h6zh6, other scholars would place the mother-child relationship in this role. See Shepardson,
supra note 58, at 173 ("'The k'e that exists between mother and child provides the foundational
concepts and forms for all relationships in Navajo social life."' (quoting GARY WITHERSPOON,
NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 125-26 (1975))).
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frequently set out to instill male-female and parent-child hierarchies.65 The
emphasis on male authority remained central to U.S. policy. While the process
of colonization and the concomitant disempowerment of Navajo women is
ongoing, three events in the history of U.S.-Navajo relations bear particular
attention: the capture, forced march, and internment of Navajo people in
Fort Sumner in 1864; the imposed livestock reduction of the 1930s; and the
mandatory schooling of Navajo children in boarding schools. These three
events serve as cultural markers for many Navajo-moments in which their
injuries are concrete and quantifiable.66 Each marks a significant downward
shift in the status of Navajo women. Together these events and their after-
math illustrate the effects of U.S. colonization and the subsequent material
and spiritual harms to Navajo people.
"During the spring of 1864, more than 7,00067 Navajo men, women,
and children were driven like cattle across the ... plains of New Mexico to
Fort Sumner, where ... [they were] prisoners for four long years-four years
65. See PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED Hoop: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN
AMERICAN INDIAN TRADITIONS 32 (1986) (explaining that contemporary sources complained of
the "petticoat" government of the Cherokee, in which the Women's Council was powerful and
the penalty for killing a woman was double that of killing a man). Jesuit missionary Friar Paul Le
Jeune described the changes necessary to make the Montagnais-Naskapi proper French subjects:
The men must gain authority over their women, parents must use physical punishment with their
children, and the (male) leaders of the tribe must command obedience and respect out of fear. See
id. at 38-40. For the Navajo, this included the criminalization of plural marriages, which were
designed to protect women. See Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 411 (explaining that plural
marriages occurred when it was not feasible to enact the usual matrilocal living arrangements, and
that if the man married his wife's sisters or his widowed mother-in-law, it ensured that his wife's
family would be cared for and that his wife would not be outnumbered in her husband's house).
66. See, e.g., Conversation with Justice Raymond Austin, in Canyon de Chelley, Ariz.
(Summer 1995) (describing Kit Carson's pursuit of Navajo hiding in Canyon de Chelley); Inter-
view with Peggy Bird & Jennifer Skeet, supra note 17 (describing the harm created by generations
of boarding school parents); Interview with Gloria Champion, supra note 17; Interview with Leo
Natani, supra note 12 (discussing his family's stories regarding incarceration in Fort Sumner and
the devastation of alcoholism). The importance of federal policies on livestock reduction was made
apparent in the number of Peacemaking files involving family disputes over limited grazing permits.
See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
67. There may be some disagreement about the number. Compare Lenore A. Stiffarm & Phil
Lane, Jr., The Demography of Native North America: A Question of American Indian Survival, in THE
STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 23, 34 (M. Annette
Jaimes ed., 1992) (noting that 9000 Navajo surrendered and were force-marched more than 300
miles to a site near Fort Sumner), with MARIE MITCHELL, THE NAVAJO PEACE TREATY, 1868, at
78 (1973) (noting that 7000 Navajo were forced to march to Fort Sumner). The differences are
explained in part by the fact that, once begun, the march was joined by many Navajo who were
forced to surrender or face starvation. See id. at 74-76; see also DAVID F. ABERLE, THE PEYOTE RELIG-
ION AMONG THE NAVAHO 25 (2d ed. 1982) (stating that by 1864, 8000 Navajo had made the trek
to Fort Sumner).
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of hardships, disease, and near starvation.. .,6. The conditions inside Fort
Sumner were brutal.69 It was winter and the fort had no shelters for the
Navajo and very little food.7" As a result, as many as 3500 Navajo died in the
fort.7 The Peace Treaty of 186872 allowed the Navajo to return home, but
to a land whose size had been seriously diminished. 3 The treaty also provided
a limited franchise to Navajo men, but not to women.7 ' After the return
from Fort Sumner, tribal economic and political life were largely controlled
by the United States. The imposed Anglo judicial and tribal council systems
68. MITCHELL, supra note 67, at 74. This incarceration followed Kit Carson's campaign to
locate and force the surrender of those Navajo in hiding. See ABERLE, supra note 67, at 25.
Carson was acting under the direction of General Stephen W. Kearney. See MITCHELL, supra note
67, at 74. Many people hid in the canyons and caves of Canyon de Chelley, Arizona. The
canyon offered a great deal of protection because there was only one narrow path that led to its
narrow floor. In this way, the Navajo had successfully repulsed soldiers in the past. In an effort to
starve the Navajo out of hiding, Carson ordered the soldiers to burn their crops, chop down their
fruit trees, and slaughter their livestock. Many Navajo decided to surrender rather than starve,
only to find that conditions in the site of removal, Fort Sumner, were not appreciably better. See
id. at 78-89.
The Navajo had been involved in warfare against the Spanish colonists for over 200 years at
the time of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848. There was no pan-Navajo leadership, and
groups of Navajo gained additional livestock by raiding wealthy Mexican landowners. Mexican
landowners also raided Navajo communities, and Navajo raids sometimes centered on freeing Navajo
who had been sold as slaves in the market in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Following the Treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the U.S. government began to attempt to control Navajo raiding. While this
provided the excuse for Navajo removal, the more important reason probably lies in the discovery
of rich mineral deposits in Navajo land. See MITCHELL, supra note 67, at 29.
69. See MITCHELL, supra note 67, at 78-89.
70. See Stiffarm & Lane, supra note 67, at 34. Though representatives of the U.S. govern-
ment had promised that food, shelter, and farming tools awaited them, this was not the case. The
first winter, people were forced to dig holes in the ground and cover themselves with bits of tent
and other scraps to protect themselves from the bitter cold. See id. It appears that Kit Carson
suspected as much. In order to encourage his men's efforts, he at one time offered them the
privilege of selling the women and children captured as slaves to wealthy Mexican landholders, a
practice initiated by the Spanish and, at that time, in place for over 100 years. Carson reasoned
that slavery was a better lot than what awaited the Navajo at Fort Sumner. See MITCHELL, supra
note 67, at 67.
71. See Stiffarm & Lane, supra note 67, at 34. The memory of Fort Sumner is still alive for
many Navajo. One peacemaker related how his grandfather reported that starvation inside the fort
forced people to look in horse droppings for corn kernels to eat. See Interview with Leo Natani,
supra note 12.
72. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, Aug.
12, 1866, U.S.-Navajo Nation, 15 Stat. 667.
73. See ABERLE, supra note 67, at 25. Aberle writes that "[b]etween 1863 and 1868, [the
Navajo] had passed from prosperity and independence to the cramped, hungry, and unhealthy
conditions of Fort Sumner, and on to the poverty and freedom of the return to Navaho land." Id.
74. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians,
supra note 72, art. X (providing that "[n]o future treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the
[Navajo] reservation.., shall be of any validity. . . unless agreed to and executed by at least
three-fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying or interested in the same").
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"did not support the high position of Navajo women.""5 Census reports listed
men as "heads of household," despite the Navajo matrilineal system of prop-
erty76 and matrifilial system of living arrangements.77 In the subsequent
"allotment period" in which the United States carved up Indian land into
individual parcels, most of the allocations went to these male "heads of
household."78 As Jo Carillo writes, the result was not merely a change in tribal
landholding patterns.
Relying as it did on the "family head" provision to distribute land par-
cels, the allotment legislation allowed the United States to insinuate
itself into the tribal social fabric by systematically privileging tribal
males over tribal females. This designation further destabilized tribal
traditions, particularly female-centered ones, and it gradually allowed
the pluralistic and gender-inclusive ways that many Native American
peoples had used in their processes of self-government to slip from
79practice, if not memory.
The confinement to a limited land mass coupled with the Navajo
economic reliance on sheep herding0 set the stage for 'the most devastating
75. Shephardson, supra note 58, at 174 ("After the Treaty of 1868, the new federal
authority did not support the high position of Navajo women."). Aberle notes that "[t]he picture
that emerges from agents' reports is one of the gradual replacement of traditional leaders by police,
courts, and the agent himself." ABERLE, supra note 67, at 34. Rather than a system of indirect
rule, the "[U.S. government] agent became the super-ordinate political figure." Id. In 1923, the
United States imposed a tribal council system. If the people refused to elect members, the Secretary
of the Interior simply appointed someone. See id. at 42. Navajo women were not given the vote
until 1928. See id.
76. See id. at 161.
Inheritance operates according to matrilineal principles. This means that a man's relatives
in the maternal line-his own siblings, his mother, his mother's sisters and brothers, and
her sisters' children-take precedence over his wife and his own children .... A woman's
children and other relatives in the maternal line take precedence over her spouse.
Id.
77. See LAMPHERE, supra note 58, at 81 (stating that the Navajo expressed a preference that
young couples reside with the woman's family); Shephardson, supra note 58, at 174. For example,
current family law provisions of the Navajo Nation Code provide less protection for women than
was the case under traditional law when property rights passed exclusively through the female
line. See Genevieve Chato & Christine Conte, Rights of American Indian Women, in WESTERN
WOMEN: THEIR LAND, THEIR LIVES 229, 234 (Lillian Schlissel et al. eds., 1988). The authors
describe a case in which a woman requested in divorce proceedings a one-half interest in a hogan
built on her husband's family's land. Traditional law would have accorded her 100% of the value
of the property, but the trial judge refused her even half. The judge's ruling was overturned on
appeal, and the woman was awarded half the value of the hogan. See id. at 235-36.
78. See Shephardson, supra note 58, at 174.
79. Jo Carillo, Tribal Governance/Gender, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 205, 206
(Jo Carillo ed., 1998).
80. See ABERLE, supra note 67, at 31-32 (describing various accounts of per capita sheep
ownership, all of which are considerable). Aberle notes that had the Navajo remained restricted
to the Treaty of 1868's land provisions, the result would have been serious deprivation. See id. at
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experience in [Navaho] history since the imprisonment at Fort Sumner' ":
the forced reduction of Navajo livestock and the grazing permit structure
that followed. In the 1930s, in response to concerns about overgrazing, the
U.S. government began a program of forced stock reduction."2 Federal
agents slaughtered sheep and goats and burned the carcasses.83 The reduc-
tion in sheep herd size and the effects of the Great Depression on Navajo
ability to sell livestock made wage labor, frequently off-reservation, increas-
ingly necessary. 4 These jobs were more readily available for men." The
federal government promised jobs in return for Navajo compliance with
stock reduction, but these jobs did not necessarily go to those who had lost
stock," and, though many women were stock owners, all of the federal jobs
were for men. In addition, grazing permits were often based on livestock
registrations that were completed at sheep dipping. While many women
owned sheep, male members of their families often brought the sheep to
be dipped; as a result, female-owned sheep were frequently registered under
the names of male family members.8 Thus, the economic importance of female
labor diminished because of the strict limitations on sheep ownership coupled
28. However, the Navajo have been reasonably successful in adding land over time. See id. at 27-
28. The major setback to land accumulation occurred as a result of the General Allotment Act
(Dawes Act) of 1887 and federal allocation policies, which allotted reservation lands to individual
heads of families, restricted their sale, and granted "surplus" lands to white settlers. The result is a
"checkerboard" jurisdiction where Indian land is sometimes surrounded by non-Indian land. See
id. at 28; see also General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 388-91 (1887);
Newton, supra note 61, at 301 n.56.
81. ABERLE, supra note 67, at 53 (alteration in original) (quoting Sam Ahkeah, Chairman
of the Navajo Tribal Council from 1946 to 1954). While Aberle spells the tribal name "Navaho,"
the Navajo Nation Council has declared the Nation's official name to be "Navajo." See NATION
CODE tit. 1 § 301 (Equity 1995). Therefore, I use "Navajo" throughout this Article.
82. For a thorough description of the stages of stock reduction policies, see ABERLE, supra
note 67, at 52-108.
83. See, e.g., id. at 57. "To the Navahos this waste was appalling, and the attitude toward
their valued resources was incomprehensible." Id. Aberle paraphrases a Navajo writer to Congress,
complaining of the stock reduction policy, who asked the senators how they would feel if someone
asked them for a five-dollar bill and then burned it in front of them. See id. at 63.
84. There is little doubt that this shift decreased the economic control of women. Scholars
may disagree as to whether and how much it served to diminish women's roles in the political and
social sphere. See generally Laila Shukry Hamamsy, The Role of Women in a Changing Navaho
Society, 59 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 101 (1957) (describing the loss of status of Navajo women as
a result of colonization).
85. See Chato & Conte, supra note 77, at 238 ("The New Deal administration attempted
to ease the transition from a pastoral economy to one based on wage labor by hiring Navajos as
manual laborers for public works projects ... [but] [miost of the jobs were short-term ... and gave
preference to men.").
86. See ABERLE, supra note 67, at 56.
87. See Shepardson, supra note 58, at 174.
88. See ABERLE, supra note 67, at 66.
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with the lack of female access to wage labor.89 Further, female ownership of
sheep was undercounted and thus not always recognized in the allocation of
the grazing permits necessary for sustaining sheep herds.
The third experience described by many Navajo as central to under-
standing the current Navajo context is "the boarding school experience.""
From the late 1870s until the early 1900s, the U.S. federal government
removed Indian children, often forcibly, from their parents and sent them
hundreds of miles away to boarding schools.91 Children were often not allowed
to speak their native language, wear native dress, or engage in native religious
practices. 2 As evident in the following description given by a Navajo man,
the original ideology of "'][kill the Indian and save the man"'93 remained true
for many generations of boarding schools.
[My brothers] were gone nine months of the year, hundreds of miles
to the west, at distances I could not ever have fathomed as a child.
They had no choice. The whole intent was to destroy who and what
they were. Dine'. It was a new form of warfare.... They had only
each other. They said they never cried, not even when things got
so bad some kids escaped. Stories abounded about what happened to
some of those runaways. Frostbite, rape, gangrene, exposure deaths.94
The atmosphere was often one of repression, fear, loneliness, and the
constant fear of physical reprisal. Many children were sexually and physically
89. See Chato & Conte, supra note 77, at 238 ("Today livestock raising and farming, the
traditional bases of Navajo women's authority in the household, account for only an estimated
four percent of the Navajo income.").
90. See Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.)
(notes on file with author) ("There is so much violence [in families]; there are deep wounds and
there has been no healing done. There is a whole generation of boarding schools where the
parents did not learn any parenting skills at all and then the wounds that are intergenerational.").
91. See generally Jorge Noriega, American Indian Education in the United States: Indoctrination
for Subordination to Colonialism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION,
AND RESISTANCE, supra note 67, at 371.
92. See EDUARDO DURAN & BONNIE DURAN, NATIVE AMERICAN POSTCOLONIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1995).
The destruction of Native American families was, in part, carried out through the coerced
attendance of Native American children at boarding schools designed to forcefully
remove Native American culture. The child had to live away from the parents for the
duration of the school year and was not allowed to speak the native language or engage
in any activities that were remotely connected to the child's culture. The child was
often forced to practice Christianity and was taught that any religious belief that s/he
had from his own tribal belief system was of the devil ....
Id. at 27-28.
93. See HILDEN, supra note 60, at 152 (quoting General Richard Henry Pratt, founder of
the first and largest such boarding school).
94. IRVIN MORRIS, FROM THE GLITTERING WORLD: A NAVAJO STORY 82-83 (1997).
"Dine"' is the Navajo word for the Navajo people. See Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii, supra note 21, at 120.
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abused.95 As bitter as all of this was, the most damaging aspect of the
boarding school experience might well have been the deprivation of family
and clan life.96 Removal meant that children were deprived of the education
they would otherwise have received-an education that was related to clan
relationships and geographic place.97 Children became strangers to their
95. Indian children in boarding schools often were the victims of physical and sexual
abuse, not to mention the routine psychic abuse from rules against practicing their native religion
or speaking in their native language. See ROMA BALZER ET AL., FULL CIRCLE: COMING BACK TO
WHERE WE BEGAN 80-81 (1994). Full Circle is a training manual for domestic violence work with
Native women published by Mending the Sacred Hoop/Minnesota Program Development, Inc. In
it, one woman recalled:
My grandmother told me that when she was 12 years old (in 1901), she walked away
from the boarding school to see her parents who lived in town. The nuns viewed this as an
escape and when she was recovered from her parents she was tied to a tree in front of the
boarding school and left there. She couldn't remember for how long.
Id. at 81. Another man recounted the following:
You know, I was put in one of those schools. When I was eight, I was raped by the priest.
We all were. All of us boys. It was part of being there in that orphanage, that boarding
school. All my uncles and dad too had that happen. I just thought it was normal. It hap-
pened to everyone in my family. All the men. I don't know about the women. Do you
think it could have happened to them too[?] I know a lot of Indian guys that happened
to in all those schools.
Id.
96. The early focus of U.S. Indian education policy was clearly pacification. See Noriega,
supra note 91, at 381.
Already functional outcasts within their own societies, the circumstances of boarding
school returnees were typically exacerbated by local Indian agents who sought them out
for preferential treatment in exchange for their participation in the building of "alterna-
tive" social and governmental structures intended to undermine and eventually replace
the traditional forms possessed by their peoples.
Id. at 383. Federal authorities were anxious to develop a contingent of white-educated Indians
who would be more amenable to federal control.
97. In Navajo religious thinking, geography holds deep significance, with locales represent-
ing particular aspects of traditional stories that describe the creation of the five-fingered (earth)
people. See id. at 381. As one Ojibwe woman relates her own boarding school experience:
All my life I've searched for something and never knew what it was until I heard someone
mention "boarding school" in a public meeting at the Indian Center. Everyone got mad at
this guy and ran him out of there. I just sat there, remembering. I felt choked up as I
thought of his words, "All these troubles we have as Indian people started when we were
sent to those boarding schools." As I recalled us kids being taken away, I thought of my
baby brother who was still in diapers at the time. We never had a family life after that and
eventually we got separated from each other. As adults we found each other, but we were
never able to be close again, there were too many memories that kept us apart. We could
never talk about it. There was an indescribable emptiness that seemed to stop us from
talking. Now, I'm an old woman dying from cancer but I'm happy. I know now that I need
to talk about this. I need to talk with other Indian people about their experiences in
boarding school. I've finally found what I've been searching for, a part of me that's been
lost. I can only get that back by talking to other Indian people. No one can take my
culture away from me now. I'll get back everything I've lost and more before I die. I'll
never get my family back and that's something I've had to accept, but I will never forget.
BALZER ET AL., supra note 95, at 80-81.
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parents and grandparents, their only contact occurring during vacations or
not at all.98 Though the practice of forcible removal to boarding schools
stopped in the 1920s, Indian children continued to attend boarding schools
in significant numbers through the 1960s and 1970s.99 Thus, many Navajo
men and women now in their forties and fifties were raised primarily by
persons who were hostile and anti-Indian. 100
Navajo parents who grew up in boarding schools were often subjected
to cruel models for raising children. These models were not only abusive but
were abusive in ways that were intentionally destructive of Indian identity
and self-esteem. As explained by the director of a program for Navajo men
who batter:
[We teach battering men the difference between] [dliscipline [and]
punishment [of children.] A lot of times ... we just never really made
98. See id. at 81-82.
99. See Noriega, supra note 91, at 385. The first Indian boarding school opened in 1879 in
Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The camp was headed by Captain Richard H. Pratt. Pratt ran the school
like a military institution, forcing students to perform the physical labor required to maintain the
school, enforcing reveille and lights out, and requiring military dress and hairstyles. See id. at 381.
Family visits were severely restricted, and students were not allowed to return home, even in the
summer, but rather were required to do "vacation work." See id. By 1889, 10,500 Indian children
were in boarding schools.' See id. at 382. By 1901, the numbers had shrunk despite legislation
mandating student attendance. See id. at 383. By 1917, Congress, reluctant to allocate the money
required to assure full compliance with mandatory boarding schools, shifted policies and began to
support day schools. See id. at 384. Despite this shift in policy, many boarding schools remained
open and attendance actually increased from the 1950s to the 1960s. See id. at 385. Of 52,000
Indian children in school in 1973, more than 35,000 were in boarding schools. See id. The 1970s
saw another round of boarding school closures, decreasing the number of enrolled students. See id.
at 386.
100. See Interview with Raymond Austin, supra note 14 (describing his own lack of aware-
ness of Navajo culture as a result of his educational experience); Interview with Leo Natani, supra
note 12 (describing his own boarding school experiences); Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan
& Helen Muskett, supra note 17 (describing the intergenerational harms of abusive boarding
school experiences). The boarding school experience is only one of various campaigns, continu-
ing long after the Navajo were allowed to return from Fort Sumner, to eradicate the "Indian" in
the Indian. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN
MANIFESTO (2d ed. 1988); THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND
RESISTANCE, supra note 67. Chief Justice Yazzie writes of his own experience:
I am a product of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) boarding school education which was
so destructive of the Navajo culture. When I got out of boarding school, I was given a
ticket to California to learn a manual skill in an electronics school. They told me I could
not go to college, so I went to college.... I went to law school. When I got my law degree,
I put it to use as a trial judge in the Courts of the Navajo Nation. That returned me to
another school-the school of Navajo life. Now, I seek to reconcile my paper knowledge
with the vast knowledge that is held by my Elders ....
Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 189-90 (footnote omitted).
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a distinction. And a lot of us [are] coming from boarding school: our
parents and us and all of our children .... You know, the belts, the
paddles, the standing in the comer, [the] punishment[s].... [the] read-
ing the Bible. They know all these things. That was all built in, very
military kinds of control that they had... in the name of Christian-
ity.... that really became [a] very overt means to control, and... people
still really deal with some of those issues. 101
I spoke with many Navajo who believe that the effects of the boarding
school experience live on in the parenting practices of adult survivors. 12
They believe that the current younger generation is particularly confused
because older generations were alienated from tribal life by boarding school
experiences and were thus unable to teach Navajo history and culture to
their children." This effect is compounded by the number of parents who
were taught abusive patterns for family and intimate relationships. The result
is "a whole generation of [people growing up in] boarding schools where
101. Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note 17 (discussing their
program's work with men who batter).
102. See id.; see also Interview with Peggy Bird and Jennifer Skeet, supra note 17; Interview
with Gloria Champion, supra note 17.
103. See, e.g., Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 421.
[D]iscrimination forced alienated children to return [from boarding schools] to a society
that was then foreign to them. Estranged from their own family and culture, a lost gen-
eration of people were caught in the middle (i.e., in the middle of American and Navajo
values) and turned to alcohol and learned violence. The cycle of institutionalized vio-
lence.., continues in new generations of children who do not know their tribe's language,
culture, and religion because their parents have lost it.
Id. Many people spoke with me regarding their deep concerns for Navajo youth. As one family
court judge put it,
[Miany of the young people I see are caught in the middle. They want to be white, but they
don't know what that means. They are Native American, and they don't know what
that means. They don't have a belief system. They say they are Christian, but when you
ask them how recently they practiced their religion they say, "Well, not since I was a kid,
but my parents go all the time." Or they say they are traditional, and you ask how
recently they participated in traditional activities, and it is the same thing: "But my
parents go all the time." [I don't] know how you can live without a value system, and
that has to come from a belief system whether it's Christian or traditional or
whatever.... [Yloung people frequently don't know what it means to be a parent .... So
they sort of do what I call "the traffic signal" which is they just go whichever way the
traffic is going. If everybody else sends their kids to church, they do that. If everybody
else sends their kids to school, they do that. But they don't really have a sense about
what it means to be a parent .... Can you educate a 45 year old man? The leaders of the
Navajo Nation want to go back to traditional ways, but I don't know whether we will be
able to or not because can you change a whole generation?
Interview with Mae Horseman, supra note 13. For a more thorough discussion of cultural changes,
see infra notes 495-509 and accompanying text.
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the parents did not learn any parenting skills at all and ... the
wounds... are intergenerational."'' 4
Thus, the combination of several factors undermined the political and
economic status of Navajo women: the move to a wage economy,"05 the dis-
ruption and overt intervention in Navajo legal practices that protected
women in their relationships with husbands,"6 and the imposition and
influence of European patriarchal cultures.0 7 The effects of colonization,
including internalized racism, boarding school childhood abuse driven by a
particularly virulent racist ideology, the use of alcohol as "wages" and the
development of alcoholism as a major health issue,' and unemployment,
are "wounds to the soul"'" that may intersect Anglo-European notions
of gender dominance in the lives of some Indian men" and endanger the
104. See Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.)
(notes on file with author); see also DURAN & DURAN, supra note 92, at 27.
Beginning in the late 1800s, the U.S. government implemented policies whose effect was
the systematic destruction of the Native American family system under the guise of
educating Native Americans ... while at the same time inflicting a wound to the soul of
Native American people that is felt in agonizing proportions to this day.
Id.
105. See Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 10; Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 418-20 (describing
how the increase in a wage economy promotes domestic violence because it creates nuclear house-
holds in locations where the husband has a job, thus disrupting the matrifocal living arrangements
that protect women). In addition, wage labor creates "family conflicts over how wages will be
spent, a situation that promotes drunkenness, wife-beating, infidelity, and jealousy." Id.
106. See Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 418-20.
107. See ALLEN, supra note 65, at 38-39.
108. See M. Annette Jaimes with Theresa Halsey, American Indian Women at the Center of
Indigenous Resistance in Contemporary North America, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA: GENO-
CIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE, supra note 67, at 311, 325 (writing that "the despair
experienced by American Indians of both genders has manifested itself in the most pronounced
incidence of alcoholism of any ethnic group in the United States").
109. See DURAN & DURAN, supra note 92, at 24 ("The image which became most binding
and meaningful to the authors and to some of the other people working in other Native American
communities is the concept termed the soul wound.").
110. See Barbara Chester et al., Grandmother Dishonored: Violence Against Women by Male
Partners in American Indian Communities, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 249 (1994). Chester and her
coauthors note that in addition to alcohol, an increase in domestic violence is related to the
removal of Indian people from their ancestral lands, [the] prohibition against religious
and spiritual practices, forced removal of Indian children into foster homes and boarding
schools at a rate of 5-20 times the national average, rapid transition from hunting, gath-
ering, and subsistence farming to a cash-based economy, and a 90% reduction of the
American Indian population from the time of European contact to the establishment of
reservations.
Id. at 254. While my focus here is on Native men, it is important to note that a recent Bureau of
Justice Statistics report finds that 75% of intimate assaults reported to researchers were committed
by a non-Indian. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 8 (1999).
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women and children closest to them. Not surprisingly, many of the Navajo
battered women's advocates I spoke with discuss domestic violence in terms
that combine insights regarding the effects of ongoing colonization"' with
the more gender-focused understandings of the broader U.S. battered women's
112movement.
111. See, e.g., Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note 17 (describ-
ing the importance in work with Indian batterers of developing a positive Indian masculine identity
through the use of traditional concepts). Another battered women's advocate I spoke with explained
that alcoholism is so prevalent that some families believe that the most important criteria for
a good husband are that he not drink and that he be employed. Thus, if these things are true,
family members may dismiss domestic violence as a less important consideration. The advocate's
point was that familial experiences matter in determining what kind of support a battered woman
will receive from her family members. See Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate,
in Navajo Nation (n.d.) (notes on file with author); see also BALZER ET AL., supra note 95, at 106.
Programs offered to native men who batter their partners are most effective when they
directly address their use of violence against others and incorporate an analysis which
draws links between pre-colonial and post-colonial attitudes towards women, family, and
tribe. The impact of colonization, however, should not be used as an excuse for antiso-
cial behavior but as an illustration of how the influence of changing views of women
since colonization contributes to the use of violence against them today. Connections
should be made between the individual's use of violence within the domestic setting and
the systematic Euro-cultural violence used against native people since first contact with
colonials.
Id. at 106-07.
112. See, e.g., BALZER ET AL., supra note 95. The authors write:
Men's violence against women ... is not about a couples' [sic] failure to communicate, loss
of temper, or poor impulse control. It is not a disease or caused by alcoholism (although
drinking may be involved), it is not about low self-esteem, and it is not a demonstration
of someone loving too much. Men's use of violence and abuse is about the ability to con-
trol and abuse of that ability.
Id. at 7. The same manual notes that "few native people coming in contact with the justice
system.., recognize its processes, have contributed to its development, or are involved in its
implementation. The vast majority of Native Americans are effectively unable to participate in
any informed or influential fashion in the existing justice system." Id. at 85. While defining the
accountability of intervention programs primarily in terms of their responsiveness to victims, the
authors also write that
[there is also a place in this intervention [system] to be accountable to the abuser. To be
accountable means to create a place and an atmosphere for the abuser who is a product
of social conditioning to change, and that requires that the change opportunities avail-
able are of excellent quality, are clear, are direct, and are both compassionate and con-
frontational.
Id. at 99.
Mending the Sacred Hoop was formed in 1991 by Indian people from Minnesota, Wisconsin,
and South Dakota who wanted "'the four reservations in northeastern Minnesota to model for all
Indian people a way to confront this violence' and to 'help this generation of families so that our
children see that these verbal, physical, and sexual attacks are wrong and not the Indian way.'
Id. at 16 (quoting a staff member).
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Research and anecdotal evidence suggest that domestic violence is a
significant problem for Navajo people.' Yet there are very few shelters for
battered women and their children."4 There are few programs that provide
113. See, e.g., Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping, supra note 21, at 98 (asserting that domestic vio-
lence is one of the biggest problems in the Navajo Nation court system). For some, the injuries
may be aggravated by general poor health and inadequate medical care. See RONET BACHMAN,
DEATH AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVATION: HOMICIDE, FAMILY VIOLENCE, AND SUICIDE IN
AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATIONS 85 (1992). American Indians in general suffer much higher
rates of violent victimizations than members of any other racial or ethnic group. See GREENFELD
& SMITH, supra note 110, at 2. The average rate of violent victimization for American Indians
(men and women) is approximately two and one-half times that of the national average. See id. at 2.
The aggravated assault rate is approximately three times the national average. See id. at 3. The
nature of the violence, including the percentage committed by intimates or family members, is not
significantly different from that of the national average. See id. at 8. As is true of the general U.S.
population, the majority of victims of violent crime are men. See id. at 4. American Indians suffer
higher rates of accidental death, often vehicle related, especially among young men. See BACHMAN,
supra, at 7. Some researchers believe these accidents are better understood as suicides. See id.
Rural American Indians are victimized at rates two times that of rural whites or blacks, and those
who live in urban areas are victimized at rates three times that of urban whites. See GREENFELD &
SMITH, supra note 110, at 4-5. Forty percent of American Indians live in rural areas, compared with
18% of whites and 8% of blacks. See id. at 4.
In sharp contrast to all other racial and ethnic groups, American Indian victims are far more
likely to have been victimized by someone of a different race. See id. at 8. Some perpetrators, Indian
and non-Indian, are in authority positions vis-a-vis their role as agents of the federal government.
For example, in 1990 the U.S. House of Representatives noted in the findings that preceded an
Indian child protection bill that "multiple incidents of sexual abuse of children on Indian
reservations have been perpetrated by person[s] employed or funded by the Federal government."
H.R. REP. No. 101-876, at 1 (1990) (Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention
Act, 32 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211 (1994)). According to a recent Bureau of Justice Statistics report,
75% of American Indians victimized by an intimate and 25% victimized by a family member are
attacked by non-Indian perpetrators. See GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 110, at 8. In contrast,
generally among all races only 11% of intimate victimizations and 5% of family victimizations are
committed by someone of a different race. See id. Forty percent of all Indian homicide victims are
killed by non-Indians. See id. at 22. Some studies indicate a higher homicide rate for American
Indians than the national average, but the latest Bureau of Justice Statistics report notes that
American Indian homicide rates (per capita) are no higher than those of the general population
and that Indian homicide rates are decreasing (as are the general population's). See id. at 19. But
see Scott H. Nelson et al., An Overview of Mental Health Services for American Indians and Alaska
Natives in the 1990s, 43 HOSp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 257, 258 (1992) (reporting that the
national rate of suicide, homicide, and "accidental" death among young Native American males is
much higher than the national average); Justin Arbuckle et al., Safe at Home? Domestic Violence
and Other Homicides Among Women in New Mexico, 275 JAMA 1708e, 1708e (1996) (finding that
the rate of domestic violence homicide in New Mexico among American Indians (4.9 per
100,000) was significantly higher than that among Hispanics (1.7) and non-Hispanic whites (1.8)).
114. See Telephone Interview #2 with Peggy Bird, former Director of the Native American
Family Violence Prevention Project of DNA People's Legal Services and currently faculty/attorney/
consultant with Mending the Sacred Hoop (May 1999) (notes on file with author). Funding is
clearly one reason for the lack of resources. Funding for social services, much of it federal, has
historically focused heavily on alcohol treatment. The result, according to some, is a social service
industry that tends to understand domestic violence in alcohol treatment terms. See Telephone
Interview with Eileen Hudon, Staff Member of Mending the Sacred Hoop (Mar. 26, 1997) (notes
on file with author). Hudon who is Ojibwe, noted that since most of the money for human serv-
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legal assistance directed specifically to battered women, '1 5 and the criminal
justice system is seriously understaffed."6
In addition, battered women in the Navajo Nation must contend with
the problems that face many poor women in rural areas, including lack of
transportation and the near impossibility of hiding."7 Many rural Navajo
homes do not have telephones. One battered women's counselor described
the experience of a woman who only had access to a phone several miles away
at a chapter house." ' She had to flee her husband, walk to the chapter house,
ices from federal and tribal governments is for chemical dependency programs, the medical model
of "healing" (prevalent in the chemical dependency field) is often applied to domestic violence.
See id. Hudon notes that "We're just beginning concerted efforts [on domestic violence]. The chal-
lenge is to link the conversations [regarding chemical dependency] to a well-developed [model] and
analysis of domestic violence." Id. Many people I interviewed believed that alcohol was a con-
tributing factor in domestic violence rates. See Interview with Ruthie Alexis, supra note 12; Inter-
view with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9; Interview with Leo Natani, supra note 12; see
also Interview with Raymond Austin, supra note 14; Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan &
Helen Muskett, supra note 17. See generally infra note 249 regarding the research on alcohol use
and battering. Crime victim surveys of American Indians report that the perpetrator was under
the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the victimization in 55% of the cases, and in family
violence cases, the number of drinking perpetrators reaches 75%. See GREENFELD & SMITH, supra
note 110, at 9-10. However, the majority of these perpetrators were non-Indians. See id.
115. The DNA People's Legal Services program assists battered women in filing protection
order petitions and in family law matters, as do a handful of other programs. See Telephone Inter-
view #1 with Peggy Bird, former Director of the Native American Family Violence Prevention
Project of DNA People's Legal Services and currently faculty/attorney/consultant with Mending
the Sacred Hoop (March 1997) (notes on file with author). Federal monies available as a result of
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040, are now being used in the
Navajo Nation to develop a more coordinated community response and to encourage a stronger
criminal justice intervention. See Telephone Interview #1 with Peggy Bird, supra.
116. See Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 165 ("There are not enough police to patrol a rural
nation that is larger than nine states."). Peggy Bird believes that many abusive men scoff at the
criminal law. Bird notes that batterers are aware there is little jail space available in the Navajo
Nation. See Telephone Interview #1 with Peggy Bird, supra note 115. The Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics reports that in 1998 the Navajo Nation had jail space for 249 adults and 50 juveniles. See
GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 110, at 32-33 tbl.37. A staff of 117 operates the facilities. See id.
The Navajo Nation has a population of more than 220,000 people and covers 25,000 square miles.
See Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii, supra note 21, at 118 n.13. Incentives to "undercharge" in domestic
violence cases may be especially strong because Navajo jails are seriously overcrowded and Navajo
courts do not have jurisdiction over felony charges. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(7) (providing that tribes can only impose a sentence of up to one year and/or a $5000 fine
for any one offense). There are good reasons to mistrust the fairness of federal courts in the
treatment of Indian defendants. See infra note 562 (discussing incarceration rates of Native men).
117. See, e.g., Kathryn Fahnestock, Not in My County: Excerpts from a Report on Rural Courts
and Victims of Domestic Violence, JUDGES' J., Summer 1992, at 10, 11-14 (asserting that rural bat-
tered women face problems such as lack of anonymity, isolation, traditional attitudes about gender
roles and the shame of seeking help, poverty, bias of court personnel, and inadequate resources,
and noting that extended court hours are important because many rural women must arrange trans-
portation, child care, and safety plans before going to court).
118. See Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note 17. The chapter
house is the building where local government counsels meet.
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call the program's emergency number, and wait-alone, at night-for
someone from the program to pick her up."9 Another advocate related the
following story about a woman who lived in an isolated area with her hus-
band and their three children and whose only neighbors were his relatives.
[She] had to haul all the wood, carry the water, do all of this back-
breaking labor. Her husband would disappear for days and then he
would come home drunk and he would force her to have sex and
he would beat her. He might leave groceries, but then he leaves again.
He would let the air out of the tires so she couldn't leave. She tried
to leave him and he would follow her and bring her back.
So she sat down with him at one point and said, "I just want this
to be over and I want a divorce." She didn't even get the words out
of her mouth, he beat her so bad that time that he almost killed her.
He kept her in the house for two days and he didn't take her to see
a doctor.... After a couple of days he drove the whole family over to
some of his family.., and they convinced him that he needed to
take her to the hospital, but he took her far away to a hospital where
[they were] less likely to be recognized. He explained to the doctors
that she had fallen off a horse and had been kicked by the horse. Of
course she couldn't say anything different because he was there and
he had the kids .....
[Her family found out about her situation and contacted her attor-
ney, who faxed a restraining order to the police station. The police
showed up at the hospital when he came to take her home and arrested
him for violating the restraining order.] He has federal charges pend-
ing, but the prosecutors are saying they will be lucky if he... gets two
or three years. This woman doesn't want to leave the area. Her elderly
parents are here; here is her home. But every time she has left, he has
tried to stalk her and chase her. So it's not clear what can be done.
1 20
119. See id. For many Native women the situation is likely worse. There are few shelters that
focus on services to Native women. Native women who turn to shelters run by non-Natives often
face hostility and a helping environment dominated by values and traditions in tension with their
own.
[B]attered Indian women become further disadvantaged by poverty, isolation, and society's
prejudices against women. In seeking to move away from the violence within their homes,
many women come face to face with anti-women and anti-Indian hostility in the form
of institutional and agency racism.
BALZER ET AL., supra note 95, at 14; see also Lemyra DeBruyn et al., "It's Not Cultural": Violence
Against Native American Women, in BALZER ET AL., supra note 95, app. at A-I, A-7 (reporting that
in 1990 there were less than 10 shelters nationwide with services specifically focused on the needs
of Native women). The introduction of new federal funding passed as part of the VAWA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 13931-14040, is providing greater services and interventions for Native women. See Tele-
phone Interview with Eileen Hudon, supra note 114.
120. Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.)
(notes on file with author).
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These obstacles to stopping domestic violence only tell a part of the
story, however. Some scholars conclude that despite the material and cul-
tural assaults on the status of Navajo women, the result has been "'only a
slight erosion of their status.'. '. Living arrangements, particularly in more
rural areas, remain centered on the wife's family."' Women, especially
mothers, continue to be held in high esteem and to play significant leader-
ship roles.123 In addition, there is a small but very active anti-domestic vio-
lence movement. Battered women's advocates have pressed for domesticviolnc .... 124125
violence legislation,"' have trained judges of the Navajo Nation courts,
and have urged greater social service funding for victims.12 They operate
121. Shephardson, supra note 58, at 175 (quoting Scott C. Russell & Mark B. McDonald,
The Economic Contributions of Women in a Rural Western Navajo Community, 6 AM. INDIAN Q.
262, 263 (1982)). Other research finds that Navajo women who maintain close ties with other
Navajo women and with the reservation are more likely to retain household authority and
to believe in gender-egalitarian relations than are more isolated women, who are more likely to
convert to Christianity or Mormonism and adopt beliefs in male control of households. See Chato
& Conte, supra note 77, at 242. Current efforts to revitalize Navajo common law offer hope that
women's status will improve. In addition to traditional Navajo law, the Navajo Nation Council
adopted equal rights legislation in 1980 that bars discrimination on the basis of sex. See id. at 243.
The Navajo Nation have had a Navajo Office for Women since 1984. See id.
122. See, e.g., Chato & Conte, supra note 77, at 233-34 (noting that in rural areas a tradi-
tional camp consists of sisters, their husbands, and their children); Shephardson, supra note 58, at
175 (stating that some studies of rural Navajo women find they retain high status because of their
arts and craft work and elements of localized matrilineages, and that large extended matrilocal
families persist). For a slightly older study of gender relations, see generally LAMPHERE, supra note
58. Lamphere found, as have other researchers, that when Navajo are asked where a young couple
should live, the answer is with the wife's family. See id. at 77. This is the traditional Navajo
living arrangement. See Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 411, 414.
123. See Chato & Conte, supra note 77, at 234. The authors describe women in rural areas
as being "at the heart of economic activities" and note that "older women receive the most respect
and have greatest authority over the allocation of the labor, products, and cash." Id. However,
they also note that changes in divorce law have stripped women of some of their traditional sources
of economic power. See id. at 234-35.
124. See Telephone Interview with Chris O'Shea, supra note 17.
125. See Telephone Interview with Gloria Champion, director of Shiprock Home for Women
and Children (Oct. 1998) (notes on file with author); Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers,
supra note 9.
126. Bird and Champion have been particularly active in providing domestic violence related
training for peacemakers and judges. See Interview with Peggy Bird and Jennifer Skeet, supra note
17; Telephone Interview with Gloria Champion, supra note 125. Navajo Nation Council Woman
Genovese Jackson, with the assistance of former DNA Legal People's Services attorney Chris
O'Shea, drafted domestic violence protection order legislation that was enacted in 1994. See
Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NATION CODE tit. 9, §§ 1601-1667 (Equity 1995); Telephone
Interview with Chris O'Shea, supra note 17. Bird, Champion, and Jackson have pushed for
increased funding for domestic violence treatment. See Interview with Gloria Champion, supra
note 17. The chief prosecutor for the Navajo Nation, Donovan Brown, and Window Rock
District Prosecutor Sharon Tsingine are currently working with anti-domestic violence advocates
to implement proprosecution policies in compliance with VAWA funding obligations. See Inter-
view with Sharon Tsingine & Donovan Brown, supra note 17.
32 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (1999)
batterer's treatment and education programs2 ' and shelters for battered
women.' As a result of these efforts and those of the Navajo judiciary, the
Navajo Nation Council initiated hearings in 1991 to discuss domestic
violence in the Navajo Nation.29 The immediate impetus for these hearings
was the deaths of two women within a year, both killed by intimates.'30 As
a result of the hearings, the council passed the Domestic Abuse Protection
Act, which authorizes courts of the Navajo Nation to issue domestic violence
protection orders.'
B. Peacemaking: Theory and Practice
Ultimately... the greater necessity is that [tribal court] decision-
making craft a jurisprudence reflecting the aspiration and wisdom of
traditional cultures seeking a future of liberation and self-realization
in which age-old values may continue to flourish in contemporary
circumstances. 132
Though the Peacemaker Courts' were first established in 1982, they
were largely ignored until 1991, when the Supreme Court of the Navajo
Nation began a push to reinvigorate modem Navajo law with Navajo com-
mon law.' In an endeavor to bring about cultural and social reform as well
127. For example, the Family Harmony Project in Crownpoint provides both treatment
programs for men who batter and support groups for battered women. See Interview with Cheryl
Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note 17.
128. For example, the Shiprock Home for Women and Children in Shiprock provides
shelter for battered women and their children.
129. See Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 407.
130. See id.
131. See NATION CODE tit. 9, §§ 1651-1667; see also Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note
50, at 112-16 (discussing the legal remedies available for battered women in the Navajo Nation
and among other tribes). The Navajo Nation Code's domestic protection order statute provides
more broad-based protection than do most other states and tribes. See id. at 99 n.143. For
example, the code offers protection to clan members, former members of an abuser's immediate
residence area, and coworkers. See NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1605(B). As a result, the number of
petitioners has been so overwhelming that the courts have enlisted the assistance of domestic
violence commissioners hired specifically to hear only protection order cases. See Interview with
Peggy Bird and Jennifer Skeet, supra note 17.
132. Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court
Jurisprudence, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 411, 413.
133. The word "court" is no longer used to refer to Peacemaking; instead, the formal name is
now the "Peacemaker Division of the Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation," or "Hozhooji
Naat'aanii," the Navajo term. See James W. Zion, Briefing Paper: Enforcement of Decisions in
Navajo Peacemaking 1-2 (Feb. 28, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). This
change was designed to make the courts more accessible and to advertise their difference in
process and outcome from tribal courts, which are styled on the Anglo model.
134. See An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 21, at 165. In 1991, the judiciary
received a grant to promote the use of the Peacemaking system. Philmer Bluehouse, Freddie Miller,
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as legal reform, the Navajo Supreme Court is attempting to integrate tradi-
tional Navajo law into all adjudicatory functions."' The general premise is
that Anglo justice, described as hierarchal and "win-lose," has- failed the
Navajo. '36 They argue that the only hope for Navajo people is a return to
the problem-solving methods that worked in early Navajo history."'
The Honorable Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice for the Supreme Court of
the Navajo Nation, contrasts the Navajo concept of "horizontal" justice
with the Anglo "vertical" system of justice. The latter uses coercion and
power, focuses on finding "truth," and limits standing to parties who claim
direct injury, and its criminal law focuses on establishing guilt.39 In con-
trast, horizontal justice systems have a much wider "zone of dispute"'4 and
rely on moral suasion rather than coercion and power. The emphasis in
horizontal justice systems is on healing rather than on guilt. Yazzie argues
that the term "'guilt' implies a moral fault which commands retribution,"
but the end goal of Navajo law is not fault finding but "integration with the
group" accomplished through "nourishing ongoing relationships with the
immediate and extended family, relatives, neighbors and community.''.
Thus, Peacemaking is premised on traditional Navajo jurisprudence in which
"law is not a process to punish or penalize people, but to teach them how to
and Anita Roan were given the responsibility of creating Peacemaking courts throughout the Navajo
Nation. See id. at 161.
135. See Austin, supra note 4, at 46. See generally Daniel L. Lowery, Developing a Tribal
Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18-AM. INDIAN L. REV. 379
(1993) (describing the use of Navajo common law in published opinions of the Navajo judiciary);
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994).
136. See Interview with Raymond Austin, supra note 14 ("Anglo culture doesn't work for
us .... ). The Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation is working to incorporate traditional ways
into the court system. See id.
137. See id.; see also Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15.
138. See Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 178 ("There are many victims of any
crime. They include the direct recipients of the harm and those who depend on them, family
members, relatives and the community."). See generally ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56.
139. See Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 177-80.
140. See Mary Jo Brooks Hunter, Commentary: Making the Invisible Visible: Historical Perspec-
tive, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 89, 90 (1997) (quoting Navajo Chief Justice Yazzie as stating that
the "zone of dispute" in horizontal systems of justice such as Peacemaking is wider than in "typical
adversarial system[s]"). Justice Yazzie relates a story of criminal adjudication in which an elderly
woman repeatedly raised her hand from the courtroom gallery, urgently signaling her wish to be
recognized by the judge. See Interview with Robert Yazzie, supra note 14. Finally, the judge asked
her what she wanted. "I'm the defendant's mother," she responded; "don't I get to speak?" The
judge reluctantly informed her that unless she was called as a witness by the defense or the prose-
cution, she did not get to speak. See id. Justice Yazzie argues that the mother should have been
involved in the process and that Peacemaking allows this involvement. See id.
141. Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 182. Emotion is a constituent part of law
under this view. See id. at 180 ("I insist that any definition of 'law' must contain an emotional
element: one of spirit and feelings.").
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live a better life. It is a healing process that either restores good relation-
ships among people or, if they do not have good relations to begin with,
fosters and nourishes a healthy environment. 142
Traditional Navajo thinking does not separate religious and secular life;
rather, all of life is sacred and imbued with spiritual meaning. The concept
of k'e, fundamental to Navajo common law, expresses an interdependence
and respect for relationships between humans, the natural world, individu-
als and family, and individuals and clan members.'43 This interdependence
operates to define Navajo common law, which derives from relational
frameworks in which "responsibilities to clan members are part of a sophisti-
cated system that defines rights, duties, and mutual obligations."'144 "The
individual and the community are part of the kinship that exists among all
life forms and the environmental elements. Harmony is the desired result
of the relationship with all life forms, including humans, animals, and
plants.'145 Relational justice does not necessitate the subordination of the
individual, however. Traditional Navajo thought and law are radically
egalitarian and eschew coercion. 146 Individuals do not speak for others, not
even for members of their own family.
47
These concepts of relational justice provide the foundation for the prac-
tice of Peacemaking. In Peacemaking, parties meet with a peacemaker and
others who have either a special relationship to the parties (e.g., family and
friends) or relevant expertise (e.g., alcohol treatment counselors and hospital
social workers)"4 Each participant is given a chance to describe the problem
142. Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 160-61.
143. Justice Austin described the world as being divided into a pie: animals, humans,
spiritual beings, dirt, sky, cosmos-everything See Interview with Raymond Austin, supra note
14. He explained that there is a spark of the creation in every thing that comprises the pie. See id.
Therefore, each piece owes the others respect. See id.; see also Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note
21, at 182 (describing the concept of k'e).
144. See Austin, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that an individual who behaves badly acts "as if
he had no relatives"). Much of Native American jurisprudence, including that of the Navajo, is
said to derive from a relational understanding of justice, rather than from an individual framework
of rights. See id. at 10; Pommersheim, supra note 132, at 436-41.
145. Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 50, at 87.
146. See LAMPHERE, supra note 58, at 41; Austin, supra note 4, at 8.
147. See Austin, supra note 4, at 8; see also LAMPHERE, supra note 58, at 39.
If someone comes to borrow a shovel or wagon that belongs to the mother of the house-
hold, a daughter might say shimd b6holnfil ("my mother, its her business"), 'Yi 'aa dinf ("you
ask her"). If the mother is not at home, the individual making the request must return
later, since no one except the owner has the right to dispose of the property ....
Id.
148. See Notes on Peacemaking Session, supra note 11 (observing participation by a hospital
social worker in a Peacemaking session).
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that the petitioner has identified as the reason for the session.'49 The peace-
maker then leads the group in developing recommendations and agreements
designed to ameliorate or solve the problem.'
Peacemaking is structured around procedural steps. It begins with an
opening prayer in both Navajo and English.'5' After the peacemaker has
explained the rules, the petitioner is allowed to explain his or her com-
plaint. The respondent is then asked to respond to the petitioner's com-
plaint.'2 Next, the peacemaker provides a "[birief overview of the problem
as presented by the disputants."'53 Family members and other participants,
including traditional teachers, may then join the discussion, providing their
description or explanation of the problem(s).'
The peacemaker, usually chosen by his or her chapter,5' is a respected
person with a demonstrated knowledge of traditional Navajo stories."' He or
she must be someone who possesses the power of persuasion, because peace-
makers do not judge or decide cases. Their power lies in their words and their
influence. Peacemakers "show a lot of love, they use encouraging words,
[when you] use [Navajo] teaching to lift [participants] up you can accom-
plish a lot, [if you] are very patient."'5 7
Peacemaking may be hard for outside observers to understand, because
it seems to combine so many different things: mediation," 'restorative justice, 59
149. See id.
150. See generally James W. Zion, The Dynamics of Navajo Peacemaking 7 (Apr. 24, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
151. Indeed, most Peacemaking is conducted in both English and Navajo. Many middle-aged
and younger Navajo are not fluent speakers of Navajo. See Interview with Leo Natani, supra note
12. Prayer "helps to purify your mind so that you can focus on the problems at hand." Interview
with Raymond Austin, supra note 14.
152. See Philmer Bluehouse, Training Materials for Community Education (Apr. 20, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). These training materials admonish peacemakers, while
in the investigation and questioning phase, to do the following: permit ventilation; remind parties of
the rules when necessary; keep objective toward resolution; encourage open communication; allow the
use of supporting documents; and allow conferencing with the referring judge when necessary. See id.
153. Id.
154. "The opinions and feelings of both the 'victim' and the 'perpetrator' are important, as
are those of their relatives." Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 78.
155. See An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 21, at 165. Chapters are local units
of governance. See NATION CODE tit. 2, §§ 4001-4021 (Equity 1995).
156. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 2.1(a), in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 102 (providing
that to be a peacemaker a person must have "the respect of the community ... and a reputation
for integrity, honesty, humanity and an ability to resolve local problems").
157. Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
158. See, e.g., Lieder, supra note 5, at 35-36 (describing Peacemaking as mediation).
159. See generally Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2.
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therapeutic intervention,' family counseling, 6' and Navajo teaching.162
Understanding is also made more difficult because of the significant differ-
ences in the practice of various peacemakers6 and the different approaches
used for different kinds of problems." Peacemaking practice is fluid, flexi-
ble, and thoroughly practical, fitting the process to the situation. 165 As Phil
Bluehouse, coordinator for the Peacemaker Division, relates:
[11f there's no flexibility [in Peacemaking], we'll be doing a disserv-
ice.... [I] prefer [the] middle ground leaning more towards flexibility,
because to me, that's the nature of the human being .... I encouraged
fluidity over the process. Be dynamic, be explorative .... The court[s]
compartmentalize, its this kind of case or that kind of case. I say, we're
dealing with human beings.... 66
160. Peacemaking could be described as an example of therapeutic jurisprudence. See Bruce
J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 184, 193
(1997) (describing domestic violence as a "therapeutic" concern of therapeutic jurisprudence).
"Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that, other things being equal, positive therapeutic effects are
desirable and should generally be a proper aim of law, and that antitherapeutic effects are undesir-
able and should be avoided or minimized." Id. at 188 (footnote omitted). See generally Leonore
M.J. Simon, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Processing of Domestic Violence Cases,
1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 43 (1995).
161. See, e.g., Zion & Yazzie,*supra note 5, at 82 ("Navajo peacemaking addresses other psy-
chological problems. It is a form of counseling.").
162. See Interview with Ruthie Alexis, supra note 12; Interview with Crownpoint Peace-
makers, supra note 9; Interview with Leo Natani, supra note 12.
163. My review of Peacemaking files, as well as my interviews with peacemakers and with
Bluehouse, suggests that peacemakers may vary in their approach. See Interview with Philmer
Bluehouse, supra note 15; Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
164. For example, peacemaker practice in domestic violence cases varies. Some peacemakers
believe that there are cases too severe or too dangerous to be handled in Peacemaking. Others
believe that no case is inappropriate for Peacemaking. Some would postpone a case if the wife
is afraid. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9; Interview with Leo Natani,
supra note 12. There may also be differences in judicial practice. For example some judges believe
they have no authority to order an unwilling party into Peacemaking, despite the apparent formal
authority to do so. Compare Interview with Mae Horseman, supra note 13 (stating that a judge has
no authority to order unwilling parties into Peacemaking), with PEACEMAKER Cr. R. 6.2, in ZION
& MCCABE, supra note 56, at 109 (stating that a court may order civil litigants into Peacemaking on
a finding of good cause).
165. See Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15. This is not to say that there are
no boundaries, nor is it to say that there are no practice norms. Boundaries exist, for example,
with regard to the ethical behavior of peacemakers concerning abuse of process at the expense of
the accused in criminal court cases. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 2.2(e), in ZION & MCCABE, supra note
56, at 103 (peacemakers may not use force, violence or engage in acts that violate the Navajo Bill
of Rights). Practice norms may exist as well. For example, the Peacemaker Court Rules allow for
nalyeeh (reparations), but in talking with several peacemakers and peacemaker liaisons, none could
give me an example of a case in which nalyeeh was given other than to compensate for property
damage. See Interview with Leo Natani, supra note 12; Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window
Rock File Review, supra note 9.
166. Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15.
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The Peacemaker Court Manual also stresses the need for flexibility:
It cannot be stressed, repeated or urged enough that the Peacemaker
Court... is not frozen in its present form forever. As an experiment
which has been carefully built upon Navajo custom and tradition,
we will have to see whether it meets the needs of the Navajo
People ... , and we will have to see what changes need to be made.'67
Peacemaking is a formal part of the Navajo legal system, developed
and overseen by the Navajo Nation judiciary. 6' There are two primary routes
by which cases reach Peacemaking: court referral and self-referral. Criminal
cases may be referred by the court as the result of diversion ' or as a condi-
tion of probation.17 The Domestic Abuse Protection Act creates special
rules for domestic violence protection order cases: A referral to Peace-
making must be approved by the petitioner, and the peacemaker must have
received special domestic violence training.7 In all other civil cases, the
rules allow courts to refer cases to Peacemaking over a party's objection, but
in practice judges seldom refer civil cases involving allegations of domestic
violence unless both parties agree to the referral.' In addition to court
referral, Peacemaking may be initiated by a petitioner on a claim that he or
she has been "injured, hurt or aggrieved by the actions of another." '173 Self-
referred cases make up the majority of Peacemaking cases.'74 In a self-referred
case, the peacemaker liaison seeks authorization from the district court to
167. ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 157.
168. See id. at 101 (providing in Rule 1.4 that Navjo Nation judges appoint peacemakers to
specific cases and in Rule 1.2 that pursuant to Navajo customary law and as authorized by NATION
CODE tit. 7, § 204(a), which permits the use of Navajo customary law, the Navajo Supreme Court
has the authority to create the Peacemaker Court).
169. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 6.3(b), in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 109.
170. See id. Diversion requires the victim's consent, see id. 6.3(b), while the referral as a
condition of probation does not, see id. 6.3(d). However, the common judicial practice, at least in
domestic violence cases, appears to be to require the victim's consent in either case. See Interview
with Marilou Begay, supra note 13 (asserting that cases involving domestic violence are not referred
to Peacemaking without the victim's consent); Interview with Mae Horseman, supra note 13 ("It
is something that we can't force them to go. We can't say, go to the Peacemaking. It is a choice
they make.").
171. See NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1652 (Equity 1995). Victim consent to Peacemaking must
"be in writing, read to the victim in her or his primary language, and signed by the victim." Id.
§ 1652(A). The consent form must tell the victim of his or her right to remove the proceeding to
family court at any time. See id. § 1652(B). "Only peacemakers who have received specialized
training in their primary language on the causes, symptoms and dynamics of domestic abuse shall
be qualified to hear domestic abuse cases." Id. § 1652(C).
172. See Interview with Marilou Begay, supra note 13; Interview with Mae Horseman, supra
note 13.
173. PEACEMAKER CT. R. 3.2(a), in ZION & MCCABE, supra note.56, at 105.
174. See Zion, supra note 133, at 2.
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subpoena the respondent and all other necessary parties identified by the
petitioner.
175
C. Peacemaking's Potential in Domestic Violence Cases: Systemic and
Individual Responsibility and Transforming Context
While Peacemaking may offer other benefits, '76 I will focus my attention
on three areas that highlight its potential advantages for some battered
women. With regard to each area, I compare Peacemaking's approach with
that of the predominant means of legal intervention in domestic violence
cases: civil protection orders, criminal prosecution, and the use of batterer's
treatment programs through diversion and probation in misdemeanor cases
or as a remedy in civil protection orders.
I argue that Peacemaking offers three potential benefits for battered
women: the ability to address both systemic and personal aspects of battering
and thus disrupt the familial and social supports for battering; the ability to
foster social and personal change through the use of traditional Navajo
creation narratives based on gender-egalitarian understandings of male-female
relations; and the ability to foster "safe connection"'77 that does not treat as
pathology women's multiple loyalties, including their commitment to rela-
tionships with men who have been abusive.
1. Peacemaking May Address Both Systemic and Personal-Responsibility
Aspects of Battering
Battering is a systemic problem. "[Ilts distinctive character derives from
how the convergent supports for male authority 'enter' an actual conflict
and merge with the batterer's pattern of control during and after a conflict
175. See PEACEMAKER Cr. R. 1.5, in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 102. It appears that
district court judges usually approve subpoenas based on the recommendation of the peacemaker
liaison. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9.
176. One notable benefit not discussed here is the ability of Peacemaking to give voice to all
of those hurt by the abuser's violence, including children and family members of both the victim
and the abuser.
177. 1 borrow the term from Christine Littleton. See Christine A. Littleton, Women's
Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 23, 52. In order to support women's "safe connection," legal doctrine should
[flirst, change the batterer so that he fits within female models of commu-
nity .... Second, decrease the cost of rupture to women, so that both sexes face roughly
similar disadvantages from the potential break-up.... Third, increase the perceived costs
of battering behavior.... Fourth, expand the options for community so that women
might validate desires for connection without running the 50-50 risk battering male
partners impose.
Id. at 52-53.
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arises . ,,78 I identify four related ways in which the systemic nature of
battering may be understood: Social structures support and maintain its
existence; social and familial networks may support an individual batterer's
abusive behavior; batterers are sometimes themselves subjected to oppressive
systems in ways that are relevant to their decision to batter; and battering is
itself a system of behaviors that includes both physical and nonphysical
means of control and domination. This part describes these systemic aspects
of battering, the possibilities suggested by Peacemaking for addressing each
of them, and potential problems with Peacemaking's use.
a. The Systemic Nature of Battering: Societal and Familial Supports
[The] problems that battered women face are rarely linked to women's
subservient position within society and the family structure, sex dis-
crimination in the workplace, economic discrimination, lack of child
care, lack of access to divorce, inadequate child support, problems of
single motherhood, and lack of educational and community support."'
Battering may be experienced as a personal violation, but it is an act
facilitated and made possible by societal gender inequalities."8 The batterer
does not, indeed could not, act alone. Social supports for battering include
widespread denial of its frequency or harm,'' economic structures that render
women vulnerable, and sexist ideology that holds women accountable for
male violence' s and for the emotional lives of families, 8 3 and that fosters
deference to male familial control."8 Batterers often use the political and
economic vulnerability of women to reinforce their power and dominance
178. Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in DO ARRESTS AND
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 121 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996).
179. Schneider, supra note 55, at 568. Schneider urges a focus on "the batterer and the social
structures that support the oppression of women and glorify violence" rather than a "focus ... on
the woman and her individual pathology." Id.
180. As Evan Stark writes: "[Wihen we speak about 'battering,' we refer to both the pat-
tern of violent acts and their political framework, the pattern of social, institutional, and interper-
sonal controls that usurp a woman's capacity to determine her destiny .... Stark, supra note
178, at 121-22.
181. See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 49, at 10-19.
182. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 106-11 (1992) (noting the similarities between the criminal
law concept of provocation and the justifications and excuses batterers give for their violence).
183. See EVELYN C. WHITE, CHAIN CHAIN CHANGE 25-26 (1985).
184. See, e.g., DAVID LEVINSON, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
(1989) (describing a crosscultural study of 90 societies that found domestic authority to be associated
with the frequency of wife-beating); ELLEN PENCE & MICHAEL PAYMAR, EDUCATION GROUPS
FOR MEN WHO BATTER: THE DULUTH MODEL 147-51 (1993) (describing the use of "male privi-
lege" as a tactic to maintain control).
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over particular women.'85 Thus, their dominance, or their attempts at domi-
nance, are frequently bolstered by stigmatization of victims through the use
of gender social norms that define the "good" woman (wife/mother).' 6
Batterers also take advantage of the vulnerabilites of their victims, such as
the victim's economic dependence on the batterer" or on the state,188 her
status as an illegal immigrant, 9 her alcohol or drug dependency," 0 or her
responsibility to provide and care for children.' 9' Battering also increases
women's social and economic vulnerability. Battered women lose jobs, edu-
185. Elizabeth A. Stanko argues that criminologists have too often narrowed their study of
violence to only that violence that is criminalized, rather than the (legal) violence of the state or
the violence of private actors that is systematically ignored or condoned by the state. See Elizabeth
A. Stanko, Challenging the Problem of Men's Individual Violence, in JUST BOYS DOING BUSINESS?
MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND CRIME, supra note 1, at 32, 33; see also Margulies, supra note 40, at
1076 (asserting that "shortages of affordable housing can mean staying with an abusive partner
and risking injury or even death," that welfare restrictions may make leaving a batterer more
difficult, and that the lack of legal representation for women can mean the difference between
safety and danger); Meier, supra note 41, at 222-23 (describing the difficulties that have kept
poverty lawyers and domestic violence lawyers from working together). One woman I worked with
in Honolulu described her decision some years earlier to return to her abusive husband. He had
won custody of her young son and then attempted to burn down their vacant house, and the
courts still would not modify the custody order. This woman concluded that her son would only
have some measure of safety if she returned to the home. See Interview with Anonymous Woman
Participant in Waikiki Community Center Family Violence Program, in Honolulu, Haw. (1988).
Other women faced with the same circumstance have taken their children and gone into hiding.
See Interview with Anonymous Shelter Resident in Advocates for Battered Women Shelter, in Little
Rock, Ark. (1984).
186. See James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE, supra note 32, at 133, 147. The fear of economic and social marginality attending single
women and especially single mothers may create an additional incentive to give a battering rela-
tionship another try. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106 (1995) (discussing the por-
trayal of single mothers as deviant); Raphael, Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, supra note
33, at 217-18 (writing that the low benefits of Aid to Families with Dependent Children encourage
poor mothers to become involved with men who offer financial help, but who also abuse them).
187. Women's subordinate social status and economic power relative to that of men may
be a necessary but not sufficient condition for wife-beating to be widespread in a society. See
LEVINSON, supra note 184, at 88 (stating that in crosscultural studies, the following four factors
are the strongest predictors of frequent wife abuse: "sexual economic inequality, violent conflict
resolution norms, male domestic authority, and divorce restrictions for women").
188. See Raphael;Feminist Theory of Welfare Dependency, supra note 33, at 217-18.
189. See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQUETTE L. REV. 161 (forthcoming Oct. 1999); Lauren
Gilbert, Family Violence and the Immigration and Nationality Act, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Mar. 1998, at
1; Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against
Women Act, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 665 (1998); Leslye E. Orloff et al., With No Place to Turn:
Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women, 29 FAM. L.Q. 313 (1995).
190. See DUTTON, supra note 34, at 64 (discussing substance abuse among battered women);
GINNY NICARTHY, GETTING FREE: A HANDBOOK FOR WOMEN IN ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS
223 (1982) (providing advice for women who are addicted to drugs or alcohol).
191. See Mahoney, supra note 49, at 19-20.
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cational opportunities, 92 careers, homes, and savings. 93 They may also lose
relationships with family and friends that might otherwise provide material
aid. 94 Women become homeless as a result of battering,' 95 their homeless-
ness is made more difficult to remedy because they are battered,' 96 and they
are more vulnerable to further battering because they are homeless.' 97 Women
on the run, avoiding a batterer, are unable to stay long in one place, unable
to participate fully in job training programs and housing programs, and
unable to wait out the long lists required for government-sponsored childcare.
Women involved with someone who batters find their efforts at economic
self-sufficiency sabotaged.' 9
While larger social forces create the social landscape that makes batter-
ing possible, the batterer's personal supports for controlling behavior may be
critical in his decision to batter. The most important of such supports may
be his experience in his family of origin I" and his relationships with friends.2"
Lee Bowker's research found that abusive husbands who saw their friends
daily committed more severe and more frequent acts of wife abuse, were
more likely to assault children, and were more likely to assault their partner
while pregnant than were men who saw their friends less frequently."'
Bowker suggests that "[t]hese correlations point to the possibility of a male
peer subculture of violence that justifies wife beating, and strongly suggests
that the better integrated the battering husband is into this peer subculture,
the more severely he is likely to beat his wife.""2
192. See Raphael, The Unexplored Barrier, supra note 33, passim (describing the manner in
which battering men sabotage welfare-to-work efforts by women); Zorza, supra note 33, passim
(describing the manner in which battering makes women homeless); see also Meier, supra note 41,
at 215 ("[Flor many poor women, their inability to develop or maintain economic self-sufficiency
is the result of violent victimization and intentional sabotage by abusers;").
193. I speak from my personal experience as a social worker and attorney working for and
with battered women since 1978. This work includes serving as a shelter staff member, a coordinator
of a community-based domestic violence program, a professional trainer, and a counselor for battered
women and for men who are court-ordered to batterer's treatment groups.
194. See supra note 193.
195. See generally Zorza, supra note 33.
196. See generally Green, supra note 40.
197. See id. at 172.
198. See generally Raphael, The Unexplored Barrier, supra note 33.
199. See, e.g., J.J. Gayford, Battered Wives, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE 123, 125 (Richard J. Gelles & Claire Pedrick Cornell eds., 1983) (stating that 40% of the
abusive men studied were exposed to violence during their childhoods).
200. See LEE H. BOWKER, BEATING WIFE-BEATING 54 (1983).
201. See id. at 54-55. This finding may be confounded by its correlation with alcohol and drug
use. See id. (finding that increased social embedment, as measured by daily time with friends, is
correlated with use of alcohol and psychoactive drugs). In other words, men who see their friends
daily are likely to be men who drink and use drugs with their friends daily.
202. Id. at 54.
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Also significant are the number of abusers who experienced or witnessed
violence in their homes of origin,03 with the strongest correlation being for
those men who witnessed their father abusing their mother.2° Thus, some
number of abusers may have family members who tacitly approve of wife-
beating or who are long practiced in denying its existence."
Peacemaking may address societal and familial support for battering
in two ways: through confronting family and batterer denial of battering's
existence and its harm and through gaining material assistance for the victim.
Peacemaking may confront the denial of the abuser--denial that he com-
mitted the violence, that it was harmful, and that it was a moral choice not
compelled either by the victim's "provocation" or by life's circumstances."'
203. See Gayford, supra note 199, at 125.
204. See id. at 125-26.
205. One must be careful not to overstate this point. A significant number of child victims
and witnesses are nonviolent adults, and a significant number of wife batterers experienced no vio-
lence in their home of origin. The point of familial condonation can also be overstated. Men whose
mothers escaped or were successful in stopping battering may be unlikely to condone or deny their
sons' violence. See generally BOWKER, supra note 200 (describing the various strategies women
used to solve the problem of domestic violence). Similarly, fathers who have reformed their behavior
may be quick to intervene in their sons' violent behavior. The point here is that for some number
of abusers, family members are likely to reinforce thought and behavior patterns that are related to
abuse. See, e.g., PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 184, at 50 (describing the "self-talk" of battering
men that encourages their minimization, denial, and blame of the violence on others).
206. Peacemaking proponents argue that this is a major advantage of Peacemaking over
"Anglo adjudication" in which the privilege against self-incrimination, the formality of the process,
and its extreme adversary nature encourage defendants to deny responsibility. See Zion, supra note
150, at 6-7; see also Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 193 (making a similar argument for
conferencing). Such claims may overstate the adversary nature of some domestic violence hearings,
particularly in cases charged as misdemeanors, in which defendants frequently have the option of
diversion or probation. See, e.g., Linda Dakis & Lauren Lazarus, Attacking the Crime of Domestic
Violence: How Dade County is Protecting the Victim and Punishing the Perpetrator, FAM. ADVOC.,
Spring 1997, at 46, 47, 49 (explaining that the Miami-Dade County domestic violence court uses
pretrial diversion for carefully screened batterers); Judge Amy Karan et al., Domestic Violence
Courts: What Are They and How Should We Manage Them?, JuV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 1999, at
71, 77-78 (explaining the benefits of a dedicated domestic violence court, including the use of
standardized treatment programs for batterers); Elena Salzman, The Quincy District Court Domestic
Violence Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U.
L. REV. 329, 348-49 (1994) ("Probation in Quincy usually includes participation in a mandatory,
long-term batterers' treatment program."). In other locales, defendants are likely to receive little
or no punishment at all. See, e.g., Marjory D. Fields, Criminal Justice Responses to Violence Against
Women, in PENAL THEORY AND PRACTICE: TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
199 (Anthony Duff et al. eds., 1994). Fields, a New York trial judge, writes:
[New York] bludges prefer adjournments [in domestic violence cases] in contemplation of
dismissal (ACD), which are pre-trial compromises, because they take less court
time .... The penalty for the defendant's failure to comply with the ACD conditions is
restoration of the case to the court calendar for trial. This is well known to be an empty
threat, because the prosecutors do not monitor compliance with the ACD conditions,
and cannot reassemble the evidence to try a case four to five months stale ....
Id. at 202 (citations omitted). In summary, this is hardly the punitive extreme implied in
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Peacemaking proponents argue that the ability of the victim, her family,"7
and the abuser's family to confront the abuser directly about his violence
makes it harder for him to deny his wrongdoing. 208
In a case involving family violence, a young man related his excuses,
exhibiting denial, minimilization and externalization. One of the
people who listened was the young man's sister. She listened to his
story and confronted him by saying, "you know very well you have a
drinking problem." She then related the times she had seen him drunk
and abusive.... [S]he told her brother she loved him very much and
was willing to help him if only he would admit his problems. He did.2°9
Bluehouse described this confrontational aspect of Peacemaking:
inhere may be issues of domestic violence where there's some denial,
the victimizer may be intellectualizing which becomes very obvious in
Peacemaking, because family members will know. [They will say,] "this
doesn't sound like you."... [Family members may say,] "Uncle, I can't
understand why you are talking to your family like this [in Peace-
making]; is this another side of you? We like this side of you, we'd like
to see more of this side of you. We've seen you... deal with your wife in
a cruel and inhumane [manner], so why all of a sudden in a Peacemaking
room with a person from the outside [do you behave this way]? ' '210
Peacemaking proponent literature. I argue that the potential differences in Peacemaking that matter
for some battered women are in the resources made available to victims and the attempts to restruc-
ture the barterer's familial and social networks.
207. See Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 183 ("The involvement of relatives assures
that the weak will not be abused and that silent or passive participants will be protected."
(footnote omitted)); Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 424-25. Battered women's advocates doubt
the ability of family members to protect the battered woman and point out that the woman's fear
may keep her from asserting her own interests. See, e.g., Hooper & Busch, supra note 2, at 118-19.
Loretta Frederick discusses a similar problem in sentencing circles. See Frederick, supra note 2
(describing a domestic violence abuser who claimed in a sentencing circle meeting that he beat
his girlfriend because she dated other men, and noting that the discussion focused on her unfaith-
fulness and his resulting anger and concluded with a suggestion that the couple get married in order
to "inject some stability into the relationship").
208. See Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping, supra note 21, at 99; Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at
165-66. Barry Stuart notes a similar effect for sentencing circles, a process somewhat similar
to Peacemaking, used in Canada with First Nations offenders. See Barry Stuart, Circle Sentencing:
Turning Swords into Ploughshares, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 1, at 193, 201.
"[The] thing about the circle is that bullshit don't carry you as far as it does in Court. If
you try [in circle] you don't risk being judged just by the suits [i.e., the judge and the
lawyers] but by everyone who really counts in your life. [You] must keep the teachings [of
the circle], speaking from the heart must tell it all, no bullshit, cause the people in the
community, they know what's bullshit."
Id. (quoting Kwanlin Dun, offender, regarding his experience in a sentencing circle).
209. Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 165.
210. Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15.
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Families cannot always be counted on to confront an abusive family
member, however. Family members may deny, minimize, and blame the victim
for the batterer's violence. Peacemakers note that parents in particular are
prone to cover for their son and blame his partner."' Thus, peacemakers
must confront familial or parental denial in order to confront the batterer's
denial."' "[If there is a lot of denial you have to confront the person with
respect and love, but you have to cut through [the denial], and you have to
confront them." '
Denial and familial solidarity are not the only impediments to families
confronting batterers. Family members-his or hers-may be too afraid of the
batterer to confront him or too focused on hiding the past or current violence
in their own households. 4 In such cases, if the baiterer is confronted, it must
be by the peacemaker.215
211. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
212. See id.
213. Id. Other peacemakers also discussed the importance of breaking denial. See, e.g.,
Interview with Ruthie Alexis, supra note 12 ("So, whereas for me I think Peacemaking is positive,
it is a positive thing where people will get in touch with their problems and break that denial, and
I think that's important. When you can break someone's denial, you've made a lot of progress.").
214. A significant number of identified batterers relate histories of abuse in their families of
origin. See, e.g., DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 58 (1995) (citing research findings by Murray A. Straus,
Richard Gelles, and Suzanne Steinmetz that men who grew up in abusive households were three
times more likely to hit their wives, see MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS:
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 100 (1980)). Battering in the battered woman's home of
origin may also mitigate against gaining help there. For example, Zion relates the following story:
"Vane related stories of sleep deprivation because of continued sleep disruptions in which
her husband would] violently pull her from bed to confront her about her infidelity or the
illegitimacy of the older child.... She softly told the story of being trapped by a brutal cow-
boy .... She was driven from her grandparent's home by rape and molestation, severely treated
by her parents, treated as a captive by the denying father of her children, and given more
abuse by her own family when she returned to it. She painted the picture of a brutal, male
world, where abuse, accusations of sexual misconduct, and attempted rape were commonplace."
Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 50, at 100-01 (quoting James W. Zion, Jane Begay's Story 6, 7
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the St. John's Law Review) (citing the testimony of a
witness before a domestic violence subcommittee of the Navajo Nation Council in public hearings
on domestic violence)). Jane Begay's story "reveal[s] the breakdown of her 'special reciprocal rela-
tions' in Navajo society that should have shielded her." Id. at 101.
215. Denial may not be limited to the parties. Peacemakers may also engage in the same societal
denial of domestic violence's presence or its seriousness. As one battered women's advocate related:
[A trainer] was doing domestic violence training for peacemakers in [locale omitted].
The peacemakers were telling [the trainer], "this [domestic violence] does not happen
here." [The trainer finally] said, "Uncle, grandfather, don't you remember what used to
happen to [naming women who had been battered]? I was a little boy, [but] I remember
that." [The peacemakers] quit saying that it did not happen. Only one peacemaker
came up to [the trainer] later and told him that he was right to confront them.
Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.) (notes on file
with author) (names and identifiers withheld at the request of the interviewee).
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Peacemaking also provides a forum for the victim's family to intervene
on her behalf. For example, in one case an uncle was a copetitioner with his
niece. The uncle expressed concern that his niece's daughters took her hus-
band's side in arguments and that both the father and the daughters verbally
and physically abused the mother.216
In addition to encouraging family participation, Peacemaking may also
provide a mechanism for transferring material resources to the victim, thus
lessening her economic and social vulnerability. This could occur in three
ways. First, the abuser or his family or both may agree to provide nalyeeh"7
(reparations) in the form of money, goods, or personal services21 for the
victim. Nalyeeh is a concrete recognition that the harm of battering is
Denial, too, is a phenomenon in Anglo adjudication. See Mahoney, supra note 49, at 13-14.
Mahoney describes the cultural denial evidenced in law's treatment of battering as unusual, while
the personal experience of many of laws' actors proves its ubiquity. She writes:
Using the conservative estimate that domestic violence occurs in one quarter of
households, at least four of the fifteen or more actors in an average criminal action-
jurors, judge, and attorneys-probably will have experienced or committed at least one
domestic assault .... [Therefore,] the response to and evaluation of the case before them
will also include the unseen and unspoken ties that bind these participants to the fabric
of their own lives, their parents' lives, and their children's.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
216. See Window Rock File Review, supra note 9. The peacemaker's notes state that "there
is a lot of accusations and blaming going on, with the two older daughters ... siding up with their
father against their mother." See id. The family agreed to seek counseling, cease harassment, seek
traditional counseling with a medicine man, and seek family counseling. The father agreed to seek
alcohol rehabilitation services, and the mother agreed to attend counseling regarding her husband's
alcoholism. Some time later, the wife wrote that while she had found counseling at the alcohol
rehabilitation center to be very helpful, her husband had failed to attend. She therefore asked the
peacemaker to file an order to show cause (why the husband should not be found in contempt of
court, presumably). See id.
217. See Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 168 (stating that the offenders' relatives help to pay
nalyeeh to victims); Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15 (describing the use of nalyeeh
in Peacemaking). Despite the frequent references to nalyeeh in the literature on Peacemaking, my
research left me confused about the degree to which nalyeeh is currently used in domestic violence
cases. In my review of Peacemaking files, I found no domestic violence cases where nalyeeh was used.
See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9. In addition, one
peacemaker liaison explained that nalyeeh was used only for the purpose of compensating a loss of
property. See Interview with Leo Natani, supra note 12 (explaining that nalyeeh is usually only for
property damage and the petitioner must show a receipt). This is unfortunate and may reflect the
need for more peacemaker training regarding domestic violence. The Navajo Nation Code provides
that peacemakers receive domestic violence training, NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1652(C) (Equity 1995),
but at the time of my visit (1997), not all peacemakers had been trained, and both advocates and
peacemakers complained that the training was too brief and too cursory. See Interview with Crown-
point Peacemakers, supra note 9.
218. For a description of the use of personal services and supportfrom the barterer's family for
the victim in a process similar in many respects to Peacemaking, see Braithwaite & Daly, supra note
1, at 200 (describing the role of the batterer's family in community conferencing).
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real219 and that responsibility for it extends beyond the individual batterer.
In addition, both abuser and victim are likely to be referred to social service
providers and to traditional healing ceremonies.2 The assistance given by
agencies and by traditional healers often results in increased community and
governmental material support.2 Finally, the victim's family may overcome
past estrangement from the victim and agree to provide her with assistance.
Though it is not clear that extending such assistance to include goods,
services, or both is now a common practice in Navajo Peacemaking, such an
extension appears congruent with traditional Navajo practices."' Assistance
of this kind may alter the battered woman's material conditions and decrease
her vulnerability to ongoing battering. For example, his family members may
agree to such help as loaning a car or providing transportation.223 Her family
members may agree to spend the night with her on a rotating basis. 4 In
addition, bank accounts may be changed or split so that she has greater
financial independence. 5 The agreement may also include assistance with
job training, employment, or childcare. The subsequent reorganization of the
financial priorities of the batterer's extended family may serve to emphasize
the injustice done to the victim and, at the same time, to decrease the vic-
tim's vulnerability to the batterer's control.
Peacemaking may also provide material assistance through referrals to
social service agencies and traditional healing ceremonies. Peacemaking
agreements often include an agreement from the batterer to engage in
219. See, e.g., Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 168 (explaining that nalyeeh in a rape case may
include the delivery of cattle to the victim, which "reinforces [the victim's] dignity and tells the com-
munity she was wronged").
220. Peacemaking routinely connects participants to social service providers. Notes on Peace-
making Session, supra note 11 (noting that referrals were made to alcohol treatment, counseling,
child protective services, and hospital personnel in a Peacemaking session); Interview with Ruthie
Alexis, supra note 12 (describing her practice of referrals to social service agencies). Service provid-
ers sometimes take part in the Peacemaking session. Peacemaking agreements sometimes include
agreements to attend traditional ceremonies. See Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 169.
221. For a discussion of the use of healing ceremonies in gathering material, social, and spiri-
tual support for an individual, see infra notes 267-273 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Yazzie & Zion, supra note 2, at 166 (describing a Peacemaking agreement for an
unemployed father to meet his child-support obligations by cutting and hauling firewood for the
mother until he got a job).
223. My recommendation borrows from that of Braithwaite and Daly, who suggest a method of
community conferencing, a process similar to Peacemaking, in domestic violence cases in which
family members provide assistance for the victim, including monitoring. For example, family mem-
bers may live with the couple or allow the husband to live with them. See Braithwaite & Daly, supra
note 1, at 194.
224. See id. at 194-95 (suggesting a similar strategy).
225. See id. at 200.
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affirmative steps toward changed behavior, such as alcohol treatment and
traditional healing ceremonies.2 6 For example, in my file review of domestic
violence cases, four of the fourteen that reached agreements227 included the
batterer's attendance in alcohol treatment and the woman's attendance in
Alanon meetings."'
How does Peacemaking's ability to change material and familial sup-
ports for battering compare with prominent formal adjudication methods of
domestic violence intervention? The well-publicized insistence that criminal
justice systems treat battering as a serious crime has had a significant impact
on public awareness and perceptions. This general awareness does not neces-
sarily translate into more services for battered women, however. In criminal
adjudication in particular, the "zone of dispute" '229 is narrowly focused on the
offender and the state. There is no structural way of addressing the culpa-
bility of family in supporting the abuse or of recognizing family's interest in
stopping it.230 Thus, formal legal interventions offer little that disrupts
familial supports for battering.
226. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing referrals to social service agencies).
While referrals to other services are common, I found no referrals to batterer's treatment programs
in my review of peacemaker files. However, one peacemaker liaison described referring a man to a
barterer's program, and, in a different locale, a counselor in a batterer's treatment program told me
that a number of referrals from local peacemakers had been received. See Interview with Leo
Natani, supra note 12; Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note 17. It
is not clear that there is widespread knowledge that the programs exist. See Interview with Philmer
Bluehouse, supra note 15 (noting that there are so many community programs that it is hard to keep
track of them all). Batterer's treatment programs are fairly new and may not be generally known.
However, domestic violence training with peacemakers mandated by the Navajo Domestic Abuse
Protection Act, NATION CODE tit. 9, §§ 1601-1667 (Equity 1995), is beginning to change this.
See Telephone Interview #1 with Peggy Bird, supra note 115; Interview with Peggy Bird and Jennifer
Skeet, supra note 17; Interview with Gloria Champion, supra note 17.
227. 1 identified 20 cases as verified domestic violence cases. See supra note 11 (describing
the methodology used). No agreement was reached in three of the 20 cases. In three other cases the
Peacemaking session never took place: In one case, the petitioner withdrew the petition before the
Peacemaking session; the second case was postponed at the respondent's request (while a protection
order hearing was held); and in the third, there was no evidence in the file of further action.
Agreements generally included referrals to services, but in two domestic violence cases there were no
referrals.
228. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
229. See Yazzie, Life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
230. These issues, if addressed at all, are addressed in batterer's treatment programs. Such
treatment programs challenge stock stories that support batterers' controlling behavior, but they
do so largely in a vacuum, with only marginal control of what happens outside of the meeting.
Batterer's treatment programs will suspend treatment and send an abuser back to court if they are
aware of incidents of further abuse or threats of abuse. Many programs engage in routine checks
with partners or ex-partners to determine whether abuse has reoccurred. Police reports or restraining
order violations usually result in automatic suspension from the program. See generally PENCE &
PAYMAR, supra note 184.
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The ideal model for intervention proposed by battered women's advo-
cates has been a "coordinated community response." '  In a coordinated
response, criminal sanctions are accompanied by strong supports for battered
women. Prosecutors craft their strategies so as to maximize victim safety;...
police provide victims with information about rights as well as referrals to
services including shelters;23 courts routinely order victim compensation;
and detectives and prosecutors follow up with victims to monitor threats or
intimidation tactics of the batterer 34 In addition, the justice system works
closely with service providers to assist women in safety planning and
advocacy with other systems, such as public assistance, child protective serv-
ices, and employers, and also to encourage support from victims' family and
friends.235 The reality in many jurisdictions, however, is very different.2"6
Without these supports, legal intervention may not create the kind of
change in either the victim's or the batterer's milieu necessary to provide
real safety or to enhance the victim's autonomy.237 The emphasis on legal
intervention has served to develop prosecution and civil protection order
proceedings without commensurate development of services and resources
231. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What's the Big Deal?, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
207, 207 (1997) ("[Alctivists have not seen arrest as a panacea. They have not identified it as a unitary
action, sufficient unto itself. Rather, activists have been calling for coordinated, comprehensive, and
specialized intervention by all components of the legal and human services systems.").
232. See Mahoney, supra note 37, at 84 (describing a prosecution strategy designed to maxi-
mize a woman's safety and recognize the batterer's tactics of control).
233. A number of locales now require police to give victims written information regarding
criminal justice intervention and the availability of civil protection orders as well as the phone
numbers of local service providers. See Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 178, at 98, 104 (describing a
Pennsylvania code that mandates that law enforcement provide victims with referral information).
234. Barbara Hart provides a thorough description of the strategies needed for a more effec-
tive criminal justice response to domestic violence. See id. at 103-13.
235. See id.
236. See Fields, supra note 206, at 202 (describing common judicial practice in domestic
violence cases in New York). See generally Hart, supra note 233 (describing difficulties battered
women face in the criminal justice processing of cases against their batterers).
237. It is not that punishing batterers does not help some women, but rather that it does not
always help and that, even when it does help, it is seldom enough. While some women benefit
from the collateral benefits of formal adjudication, these benefits are seldom assured. Frederick
notes the following problems with the criminal justice system's treatment of battering: There are
no advocates for full restitution for the victim of domestic violence; the system does not address
restoration of the victim's autonomy; and the system does not encourage the community to see its
role in battering through its minimization of the victim's danger, the seriousness of the violence,
and the terror the victim feels, and through its failure to adequately fund shelters and advocates.
See Frederick, supra note 2. Frederick concludes, however, that restorative justice processes present
greater dangers to battered women than does the criminal justice system. See id.
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for women. The compensation formally available through protection order
statutes and criminal codes is seldom ordered by the court."'
Formal consequences of legal intervention are notthe only way to meas-
ure success with regard to connection with material resources, however.239
A woman's contact with the justice system may be autonomy-enhancing
in ways that only marginally have to do with the operation of law."4 For
example, in addition to providing information regarding her legal rights and
referrals to social services, court personnel may encourage her to contact
estranged family members or other informal resources that, in turn, may
provide material assistance. The protection order may be important evi-
dence in a collateral fight. 41 The public censure involved in formal adju-
dication may encourage those who care about the batterer to recognize and
238. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 233, at 111 (describing how, in Pennsylvania, neither restitu-
tion nor victim compensation has been predictably awarded). Indeed, some judges hearing peti-
tions for protection orders are even hesitant to order child support, though protection order
statutes allow such orders, under the theory that other courts are better able to handle such
determinations. See Interview with Debra Weissman, former director of a legal services program
in North Carolina, in Miami, Fla. (Jan. 1999) (notes on file with author) (describing the practice
of some judges in North Carolina).
239. For example, debates over mandatory arrest policies frequently fail to locate the ques-
tion in the broader landscape of work for social change. In part, it is the political work that
engenders the pro-arrest and prosecution policies that will determine the effects of these policies
on the lives of women in that community. If the ideology of the reform efforts is not in touch
with the lives of the women they serve, they will not liberate. See generally Stark, supra note 178.
When elite women argue for mandatory'arrest policies, there is the real danger that it will be
implemented in a way that blames battered women, most of whom seen by the court will be poor
and minority, and it will pathologize their loyalties to family and to men. This is not an inevi-
table outcome, however. If mandatory arrest becomes the door through which women gain
empowerment and have more choices, then it can serve the ends of liberation. The important
thing is to ask all of the questions at once, to understand that battering happens within a myriad
of both competing and mutually reinforcing subordinating experiences for many women. See gen-
erally Donna Coker, Assessing Help Strategies for Battered Women: Material Resources and Poor
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1999) (arguing for assessing domes-
tic violence intervention strategies for the likelihood that they increase, battered women's material
resources, with poor women of color operating as the "test case" for such assessment, and applying
this assessment to pro- and mandatory-arrest policies).
240. 1 do not mean to diminish the importance of results that flow from legal intervention.
Restraining orders allow women to establish custody and visitation with children, which in turn
limits the batterers' ability to abduct the children and serves to organize child exchange in a way
that protects battered women. Batterers may be ordered to compensate their victims for losses
related to the battering.
I also do not intend to diminish the risks and negative outcomes of using legal intervention.
Inviting the state into your intimate life always carries a risk. For example, a battered woman may
find herself the subject of a child abuse or neglect investigation or lose her housing because of the
"disturbance" created first by the violence and then by the arrest.
241. Examples include child custody litigation and a civil tort action against the abuser. See
Mahoney, supra note 37, at 85-86 (describing attorney Kim Hansen's use of a power and control
theory in a tort claim against a batterer).
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intervene in his destructive behavior.242 The restraining order may make
timely police response more probable,"' and, if the police refuse to enforce
the restraining order, the order becomes a baseline from which to protest
police behavior, and thus a focus for organizing with other battered women.244
Both Peacemaking and formal adjudication have the capability to
connect battered women with community resources. However, the breadth
of Peacemaking's reach and its reliance on clan and familial responsibility
have the potential to alter the victim's social context in a way that may not
be true of formal adjudication.2 45
b. The Systemic Nature of Battering: Oppression in the Batterer's Life
and Peacemaking's Alternative to the "Responsibility Versus
Description" Dichotomy
Battering is systemic in that in addition to the social supports for male
abuse and privilege, many batterers are themselves subjected to oppressive
systems,246 including economic policies that result in an inability to support
242. See BOWKER, supra note 200, at 54 (noting that battering men who saw their friends
daily were more likely to continue abuse than those who did not, suggesting the importance of
friendship networks in supporting battering).
243. See, e.g., Molly Chaudhuri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered
Women's Experience with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANG-
ING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 227, 241 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1992) (find-
ing in a study of the effectiveness of domestic violence restraining orders that police came much
more quickly, with more consistency, and were more supportive after women obtained restraining
orders).
244. See Stark, supra note 178, at 127 (explaining that battered women's advocates use man-
datory arrest policies to establish a baseline for police conduct and as an organizing focus when
police deviate from the baseline).
245. In contrast are two cases in which it appears that only the couple were involved and
there were no referrals for further assistance. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window
Rock File Review, supra note 9.
246. Crenshaw writes that antiracist discourse and political organizations often overlook the
existence of gender oppression within communities of color, while antisexist organizations and
discourse overlook the existence of racism. See Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1252. Conversely,
male subordination of women may be a "defensive response to the economic, social, and political
subordination produced by race discrimination and economic exploitation." Elizabeth M. Iglesias,
Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction
of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 945 (1996). Iglesias notes that
[for women of color,] our racial and ethnic identities make it hard to accept images of
men that threaten or degrade their masculinity. Part of being straight means loving and
wanting men. Part of being colored means understanding the degree to which men expe-
rience their oppression as assaults on their manhood. Putting these two positions
together may mean listening to what men say about their struggles to construct self-
confident and other-affirming masculine identities.
Id. at 957-58 (footnotes omitted).
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families, 47 racist structures that hurt individuals both materially and spiritu-
ally,24 substance abuse and addiction,249 and histories of horrific childhood
abuse."' Peacemaking has the potential to recognize both individual moral
responsibility and oppression in the life of the abuser.
247. See, e.g., Etiony Aldarondo & Glenda Kaufman Kantor, Social Predictors of Wife Assault
Cessation, in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE,
supra note 45, at 183, 189-90 (comparing assaultive husbands who were persistently violent with
those who had ceased to be violent at the time of the study, and finding that family income was
significantly higher in the cessation group); Richard J. Gelles, Through a Sociological Lens: Social
Structure and Family Violence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 31, 33 (Richard
J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) ("[Allthough family violence does indeed cut across
social and economic groups, it does not do so evenly. The risk of child abuse, wife abuse, and elder
abuse is greater among those who are poor, who are unemployed, and who hold low-prestige jobs.").
248. See DURAN & DURAN, supra note 92, at 195 (describing a soul wound as both individual
and collective).
249. The nature of the relationship of alcohol and drug abuse to domestic violence is the
subject of controversy among researchers, but its correlation is a consistent finding of domestic
violence research. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 214, at 12 (reporting research that found sub-
stance abuse syndromes in half of the wife abusers studied); Kenneth E. Leonard & Theodore
Jacob, Alcohol, Alcoholism, and Family Violence, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 383, 388
(Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988). While some researchers argue that alcohol and drug
abuse cause domestic violence, see, e.g., Jerry Flanzer, Alcohol and Other Drugs Are Key Causal
Agents of Violence, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 247, at 171, it
appears that the relationship is more complicated than simple causality suggests. As Gelles and
others point out, crosscultural research indicates that "differences in drinking behavior appear to
be related to what people in each society believe about alcohol." Richard J. Gelles, Alcohol and
Other Drugs Are Associated with Violence-They Are Not Its Cause, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 247, at 182, 184. The widespread belief in our society is that
"alcohol and drugs release violent tendencies," provide people with a "'time-out' from the normal
rules of social behavior," and "provide a socially acceptable explanation for [domestic] violence."
Id. The result of social definition is underscored by the finding that domestic abusers in one study
overestimated their level of inebriation at the time of the assault. See id. at 186. Alcoholism may
skew family dynamics in ways similar to that of abuse in which the nonabusing members attempt
various strategies to cope with the abuser's manipulative, blaming, and often unpredictable behavior.
See Flanzer, supra, at 172-74.
The decision to focus on alcoholism as the cause of domestic violence may serve to hide other
important variables. As Eduardo Duran and Bonnie Duran argue in a broader context, the
emphasis on "[ailcoholism as a disease entity reduces the economic and social problems within
Native American communities to medical ones" and thus "distracts ... from the multifactorial
and structural analysis of [Native suicide, homicide, and injury rates.]" DURAN & DURAN, supra
note 92, at 104.
250. Many studies find that significant numbers of men identified as batterers experienced
violence in their homes of origin. See, e.g., Aldarondo & Kantor, supra note 247, at 188 (finding
a high incidence of severe forms of child abuse reported by men who batter). Domestic violence
researcher Donald Dutton suggests that a nested ecological theory may best describe battering's
etiology. Such a theory presumes that the interaction of characteristics of macrosystems (broad
cultural values and belief systems), exosystems (social structures that impinge on a person's imme-
diate settings), microsystems (family unit or immediate context for the battering), and ontogenetic
levels (individual development and psychological makeup) are related to battering's causality in any
given situation with any given batterer. See DUTTON, supra note 214, at 21, 24-32; see also
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When describing male violence against women, we have no language,
popular or legal, that recognizes the possibility of multiple determinants of
behavior as well as moral agency without a concomitant tendency towards
misogyny."' I refer to this inability to describe the batterer's context with-
out diminishing his responsibility as the "responsibility versus description
dichotomy." The abuser's context is relevant in Anglo jurisprudence only if
it is introduced as mitigation, but as mitigation the introduction of such
evidence is generally harmful to battered women because it too often encap-
sulates notions of female provocation."' Absent duress, criminal law doctrine
places provocation between the either-or categories of insanity and free
moral agency.253 The resonance between social and legal understandings
of provocation with cultural beliefs in women's power to incite male vio-
JEFFREY L. EDLESON & RICHARD M. TOLMAN, INTERVENTION FOR MEN WHO BATTER: AN
ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 11-15 (1992). Joan Meier suggests a similar political methodology:
[W]e have yet to envision the "story" of a batterer which would realistically synthesize
the roles of male prerogative, woman derogation, and the impact of poverty in his abuse
of women. Since the oppressions of poverty (combined with historic and contemporary
racism) are ambient and shape not only individuals, but families, generations, and entire
communities, such a story would require us to hold in our minds many levels at once: the
historic and societal privations of racism and poverty, the way those privations across a
community shape individuals, the patriarchal belief system that teaches that males are
entitled to control and possess females, as well as an understanding of the personal feel-
ings and motivations of the individual perpetrator and the victim.
Meier, supra note 41, at 234. I think Alice Walker accomplishes something very close. See ALICE
WALKER, THE THIRD LIFE OF GRANGE COPELAND (1970).
251. Feminist scholars Mahoney and Schneider make a related point in their descriptions of
law and culture's (false) dichotomy for battered women between victimization and agency. See
generally Mahoney, supra note 37; Schneider, supra note 55.
Why is it so difficult to see both agency and oppression in the lives of women?... I
have come to believe that the problem lies in part in prevailing social and legal concepts
of agency.... [A]gency and victimization are each known by the absence of the other:
you are an agent if you are not a victim, and you are a victim if you are in no way an agent.
Mahoney, supra note 37, at 64; see also Schneider, supra note 55, at 548-49 ("We now alternate
between visions of the battered woman as agent-as cause or provocateur of the battering-and
the battered woman as helpless victim .... [P]ortraying women solely as victims or solely as agents
is neither accurate nor adequate to explain the complex realities of women's lives.").
252. See generally Coker, supra note 182 (explaining that the criminal law concept of provoca-
tion resonate with the excuses and justifications that battering men offer for their violence, particu-
larly their claims of justification (e.g., the "the bitch deserved it" defense) and their quasi-self-defense
claims in which battering men cast themselves as victims of a woman's emotional or verbal "attack");
Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder
in the Post-Furman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507 (1996) (describing gendered provocation notions in
death penalty cases in which men kill intimate partners). For an empirical review of gender and
provocation concepts in Model Penal Code states, see Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem
Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
. 253. See Coker, supra note 182, at 93. For a related discussion of how emotions are under-
stood in law, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
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lence254 renders provocation notions in the context of domestic violence
hopelessly misogynist: She pushed him too far; she deserved what she got.
Attention to the context of the abuser's life threatens to devolve into
victim blaming: He has a hard life, and she should be more supportive and
understanding."' This is a serious danger because the batterer is often quite
adept at "explaining" why he beats her: Life beats him, he was drunk, or his
father was cruel.257 In addition, stories that describe the abuser's violence as
pathological and an illness fail to account for his choice of victims and for
the peculiar vulnerability of wives, girlfriends, ex-wives, and ex-girlfriends.
For Native women who are all too aware of the impact of racism and colo-
nialism in the lives of Native men,258 the mix of patriarchal rhetoric that
254. See, e.g., Coker, supra note 182, at 106-11; Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility,
11 LAw & PHIL. 127, 131 (1992) (concluding that law's treatment of rape relies in part on a male
innocence/female guilt paradigm in which "[w]omen are seductive and have the power, like the
Sirens, to drive men 'wild,' to lose control, and therefore not to be responsible").
255. See Coker, supra note 182, at 104-06. The point here is not to criticize the operation
of these categories in criminal law. (I do that elsewhere. See generally id.) The point is to suggest
that the "responsibility versus description" dichotomy is an unnecessary dichotomy that limits the
vision of anti-domestic violence work. It is not inevitable that recognition of context and sup-
port for battering diminish the perpetrator's responsibility for his violence. As Angela Harris
writes,
crime does not simply emerge from structures of oppression and injustice; crime is com-
mitted by people who consciously make choices about their actions and how they wish
their actions to be interpreted. The effort to prevent crime is incomplete without critical
attention to why people choose to commit crimes, why they commit the crimes they do,
and how they interpret their own lawbreaking behavior and that of others.
Harris, supra note 48, at 42. Harris argues for an "environmental justice" approach to crime in
African American communities that acknowledges crime as both an "aspect of a much larger
problem of social justice and economic distribution" and an individual moral choice. See id. at 23.
256. Some battered women's advocates may fear that implicating poverty or racism in bat-
tering's creation may threaten the broad-based political support for law reform. But see Crenshaw,
supra note 39, at 1260, for a discussion of the way in which the politics of relating the need for
domestic violence interventions to lawmakers, most of whom are upper-class, male, and white, in
terms of "your mother, your daughter," makes invisible the suffering of battered women who are
women of color or poor. I do not argue that men of color are more likely to batter. Indeed,
research that is not dependent on official police reporting suggests that race, when not confounded
by class and poverty, is not predictive of incident rate. See, e.g., Lettie L. Lockhart, Spousal
Violence: A Cross-Racial Perspective, in BLACK FAMILY VIOLENCE: CURRENT RESEARCH AND
THEORY 85, 91 (Robert L. Hampton ed., 1991) (presenting a study of African American and white
women across three measures of social class, and finding no significant racial differences in domes-
tic violence rates).
257. See Ptacek, supra note 186, at 141 (stating that batterers use the socially acceptable
language of excuses and justifications to explain their violence). Additionally, the social expecta-
tions of female caregiving may serve to reinforce the batterer's invocation of the "good mother
and wife" who stands by her husband. (No disrespect to Tammy Wynette intended.)
258. However, it is important to note that many domestic violence perpetrators are, in fact, non-
Indian. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (reporting a recent Bureau of Justice Statistics
study that finds that the majority of perpetrators of violence against Indians are non-Indians,
including those who commit domestic violence).
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"real" men are in control may intersect the reality of racist and colonial
subordination to create a gendered and cultural double-bind.259 This may be
compounded by batterers' propensity to blame the victims for their violence. 6
Despite these problems with attention to the batterer's context, focus-
ing on his responsibility without attention to context provides an incom-
plete picture. The myriad social, spiritual, cultural, familial, addiction, and
sex-hierarchy links to his violence are rendered invisible or irrelevant.261
Traditional Navajo thinking generally takes the pragmatic approach,
assuming that certain qualities of human nature are "givens"; thus the ques-
tion is, given human nature, how does one construct a world that best
enables harmonious behavior?262 Peacemaking proponents write that Native
justice systems focus on restoring harmony of relationships rather than on
259. See BETH E. RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BAT-
TERED BLACK WOMEN 62 (1996) (describing the ways in which the sense of racial solidarity for
some African American women creates a conflict with their needs as battered women); see also
WHITE, supra note 183, at 25 ("Black women have been conditioned to repair the damage that
has been done to black families because we feel it is our responsibility to keep the family together
at all costs."); Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas, supra note 40, at 248 ("Latinas face the
precarious, often untenable situation of the 'double bind'-empowerment through the disem-
powerment of a male member of the community. The internal conflict and external pressures to cast
police officials as outsiders, hostile to the community, frustrates the development of the Latinas'
empowerment." (footnote omitted)).
260. See Adams, supra note 32, at 193; Ptacek, supra note 186, at 133, 147-49.
261. See, e.g., Gelles, supra note 247, at 31 (finding that poverty is correlated with domestic
violence, though it is not a simple correlation). Meier makes a similar point in her article urging
poverty law activists and battered women's activists to join forces. Meier does not urge the aban-
donment of criminal sanctions against domestic violence, but she suggests that battered women's
activists may learn from poverty activists to have more compassion for (poor) battering men who
are often themselves the subjects of economic and sometimes racial oppression. See Meier, supra
note 41, at 234-35.
262. See, e.g., JOHN R. FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK: A SYNTHESIS OF NAVAJO PHILOSO-
PHY (1984) [hereinafter FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK]. Farella describes the lesson of the Navajo
story, "When People Moved Opposite":
Here is the nature of man-woman relationships. They are intense, they are necessary,
and they have certain characteristic, recurrent difficulties. What to do? There is no answer
or solution, no prescription that will make it all right. But some sort of resolution is
possible if you accept the givens of human existence, if your starting point is what nec-
essarily is and cannot be changed, rather than what ideally should be. In this case that
is the acceptance of the necessity of being with one another.
There is no final answer because there is no final answer. The truth is that the gods
couldn't solve the difficulty, so they turn it over to man to do with it what he can. It is
up to you as individuals, they say, to figure it out, to decide for yourselves. The ultimate
Navajo moral imperative is not something as mundane as the golden rule; it is the state-
ment, "It's up to you." There are no pretend, try-harder solutions to eternal problems.
The best that we can do is to accept the givens of life, and momentarily resolve difficulties
in terms of these givens.
JOHN FARELLA, THE WIND IN A JAR 60-61 (1993) [hereinafter FARELLA, THE WIND IN A JAR].
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guilt-based adjudication. 63 However, contrary to the notion that this means
that the offender is "let off easy," relationship-oriented justice may mean that
the offender is held to a higher level of responsibility than is true under adver-
sarial adjudication. To understand why this may be so, it is useful to examine
the Navajo concept of nay&', or "monsters" as it is commonly translated in
English. According to anthropologist John Farella, a monster is "anything
that gets in the way of a person living his life. ' ' Nay&' include depression,
obsession, and jealousy.26 The benefit of naming something a nay' is that
the source of one's "illness"-one's unhappiness or dysfunctionality--once
named may be cured.
[Tihe vague and subjective is transformed into something very con-
crete ... merely by labeling the experience .... This is what ritual is
about, making the intangible exquisitely real and then manipulating
it. The second thing that must happen is that society must be altered.
People must expect the patient to be transformed, and they must par-
ticipate in that transformation."'
Healing ceremonies are designed to rid a person of nay&', whether the
monster's presence is reflected in physical or emotional ill health.67 Healing
263. See Yazzie, life Comes from It, supra note 21, at 180-87; Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 83.
264. FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262, at 51. Some monsters are inevitable.
When the warrior twins had rid the earth of its monsters, they found a cave where a handful
of monsters remained: poverty, old age, hunger, and cold. These monsters persuaded the twins to
spare their lives, arguing that they were necessary for the survival of the people. See PAULA GUNN
ALLEN, GRANDMOTHERS OF THE LIGHT: A MEDICINE WOMAN'S SOURCEBOOK 76-77 (1991).
As Old Age woman pointed out, killing her would mean that the five-fingered beings
would have no reason to have children. And when a boy reached his sexual peak, or a
girl reached her womanhood, they would not engage in sex and much of the joy and
depth of their lives would be lost.... Youth would lose its meaning, and wisdom [with
age] would be unattainable....
[If Cold Woman was killed] the heat of the sun would wither all of life ....
... [TIhe Poverty Creature['s] ... job was to help people care about themselves,
their families, and the earth. Without the threat and fact of poverty, they said, no one
would.., ever make anything new....
... Hunger Man explained that without him there would be no reason for people to
cultivate plants. They would lose their taste for cooking and eating. Many of the pleas-
ures of being together would be denied them.
Id.
265. See FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262, at 51.
266. See FARELLA, THE WIND IN A JAR, supra note 262 at 132.
267. See id.; Zion, supra note 150, at 15. The concept that a person who acts badly is out of
balance, that his behavior is the result of monsters, may sound dramatically antithetical to notions
of individual personal responsibility. When peacemakers describe cutting through denial-the
denial of the abuser's parents who say either "he doesn't do that" or "she makes him do that" as
well as the abuser's denial-the truth that the peacemakers want the parents to realize is that "he
DOES do that" and "she does NOT make him do that," not that there are not forces at work that
make it easier to batter (e.g., cultural forces that reinforce misogynist notions of a woman's proper
place) and forces that make his life difficult (e.g., poverty, racism). This recognizes the pull of
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requires that the person be actively involved in the curing.2  A healing
ceremony is a costly endeavor for a family not only because it is expensive
and involves time-consuming labor, but also because it threatens to expose
the family to public scrutiny.269 The family must commit to whatever ongo-
ing healing requirements are imposed by the healer.2"' Thus, the very
process of organizing a ceremony may shift familial understandings of the
patient's illness and may (re)focus material and emotional resources on the
patient's well-being. "The sheer work involved in organizing a ceremony
functions' to heal the social problems that are always associated with ill-
ness .... And the symbolism and re-enactment of the ritual makes an illness
that was previously vague and unmanageable into something that is real and
tangible enough to be manipulated." '71
A healing ceremony, therefore, remakes the patient by attempting, in
part, to remake his world: his story of himself, his family's story of him, and
the material resources available to promote his well-being.272 Peacemaking,
at its best, is a healing ceremony; it seeks to remake the world-the bat-
terer's world, creating the possibility of a different life and a different point
of view, and the battered woman's world, marshaling resources and support-
ing her struggle for greater autonomy.
273
dangerous and destructive behavior-a pull that is social, gendered, and spiritual. See, e.g., JACK
KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 130 (1988) (describing the allure for some men of engaging in
dangerous behavior as a means of proving "manhood" when few other badges of manhood are
available).
268. See FARELLA, THE WIND IN AJAR, supra note 262, at 130-31.
269. See id. at 131-32. Farella contrasts this with the treatment of sickness predominant in
Western culture in which illness is often seen as individual, having no significant social compo-
nent, and the cure is conducted in private and protected by doctor-patient privileges. See id.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 131.
272. See id. For a discussion of the importance of stories in shaping understanding and self-
concept, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR:, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY
VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, at 83-85 (1997) (describing the importance of stories
in determining the law of treaties with Native American tribes). Elizabeth Iglesias similarly explores
the importance of narratives and countemarratives that support nonmisogynistic heterosexuality and
masculine identities. See Iglesias, supra note 246, at 991 ("[Proposed] counter-narratives offer alter-
native resources through which individual men and women may begin to construct the terms of a
nonmisogynistic heterosexuality, that is, a heterosexuality in which male power does not depend
upon female powerlessness and subordination.").
273. Peacemaking is sometimes described as a healing ceremony. See Interview with
Raymond Austin, supra note 14; Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15. Both processes
may rely on "taking the person back" to an earlier time in his or her life. See Interview with Ruthie
Alexis, supra note 12; Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9. Farella discusses
this "going back" function in rituals:
The ritual [of a treatment ceremony] takes us back to the beginning. The beings,
who originated in the underworld, return .... The invocation and dramatization of the
past bring the sense of connectedness of one's current experience through all time. The
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c. The Systemic Nature of Battering: Battering as a System of Control
Battering is systemic at the micro level: Battering involves a system of
behaviors used to control, or to attempt to control, the victim. The abuser's
battering behaviors are not limited to hitting but include emotional abuse and
controlling behaviors that are frequently more deadening than the physical
violence. The result may be a "state of siege" in which control, intimidation,
threats of violence, and violence permeate every aspect of the woman's life.274
Both the scope of Peacemaking's jurisdiction and its available remedies allow
peacemakers to address battering behaviors that are nonviolent and noncrimi-
nal, such as economic coercion and control, name-calling and humiliating
behavior, and influencing the children to coerce the woman.275 To state
a claim for Peacemaking, one must allege to be "injured, hurt or aggrieved
by the actions of another."'276 Peacemaking agreements may include "rehabili-
tative" measures (e.g., alcohol treatment, counseling, and healing ceremo-
nies) as well as "stay away" provisions.
Anti-domestic violence advocates attempt to use formal law to reach
nonviolent controlling behavior. In criminal law, traditional notions of
criminality have been expanded to reach harmful, controlling, nonviolent
behavior such as stalking. 78 Additionally, creative charging decisions and
prosecutorial strategies are used to address some of the myriad ways in which
a batterer dominates and limits the autonomy of a woman."'
Regardless of creative lawyering strategies and legislative drafting,
however, the criminal law will remain a somewhat blunt instrument, able
healer is working to create this experience on the part of the patient and her family, the
sense that something tangible and therefore alterable is occurring.
FARELLA, THE WIND IN A JAR, supra note 262, at 130-31. Batterer's treatment programs may
serve similar functions. See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 214, at 164; EDLESON & TOLMAN, supra
note 250, at 97-98.
274. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefi-
nition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1993) (citing a conversa-
tion with Sue Osthoff, Director, National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women
(Jan. 2, 1991)).
275. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 184, at 3 (describing nonviolent tactics of control);
Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 199-201 (suggesting possible remedies in community
conferencing that improve the victim's position, including restructuring finances, regular family
monitoring, or requiring the batterer to move out of the family home).
276. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 3.2, in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 105.
277. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
278. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (1994) (creating a crime of stalking for intentionally
and repeatedly following someone and making an implied or expressed threat).
279. See Mahoney, supra note 37, at 84 (describing the use of creative charging to enhance a
victim's safety); Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 80-81.
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only to reach a portion of the behavior that constitutes battering.280 It will
not reach the myriad controlling behaviors of a battering system.28 "Law
especially emphasizes acts of physical violence, and this emphasis in turn
hides broader patterns of social power, [including] patterns of power within
a given relationship ....
By comparison, civil protection orders in domestic violence cases are
better able to forbid some nonviolent controlling behavior. The petitioner's
burden of proof is more easily reached than that required of a criminal
prosecution,283 and, once the protection order is granted, behaviors that would
284
otherwise be legal are subject to criminal sanctions.
2. Peacemaking May Transform Context and Foster Personal and Social
Change Through the Use of Traditional Navajo Stories
Peacemakers rely on traditional Navajo narratives to resolve problems
brought to Peacemaking. Peacemakers may tell stories in their lectures to
the parties, or they may refer to a character or a concept central to a story
in order to illustrate a point or teach a lesson.8 In this part I describe the
280. The reform effort's answer to this has been to send batterers to treatment programs
that, in the main, address a range of controlling behaviors, behaviors that far exceed those that are
criminalized. See, e.g., Dakis & Lazarus, supra note 206, at 46; Judge Linda Dakis, Injunctions for
Protection, 68 FLA. B.J. 48, 50 (1994).
281. This is why criminology and general debates on crime control are both helpful and
unhelpful when it comes to addressing domestic violence. They are not helpful if they fail to address
the importance of underlying beliefs in a way that recognizes that offenders (batterers) are likely
to hold relevant beliefs that are not that different from the majority. This is particularly true with
subordinating crimes: crimes that are aimed at particular groups (race, gender, ethnicity) and in
which the victims are targeted because of who they are.
282. Mahoney, supra note 37, at 60.
283. For example, protection order statutes allow for protection orders on grounds that might
not support a criminal charge, including, a "reasonable cause to believe [the petitioner] may become
the victim of any act of domestic violence." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 1997) (domestic vio-
lence injunction). Of course, the petitioner's evidentiary burden in a civil protection order proceed-
ing is easier than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" required of the state in a criminal proceeding.
284. See, e.g., NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1660-63 (Equity 1995) (stating that the relief available
through a protection order includes an order granting exclusive possession of the residence; an
order to "stay away" from the petitioner's, the family's, or the clan member's residence, place of work,
or school; an order restraining the respondent from having any contact with the petitioner including
in person, in writing, by phone, or through other means; and an order to attend substance abuse
counseling or domestic abuse counseling; and further specifying thai failure to adhere to the court's
orders is the offense of "interfering with judicial proceedings" and that a violating respondent is
subject to immediate arrest and, if found guilty, may be imprisoned for 180 days and fined $250).
285. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 77 (stating that the naat'aanii's lecture to the parties
"often relates Navajo creation scripture through its many examples and maxims of the right way to
do things"); see also Zion, supra note 150, at 24 ("A naat'aanii-peacemaker knows the traditional
Navajo values and will most often express them by relating what happened in creation times to
the problem at hand.").
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use of traditional Navajo stories that embody gender-egalitarian themes.
These stories offer the potential to describe Navajo masculinity in ways that
support gender-egalitarian relations. Thus, the use of these stories may trans-
form the way in which the batterer and his family understand his battering
behavior."6
Gender complementariness in traditional Navajo thinking is the para-
digm for understanding the interdependence of all creation.1 7 Navajo creation
stories and journey narratives underscore the importance of harmony,
particularly gender harmony,2"' and may support a gender-egalitarian view."'
For example, the story of the response of Changing Woman, "a central
mythological figure,"" to Sun's marriage proposal, underscores gender com-
plementariness in which women's needs and demands are understood to be as
important as those of men.291 Changing Woman gave birth to two sons, Born
for Water and Monster Slayer, who were responsible for ridding the earth of
monsters that were killing the people.29 ' When the monsters were vanquished,
Sun, father of the twins, came to ask her to move away with him.
286. Zion writes that Peacemaking moves participants from "head thinking" to "heart think-
ing." See Zion, supra note 150, at 24. The offender is less likely to reject teachings of family and
a peacemaker than of an authority figure such as a judge. See id. at 22-23. In Peacemaking, he
"learns the inaccuracy of [his] ... excuse[s] [for his behavior] and begins to change attitudes toward
others." Id. at 24.
287. See Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 10; Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 413.
288. See, e.g., Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 10 (noting that this "[b]alance in gender relations is
expressed symbolically in the female/male pairing of ritual elements, including west/east, red/blue,
earth/sun, and blood/water").
289. Peacemakers told me that they frequently use traditional stories. See Interview with Ruthie
Alexis, supra note 12; Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9. The peacemakers'
notes in the files I reviewed were generally too limited to verify the degree to which traditional
Navajo stories were used by peacemakers. Some Peacemaking files noted that the peacemaker "coun-
seled the [couple/family/children] on the responsibilities of [husband/wife/child]." Shiprock File
Review, supra note 9.
290. Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 9.
291. "[Changing Woman] is the nurturer, the giver, the provider. One feels primarily warmth,
trust, and safety in her presence, and the earth-surface dweller is always in her presence." FARELLA,
THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262, at 63. The Navajo word for mother may also include Changing
Woman, "a central mythological figure, who came to the Navajo, it is said, when people had lost
the ability to reproduce. The first female puberty rite was held for her, celebrating her fertility and
enabling her to mate with the Sun." Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 9. Changing Woman's impor-
tance is expressed in the continued vitality of the puberty rite Kinaald, a ceremony for girls' first
menstrual period. Kinaaldd "expresses the values of womanhood and assures a good life for the ado-
lescent girl." LAMPHERE, supra note 58, at 157-58. The Kinaal&d ceremony is designed to create a
positive self-image in young girls. See Shepardson, supra note 58, at 164.
292. See 1 NAVAJO HISTORY 50 (Ethelou Yazzie ed., 1971); PAUL G. ZOLBROD, DINE'
BAHANE': THE NAVAJO CREATION STORY 182-278 (1984). The monsters were born as a result
of women's "abusing themselves" with cacti, rocks, and other instruments during the years of liv-
ing separately. The men "abused themselves" as well, but no monsters were born as a result. See
FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262, at 53-54.
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[O]n the morning of the fifth day Asdzdd nddeehl the Changing
Woman made her way to the summit of Ch'6o1T'( the Giant Spruce
Mountain and sat down on a rock.
And as she sat there recollecting, J6honaa'df the Sun arrived and
placed himself beside her.
He sought to embrace her.
But she struggled to free herself.
As she did so she said these words to him:
"What do you mean by molesting me so?" she said to him.
"I want no part of you!"
To which he gave her this reply:
"I mean simply that I want you for my own," he replied.
"I mean that I want you to come to the west and make a home for me
there."
"But I wish to do no such thing," replied she.
"By what right do you make such a request of me?"
[Sun replied,] "When our son Naayj6' neizghdnf the Monster Slayer
last visited me, he promised you to me."
[Changing Woman said to him:]
"What do I care for promises made by someone else in my behalf?
I make my own promises or else there are no promises to be made. I
speak for myself or else I am not spoken for. I alone decide what I shall
do or else I do nothing."
[Sun continued to insist that Changing Woman join him. Changing
Woman spoke.] And this is what she said to him at last:
"You have a beautiful house in the east I am told," she said to him.
"I want just such a house in the west.
"I want it built floating on the shimmering water, away from the
shore, so that when the Earth-Surface people multiply they will not
bother me with their quarrels.
"And I want all sorts of gems.
"I want white shell. I want blue shell. I want turquoise. I want hali-
otis. I want soapstone, agate, redstone, jet.
"Such things I want planted around my house so that I may enjoy their
beauty."
[This is how Sun replied:]
"What do you mean by making such demands of me?" he replied.
"Why should I provide you with all of those things?
This time she answered him quickly. And this is what she said to him:
"I will tell you why," she said to him.
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"You are male and I am female.
"You are of the sky and I am of the earth.
"You are constant in your brightness, but I must change with the seasons.
"You move constantly at the very edge of heaven, while I must remain
fixed in one place.
"Remember that I willingly let you send your rays into my body.
Remember that I gave birth to your son, enduring pain to bring him
into the world. Remember that I gave that child growth and pro-
tected him from harm. Remember that I taught him to serve his
people unselfishly so that he would willingly fight the Alien Monsters.
"Remember, as different as we are, you and I, we are of one spirit. As
dissimilar as we are, you and I, we are of equal worth. As unlike as you
and I are, there must always be solidarity between the two of us.
Unlike each other as you and I are, there can be no, harmony in the
universe as long as there is no harmony between us.
"If there is to be such harmony, my requests must matter to you. My
needs are as important to me as yours are to you. My whims count
as much as yours do. My fidelity to you is measured by your loyalty to
me. My response to your needs is to reflect the way you respond to
mine. There is to be nothing more coming from me to you than there
is from you to me. There is to be nothing less."
[SIlowly... [Sun] drew close to her.
Slowly and thoughtfully he placed his arm around her.
And this time she allowed him to do so.
Whereupon he promised her that all the things she wished for she
would have....
So it is that she agreed; they would go to a place in the west where
they would dwell together in the solid harmony of kinship. 9
Navajo stories such as "Changing Woman" have the power to act as antisub-
ordination" stories, counterstories to the colonizer's story of male dominance
293. ZOLBROD, supra note 292, at 272-75. Zolbrod's research for his written version began
with the work of Washington Matthews (1843-1905), whose book, Navaho Legends, provides one
of the most complete early written accounts of Navajo creation stories. See NAVAJO LEGENDS
(Washington Everson ed. & trans., 1994); ZOLBROD, supra note 292, at 5. Zolbrod used other
translations and ethnographic accounts to verify and supplement Matthews's prose. See id. at 11-
12, 18. In addition, Zolbrod interviewed several Navajo informants who recited portions of the
story to him, and he studied the Navajo language. See id. at 12. Zolbrod's English translation attempts
to "duplicate the parallel structure of the language a Navajo storyteller employs." Id. at 14.
294. Ruth Colker, in the context of federal constitutional equal protection doctrine, distin-
guishes between "anti-subordination" and "anti-differentiation." See Ruth Colker, Hypercapital-
ism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United
States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 220-21 (1997). Colker argues that:
Courts should analyze equal protection cases from an anti-subordination perspective.
Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in society
to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole. This
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over women, human dominance over the natural world, and European
dominance over Indians.2 95 American Indian battered women's advocates
have recognized the power of similar narratives as an organizing principle for
opposition to domestic violence.
We make no apology for believing and promoting the ideals that
women battering is not an Indian tradition.... The ideals that
women shall live free of violence, control their own lives, manage
their own assets, and have a say over things which directly affect
their lives are key elements of our program. If these ideals are in line
with those of "white western feminism" then we say, "Welcome, our
approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and between
whites and non-whites, through the development of laws and policies that directly
redress those disparities....
In contrast to the anti-differentiation approach, the anti-subordination perspective
is a group-based perspective, in two ways. First, it focuses on society's role in creating
subordination. Second, it focuses on the way in which this subordination affects, or has
affected, groups of people.
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003,
1007-09 (1986) (footnotes omitted); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning and the Sound
of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787, 792 (1992) (argu-
ing that First Amendment jurisprudence should recognize that hate speech silences the less power-
ful, that "[wihen hate speech is employed with the purpose and effect of maintaining established
systems of caste and subordination it violates [the] ... core value [of full and equal citizenship],"
and that "[h]ate speech often prevents its victims from exercising legal rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and civil rights statutes"). See generally CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl J.
MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997).
295. See ALLEN, supra note 65, at 41-42. Allen argues that to create "the social transforma-
tion from [Native] egalitarian, gynecentric systems to [a] hierarchical, patriarchal system requires
meeting four objectives." Id. at 41. The first is to replace the "primacy of female as creator" with
"male-gendered creators." Id. The second is to destroy "tribal governing institutions" and their
underlying philosophies. Id. The third
is accomplished when people are pushed off their lands, deprived of their economic liveli-
hood, and forced to curtail or end altogether pursuits on which their ritual system, philoso-
phy, and subsistence depend. Now dependent on white institutions for survival, tribal systems
can ill afford gynocracy when patriarchy-that is, survival-requires male dominance.
Id. at 41-42. The fourth objective
requires that the clan structure be replaced ... by the nuclear family. By this ploy, the
women clan heads are replaced by elected male officials and the psychic net that is formed
and maintained by the nature of nonauthoritarian gynecentricity grounded in respect for
diversity of gods and people is thoroughly rent.
Id. at 42. The contradiction between traditional practices in which women are said to be respected
and the reality of domestic violence are not unique to the Navajo, of course. As Native battered
women's advocates write:
We liken our struggle caring for and protecting our mothers and sisters to our collective
struggle to care for and preserve our land, the Big Turtle. We are, however, not blind to
the contradiction between the ideology and the practice. Too many of our men who take
on the battle to preserve our traditions, land, and language-who perform the cere-
monies, who play the drums, who dance, or who carry the eagle feather-also batter and
abuse their partners and children.
BALZER ET AL., supra note 95, at 9.
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white sisters, for striving for the things which were once ours by
birthright well before your 'forefathers' arrived on our shores. 296
Of course, stories can "flip"'297 in meaning, having one meaning in one
context to a particular set of listeners and quite a different meaning in another
context with a different set of listeners. The interpretation of the Navajo
creation story, "Where People Moved Opposite"'29 provides an example.
"Where People Moved Opposite" tells the story of when men and women
determine that they can no longer live together. After First Man and First
Woman fight, First Man persuades the men to live on the other side of the
296. BALZER ET AL., supra note 95, at 7. Similarly, legal scholars have long recognized the
value of stories as a means of countering stereotypes and opening up creative opportunities for
compromise, and as a method of creating an understanding of domestic violence. See, e.g., Anthony
V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J.
2107 (1991); Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277, 315 (1993)
("In conjunction with legal reform, education, and institutional change .... [narratives] can bring
us closer to the day when sexuality is pleasure and play, not danger and degradation, for women
and men."); Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider
Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1847-48 (1994) [hereinafter Fajer, Outsider Nar-
ratives] (noting that stories may counter stereotypes created by the listener's "pre-understanding");
Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and
Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 514 (1992); Deborah M. Kolb,
The Love for Three Oranges Or: What Did We Miss About Ms. Follett in the Library?, 11 NEGOTIATION
J. 339, 345 (1995) (asserting that stories open up creative opportunities for compromise); Margulies,
supra note 40, at 1075 ("Stories are the best vehicle for illustrating the terror that survivors [of
domestic violence] face."); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing
the Conflation of "Sex,""Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 3, 366 (1995) (writing that the use of narratives in queer legal theory is important
because they have a "special power... to elicit a sense of empathy with sexual minority equality
claims"). Scholars such as Gerald L6pez believe that problem solving of all types by all persons
in all venues is often done through storytelling. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 39-41 (1992). In this part I refer to a
related but different point: Stories sometimes have the ability to change cognition, to allow parties
to "reinvent" themselves, as well as to gain empathy. See generally Fajer, Outsider Narratives, supra,
passim. This is not the inevitable result of storytelling, of course. The impact of a story depends,
among other things, on its content and context and its credibility to the listener.
297. 1 am indebted to Margaret Montoya for her suggestion that I investigate the way in
which Navajo traditional stories may "flip" in meaning. In another context, Montoya argues that
stories-albeit personal stories-have the "potential for challenging the dominant discourse" and
"invent[ing], reform[ing] and refashion[ing] personal and collective identity." Margaret E. Montoya,
Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grefias: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal
Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 210 (1994). The Changing Woman and Sun story also
has a negative meaning. Some versions relate First Woman's anger at Changing Woman's deci-
sion to leave home. Because Changing Woman took a husband without parental approval and
because Changing Woman moves to Sun's residence rather than to her mother's, she has deprived
her parents of the services of their son-in-law. See FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262,
at 60.
298. Farella notes that "Where People Moved Opposite" is a better translation of the Navajo
title of the story than the usual English translation, "Men Versus Women." See FARELLA, THE
WIND IN AJAR, supra note 262, at 59.
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river, away from the women. Though versions vary as to what started the
fight between First Man and First Woman, many versions center on First
Man's anger about First Woman's adultery.299 The men are joined by the
nddleeh, "who were no more female than they were male,"3" and prosper
materially because the nddleeh are able to do women's jobs."1 After four years
of living apart, the women's situation is desperate; they are starving and
destitute.0 2 The men, while doing well materially thanks to the n.dleeh, are
desperately lonely for the women's company.3"3 Finally, the men and women
reunite.04 The story is sometimes understood to represent the necessary gen-
der complementariness that underscores much of Navajo cosmology.
What brings men and women together, sexual desire and our
general need for and incompleteness without the other, is also what
drives us apart.' But when they are apart, they become intensely
desirous of each, other.... [Miales and females are together out of a
very fundamental necessity....
They get back together. °5
299. There are different versions of the cause of the fight that split First Man and First
Woman apart, but they all center on jealousy and most refer to sexual jealousy. In some versions,
the fight centers on the woman's adultery, while others focus on the lack of appreciation for the
different but equally important roles played by men and women. Compare 1 NAVAJO HISTORY,
supra note 292, at 28-30 (recounting that First Woman commits adultery and the men, stirred by
First Man's anger and jealousy, elect to move to the other side of the river), with ZOLBROD, supra
note 292, at 58-70 (stating that First Man and First Woman's fight over "who does the most work
around here" and "who is most important" leads to First Man's decision to take the men and separate
from the women). Farella notes that the story that begins with First Woman's adultery "is a man's
version of the story. I could never get women to talk to me about it.... The published versions of
the story are also all from men and translated by men." FARELLA, THE WIND IN A JAR, supra note
262, at 60 n.I. Farella relates the story this way:
First Woman commits adultery. First Man suspects that something is going on and he is
worried; he can't sleep and he obsesses about his wife .... So he follows her and sees her
meeting and having sex with her lover. When she returns they fight .... They argue
about control, who is the strongest, and so on. And they decide that they don't need
each other, that things would be better if they lived apart. ...
What brings men and women together, sexual desire and our general need for and
incompleteness without the other, is also what drives us apart. But when they are apart,
they become intensely desirous of each other. ...
They get back together .... They are ritually cleansed after their separation and, as
with all ritual, a four-day period of sexual abstinence is prescribed. They of course don't,
or can't, follow it. You can trust a religion with stories like this.
Id. at 60.
300. ZOLBROD, supra note 292, at 60.
301. See id. at 61.
302. See id. at 63.
303. See id.
304. See id. at 70; see also 1 NAVAJO HISTORY, supra note 292, at 30.
305. FARELLA, THE WIND IN A JAR, supra note 262, at 60.
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Another understanding is that because "First Man ... [introduced] sexual
desire and, therefore,.. . jealousy and adultery" into the, world, he is respon-
sible for the problem that began "Moving Opposite. 3 °6 Another version finds
a rationale for distrusting women because First Woman introduced adultery
and disharmony into the world."0
Just as stories may have different meanings, the understanding of "tra-
ditional" may be contested, or at least contested in particular circum-
stances." For example, traditional conceptions of gender relations may mean
a belief that the world is animated by male and female essences and that
harmony requires a balance of the two.3"s It may mean a political order in
which women have roughly equal, though not necessarily the same, power
as do men.310 Given the influence of Christianity in the Navajo Nation, it
may mean Paul's admonition to the Ephesians: "Wives [should] be subject
to [their] husbands, as to the Lord." ' For example, one interviewee told of
coming in late to a meeting of peacemakers who were discussing domestic
violence cases. One of the women peacemakers stated that she believed
that domestic violence was the result of too many women trying to act like
men. She explained that a woman acted like a man when she took a man's
306. FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262, at 54.
307. See Shepardson, supra note 58, at 172 ("When I asked a judge why so few women were
elected to the Navajo Tribal Council, he referred to this [story of separation of the sexes]. That,
he said, was why Navajo women could not be trusted in politics."); Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at
422 n.107 ("Navajo men often cite the separation of men and women over adultery in a prior
world as evidence of the superiority of men.").
308. See Laura Nader & Jay Ou, Idealization and Power: Legality and Tradition in Native
American Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 13, 25-28 (1998). Nader's work describes the use of
"harmony" ideology as pacification. Under conditions of colonization, Nader argues that Native
American use of harmony concepts may be accommodation to Christian proselytizing and Euro-
American colonization. See LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A
ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 291 (1990) ("Harmony ideologies may be used to suppress peoples
by socializing them toward conformity in colonial contexts, or they may be used to resist external
control, as the Talean Zapotec do."). "Traditional" concepts may be deployed in a similar fashion.
See Nader & Ou, supra, at 37 (describing the deployment of Indian "traditions" such as "idealiza-
tions of the Indian worldview, such as the web of life" in efforts of a power company and its Indian
allies to aggressively market the building of a nuclear waste storage facility on Indian land).
309. See Bonvillain, supra note 58, at 10.
310. See Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 412.
311. Ephesians 5:22 (New Revised Standard Version). Many Navajo people are Christians.
See Interview with Tom Tso, former Chief Justice of the Navajo Supreme Court, in Crownpoint,
Navajo Nation, N.M. (Apr. 20, 1997) (notes on file with author). Tso discussed his misgivings
with Peacemaking's focus on traditional spiritual understandings because the many Navajo Chris-
tians might feel uncomfortable. Tso counseled for a process that was not specifically "spiri-
tual," which, he believed, was more in keeping with traditional problem-solving methods of the
Navajo. See id.
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job and failed to have dinner on the table when the man got home from
work."'
Despite the possibility of different interpretations of Changing Woman's
story, the one of gender harmony is most common. This is so because "Ithe
central theme [of the Navajo creation account] is the attainment of h6zh6, a
fairly untranslatable term which can only be approximated in English by
combining words like beauty, balance, and harmony,"' and gender harmony
is necessary for h6zh6.
The pivotal element [in achieving h6zh6] is the fundamental relation-
ship between male and female, represented first by Axts6 hastiin or
First Man and Axts asddd or First Woman, and later by Asdzdd
n&//eeh6 or Changing Woman and J6h6na'Wf the Sun. The inability
of the former two to get along causes evil by bringing about the gen-
eration of the Naay6' or Alien Gods. The union of the latter couple
represents the first step leading to the destruction of the evil mon-
sters. But full harmony cannot be established until Changing Woman
and the Sun achieve a fully equitable relationship; and not until then
does the actual creation of the Navajo people occur. Everything that
happens throughout the [creation] story relates directly or indirectly
to the notion of delicate balance between male and female. 34
312. Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.) (notes
on file with author). For a description of the various responses of American Indian women to
Christian proselytizing and colonization, see generally Pauline Turner Strong, Feminist Theory and
the 'Invasion of the Heart' in North America, 43 ETHNOHISTORY 683 (1996). Anti-domestic vio-
lence advocates working in the Pueblo tribe raise similar concerns regarding traditional Pueblo
counseling. See, e.g., Sharon Pomeranz & William Johnson, Stuck in the Middle with Mediation,
1(1) PUEBLO DRUM: INDIAN PUEBLO LEGAL SERVICES, INC. NEWS. 4-5 (1997). Pomeranz and
Johnson note that in traditional Pueblo mediation,
[o]ften times the incidents of violence are overlooked entirely by the neutral media-
tor .... Traditional [Pueblo] dispute resolution emphasizes family preservation and reuni-
fication but may block a women [sic] from making informed choices about what is right
for her life. The reason why couples are asked to participate in mediation when family
violence has occurred is so that the couple can work it out and stay together. .... Families
are precious, but violence should not be taken lightly.... Mediation does not offer a
woman choices, control, advocacy, safety, or binding resolution.
Id. Similar concerns have been raised about sentencing circles. See discussion supra note 207 and
source cited.
313. ZOLBROD, supra note 292, at 5.
314. Id. at 5-6; see also Zion & Zion, supra note 21, at 415 (describing h6zh6). The necessity
of balance between male and female essences in all things can be seen in the importance of symbolic
colors in Navajo ceremonies: "White, a male color, stands for dawn; blue, a female color, stands for
broad daylight; yellow, also female, is the evening twilight; and black, a male color, is the darkness of
the night." ZOLBROD, supra note 292, at 347. Bluehouse explained in a community education
presentation that I observed that Hashkeeji Naat 'aah ("War Way") and Hozhooji Naat'aah ("Peace
Way") must be in balance to create Hozho Nahasdlii ("Harmony Restored"). See generally Bluehouse,
supra note 152.
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3. Peacemaking May Support "Safe Connection""3 5 and Avoid
Gender Essentialism
In this part, I argue that Peacemaking may evade two problems com-
mon to domestic violence reform institutions. First, Peacemaking does not
treat as pathological women's attempts to maintain relationships with men
who have abused them and may offer support that enhances women's safety
in those relationships. Second, Peacemaking does not discount women's
various competing loyalties and thus does not demand that women choose
their identity as "battered women" over other competing identities.
Peacemaking and the Focus on Separation. Legal professionals in domes-
tic violence reform institutions-judges who routinely hear protection order
or misdemeanor battering cases, court personnel hired specifically to work
with battered women,36 prosecutors, police officers, probation officers, and
court clerks-frequently understand women's unwillingness to cooperate with
formal interventions that are the direct result of battering.3 The narrative
exists in three variants: The batterer is intimidating her; she is brainwashed
by the batterer and believes that she deserves to be hit;"' and she believes
that she can change him, but she is wrong in that belief. The correct
response to each of the variants is for her to leave him."9 Martha Mahoney
argues that this emphasis on separation results from a societal inability to
recognize the coexistence of both strength and weakness, victimization and
agency."' She argues that women's struggles in the context of daily oppres-
sion are thus made invisible.32 '
315. The term is Littleton's. See Littleton, supra note 177, at 52. Littleton asks, "What
would legal doctrine and practice look like if it took seriously a mandate to make women safer in
relationships, instead of offering separation as the only remedy for violence against women?" Id.
316. See Dakis & Lazarus, supra note 206, at 47-51 (describing a Miami-Dade County,
Florida model in which court personnel assist both petitioners and respondents in civil protection
order hearings). See generally Hart, supra note 233 (providing a detailed account of what battered
women need from the criminal justice system).
317. Formal interventions include prosecution as well as civil protection orders.
318. Mahoney has described the manner in which images of battered women as extreme vic-
tims make it difficult for women to identify their own stories of victimization and struggle against
that victimization. See Mahoney, supra note 49, at 25.
319. See id. at 6 (explaining that the battered woman's "failure" to leave makes her claims of
battering suspect or makes her seem "crazy"); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea
of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1307 (1992)
("[Wihile ... social historians have painted a complex world of oppression and resistance.., law
has not managed to incorporate this duality and struggle, pain and strength, but filters it to a sense
of victimization."); Schneider, supra note 55, at 557-58. This narrative is far less misogynist than
the one it replaced, in which battered women were understood to be either liars or provocateurs
and "deserved what they got." It is still, however, an inaccurate account of women's struggles.
320. See Mahoney, supra note 37, at 64.
321. See id.
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The personal story of a Navajo domestic violence counselor illustrates
Mahoney's point.322 This counselor told me that she had "walked the talk"
and could relate to what domestic violence victims go through. When her
husband beat her, she called the police, but they would not do anything.
One day she called the police and told them that all she wanted was for
them to assist in escorting her husband to his mother's house. They agreed.
When the police arrived, her husband asked if he could ride with her. She
agreed that he could, as long as he did not "act out." The police followed
her. During the course of the drive, her husband started "acting out," and
she stopped the car and told police officers he had to ride with them
because she was afraid he was going to hurt her. When they arrived at his
mother's house, she told her mother-in-law: "[Y]ou're always blaming me
and are always saying [his behavior is] my fault, but I'm giving the problem
back to you and it's your problem." She and her husband were separated for
two years. During that time, she returned to college and became financially
independent. Her husband, meanwhile, began alcohol treatment. They are
now reunited, and there has been no more violence. Stories like this one
are simply not captured in a "staying versus leaving" calculus.
While sympathetic legal professionals in legal reform institutions are
sensitive to the propensity to "blame the victim," '323 their understanding of
the lives of the women they see may be constrained by class or racial
divides. This is particularly accentuated when those legal professionals are
not involved in political and community work on battering, because their
exposure to battered women is limited to brief encounters in the courtroom
or hurried conversations before a hearing. With such limited contact, they
may be unaware of the myriad ways in which women attempt to organize
both formal and informal resources to foster more choices in their lives and
to increase their safety. 324 Further, law-trained professionals tend to over-
emphasize legal courses of action and often believe that women will be safer
if they separate and if legal proceedings are initiated.3 25  This tendency
322. See Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.)
(notes on file with author).
323. See generally WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1976).
324. See David A. Ford, Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering
Women in Violent Conjugal Relationships, 25 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 313, 314 (1991) (noting that women
may desire to use prosecution as a power resource to negotiate more safety and more control in
their lives); Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence
Victims, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK?, supra note 178, at 214, 241; Miller
& Krull, supra note 45, at 243-44.
325. See Hart, supra note 233, at 100 ("Criminal justice system personnel too often believe
that battered women will be safer and less exposed to life-jeopardizing violence once they are sepa-
rated from the offenders and once prosecution has commenced.").
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results in an overemphasis on legal reform and an underemphasis on other
efforts for social change.
When a woman with a restraining order is killed or harmed by an
abuser, it is not uncommon to hear, "She did everything right, but.... ." She
did everything right? The work to create a coordinated system response can
so easily translate into a system that requires "good" battered women to use
every aspect of that coordinated system. Similarly, when women with tempo-
rary domestic violence protection orders do not return for permanent orders,
the assumption is that nonreturn means that the system failed.326 Research
demonstrates the contrary: Some women reunite with battering partners
and experience no further violence, and other women exchange dropping
the order for important concessions from the batterer in areas such as cus-
tody and support.327 In other words, for some women a temporary order
marks success, not failure.3"' Informed by the societal inclination to believe
victimization and agency to be diametrically opposed categories, overconfidence
in the superiority of legal processes combines with overconfidence that
separation enhances a woman's safety. The result is a simple calculus: Sepa-
ration is "good," and staying or reuniting is "bad."
Loyalty Traps329 and Gender Essentialism. Angela Harris criticizes femi-
nist legal theory for its frequent reliance on a gender essentialism that
requires that women presume an undifferentiated single identity: "woman. '
Legal institutions designed to help battered women may similarly require
that they adopt a singular essentialist identity: "battered woman."33 1
This identity requires that the woman prioritize the domestic abuse, even
if she is suffering other (and potentially worse) violence or abuse in other
326. See Telephone Interview with Linda Dakis, former Chief Administrative Judge of the
Dade County Domestic Violence Court (Oct. 1996) (notes on file with author).
327. See Harrell & Smith, supra note 324, at 219-21 (describing the reasons that the women
in the study gave for dropping the protection order).
328. See Ford, supra note 324, at 320-21; Harrell & Smith, supra note 324, at 218.
329. Paraphrasing from Beth Richie, Battered Black Women: A Challenge for the Black Com-
munity, BLACK SCHOLAR, March/April 1985, at 40, 41.
330. See Harris, supra note 39, at 585. Harris notes elsewhere that the use of a "race" identity
is primarily about "a certain set of political and moral rights and obligations that are argued to arise
from a certain history .... Claiming a nonwhite racial identity in this anti-racist context is to make
a moral demand on whites to recognize and redress the injuries caused by white supremacy."
Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 207,
212 (1996). 1 argue similarly that enhancing battered women's autonomy means, among other
things, not pathologizing the political, social, and familial identities that women use, sometimes
strategically and sometimes as an expression of personal identity.
331. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 87-89
(1989); Mahoney, supra note 49, at 25 (describing the manner in which extreme images of bat-
tered women prevent women from identifying as battered); Schneider, supra note 55, at 530-31.
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locations. "2 The emphasis on separation coupled with this insistence on pri-
oritizing battering results in defining as pathological her loyalties to anything
other than her children and her own safety."' Women who desire to remain
connected334 to their abusive partners may receive diminished support."'
332. See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 124-25 (1984).
[M]any black women feel they must confront a degree of abuse wherever they turn in this
society.... Black women in professional positions.., are often the targets of abuse by
employers and co-workers who resent their presence. Black women who work in service
jobs are daily bombarded with belittling, degrading comments and gestures on the part of
the people who have power over them. The vast majority of poor black women in this
society find they are continually subjected to abuse in public agencies, stores, etc. These
women often feel that abuse will be an element in most of their personal interactions.
They are more inclined to accept abuse in situations where there are some rewards or bene-
fits, where abuse is not the sole characteristic of the interaction. Since this is usually the
case in situations where male violence occurs, they may be reluctant, even unwilling to
end these relationships. Like other groups of women, they fear the loss of care.
Id.; SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BAT-
TERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 235 (1982) ("[Blecause poor people experience so many different kinds of
oppression, violence may be responded to as one of many abuses."); Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1245-46.
333. And safety means separation. While safety is emphasized in the domestic violence legal
interventions such as protection orders and arrest policies, it is often ignored in other justice
settings. For example, the trend in custody adjudication to emphasize the importance of the child's
relationship with both parents tends to punish the woman who desires separation. See Martha
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision-
making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 765-66 (1988); Grillo, supra note 26, at 1570-71. This results in
a strong push for joint parenting plans. See Fineman, supra, at 734. A battered woman who
wishes to minimize an abusive father's access to his children is labeled a "parental alienator," and
her desire to "disconnect" is rendered pathological. See Interview with Jennifer, in Miami-Dade
County, Fla. (Sept. 9, 1998) (notes on file with author) (describing the differences she and other
women experience between specialized domestic violence court, where the battering is treated as
real and important, and in family court custody adjudication, where women's stories of abuse are
often presumed to be nothing but strategy moves).
334. See Littleton, supra note 177, at 52-56 (describing the need to assist women with mak-
ing "safe connection"). Staying connected does not necessarily mean being reunited-it may
mean rebuilding a relationship with his family. It may mean a safe place in which to talk to him
about the harm he has done to her. There is unlikely to be a mechanism for safe discussion in the
reform model programs unless it happens through supervised child visitation, a rare event that is
totally dependent on a finding unrelated to the woman's desire to talk with the abuser. See Debra
A. Clement, A Compelling Need for Mandated Use of Supervised Visitation Programs, 36 FAM. &
CONCILIATION Crs. REV. 294, 294 (1998) (describing supervisory visitation centers). See infra Part
II.A for a discussion of why family court mediation does not provide a mechanism for safe discussion.
335. This is evidenced both in formal and informal practice. For example, though restraining
orders as a matter of law should remain unaffected by a woman's willingness to reunite with an
abuser, police routinely refuse to enforce them if there is evidence that "she let him back in," and
some courts actively discourage women from repeated restraining order filings. The most caring
judges may believe that when a woman does not appear at permanent restraining order hearings,
the system has failed her. This derives, in part, from a common myopic view that fails to account
for the woman's use of other resources in her life-family, church, friends-that may render a final
restraining order an unnecessary embarrassment or a hassle. It also fails to account for the women
for whom a temporary order provides the bargaining power needed to secure concessions from the
abuser. It presumes that the woman has reunited with the batterer and further presumes that doing
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In turn, this gender essentialism and focus on separation may exacer-
bate a sense of conflicting loyalties that some battered women feel.336 Con-
flicts of loyalty may be most acute for women of color and poor women who
experience subordination on the basis of race, ethnic identity, language, immi-
grant status, or economic status.337 The conflict may be multifaceted. First,
the group-based/identity conflict is a result of the refusal of group politics
both to acknowledge sexist practices within the group and, similarly, to dis-
courage exposing such practices to the hostile outside community.338 The
group refusal has real consequences in a woman's life. The group may with-
339draw support if she fails to keep knowledge of battering inside the group.
She may feel that she can neither live without safety nor live without
community.4 Helping institutions that operate with racist patronizing atti-
tudes, shelters that are simply ignorant regarding cultural norms (e.g., food,
clothing, and child-care norms),"' and police and justice system actors who
so will result in further battering. See generally BOWKER, supra note 200, passim (interviewing women
who solved their domestic violence problems--including some who reunited with their former abuser).
336. See, e.g., RICHIE, supra note 259, at 61-62.
337. See id.; Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1252; Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act,
supra note 40, at 468-74. Linda Mills's work is similarly concerned with the manner in which
"dogmatic approaches [that emphasize separation and criminal justice intervention] are completely
unresponsive to battered women who are incapable of leaving because of internal or cultural pres-
sures." Linda Mills, Empowering Battered Women Transnationally: The Case for Postmodem Inter-
ventions, 41 SOC. WORK 261, 263 (1996). See generally Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New
Job Description for the Battered Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 183 (1997); Linda G. Mills, Mandatory Arrest and Prosecution Policies for Domestic Vio-
lence, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 306 (1998); Linda G. Mills, On the Other Side of Silence: Affective
Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1225 (1996). Though my focus here is on hetero-
sexual relationships, it is important to note that lesbian battered women face a different set of loyalty
conflicts. See, e.g., Arlene Istar, The Healing Comes Slowly, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAK-
ING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING 163 (Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); Mahoney, Victimization or
Oppression?, supra note 49, at 50.
338. See Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1253, 1256-57; Richie, supra note 329, at 41; Rimonte,
supra note 40, at 1313-15. Gloria Valencia-Weber and Christine Zuni explain the necessity of under-
standing identity as involving both race and gender: "We believe that the unique status of American
Indian women as members of sovereign tribal nations cannot be separated completely from their
experiences, positive and negative, as females. Further, issues affecting tribal women cannot be ana-
lyzed in isolation from the extraconstitutional doctrines of tribal sovereignty." Valencia-Weber &
Zuni, supra note 50, at 92 n.114.
339. See Hart, supra note 233, at 103 (noting that women who find that the best protection
against the perpetrators' violence is the protection offered by the community with which they
affiliate may resist prosecution if they conclude that the community will abandon them or with-
draw critical support if they pursue prosecution).
340. Virginia Coto, director of Lucha, a program of the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center
that assists battered immigrant women, notes that the support found within the program is vitally
important because many women have left all other means of support. See Interview with Virginia
Coto, Director of Lucha, at Miami, Fla. (Feb. 4, 1999) (notes on file with author).
341. See Soraya M. Coley & Joyce 0. Beckett, Black Battered Women: Practice Issues, 69 J.
Soc. CASEWORK 483 (1988) (describing the way in which shelters for battered women may fail to
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treat victims and perpetrators with racist hostility all reinforce the message
of betrayal.
Related to this conflict may be the woman's awareness of the multiple
oppressive structures operating in her partner's life.342 Institutional power that
operates in racist and colonial ways towards men of color deepens the conflict.
Women whose partners are working class, poor, or men of color may fear
that their partners fit too well the stereotype of a batterer. 4 ' Additionally,
women may feel conflict between their ethnic or political identities and
inviting state intervention into their private lives.
344
Thus, a conflict of loyalty may be understood in political terms-you
do not turn over a brother to occupying authorities-or in deeply individual
terms-the instinct that further mistreatment at the hands of the criminal
justice system will not engender compassion or empathy in a man who
has been horribly mistreated by his father. 45 A woman may simultaneously
meet the needs of African American women); Crenshaw, supra note 39, at 1262-65 (describing
the same for women of color).
342. See Richie, supra note 329, at 40-43 (describing a group called "Battered Minority
Women" (BMW), who blamed battering exclusively on white supremacy). Unlike BMW, I do
not argue that battering men have no responsibility for their abuse. Quite the contrary, I argue
that they make choices for which they are responsible, but recognition of that responsibility does
not foreclose recognition of the oppression in their lives and its relevance to those choices. See
discussion supra Part I.C.1.b.
343. Women may decide not to seek help from authorities they fear will mistreat their part-
ners because of race or class bias. See Janice Joseph, Woman Battering: Comparative Analysis of
Black and White Women, in OUT OF DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, supra note 45, at 161, 162 ("[A]frican American women are hesitant to call the police
even if there is extreme violence, for fear of how the Black barterer will be treated by the police.").
See generally HILDEN, supra note 60, at 160 (arguing that America's "popular culture industry"
privileges those stereotypes of Indian males that embody "the most aggressive, 'macho' aspects
of American masculinity"); Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery
and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WiS. L.
REV. 1003, 1071 (describing the way in which racist stereotypes of African American women
shape the way in which juries understand their accounts of battering).
344. See Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act, supra note 40, at 505 (arguing that manda-
tory arrest policies are "philosophically in opposition to feminist and civil rights doc-
trines ... founded on notions of individual and community empowerment and community-based
control"); Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 50, at 87 (suggesting that Peacemaking comports well
with Indian women's value systems). Zuni notes that Peacemaking is an essentially spiritual process,
and she suggests that this spiritual nature is particularly important to Navajo women. See
Conversation with Christine Zuni, Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law, in Albu-
querque, N.M. (March 1998) (notes on file with author) (commenting on a presentation I gave to
the University of New Mexico law faculty). Similarly, Hart notes that a small number of battered
women "oppose prosecution for political reasons, believing that the criminal justice system selectively
penalizes men of color or other politically unpopular constituencies." Hart, supra note 233, at 103.
345. See Harris, supra note 48, at 43 (arguing that the common practice of "[sleeing criminal
justice as warfare assumes that violence can be-indeed, must be-overcome by more violence,
rather than by compassion and love"); Hart, supra note 233, at 103 ("Some [battered women]
believe that the exposure of batterers to the criminal justice system and its coercive controls will
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believe in her "right to not be beaten ''3' and desire to stop her partner's (or
ex-partner's) self-destructive behavior.
Peacemaking's willingness to value relationships may offer an alterna-
tive to the problems of gender essentialism and loyalty traps. 47 Peacemak-
ers in Crownpoint frequently encourage parties to agree to a separation for
a period from sixty to ninety days, during which time the battering husband
agrees to attend counseling and refrain from contacting the woman.34 This
allows the wife time to judge the seriousness of his intentions for reform.
Battered women appear to petition for Peacemaking in significant
numbers. 49 Many of these women see Peacemaking as a last effort to save
350thSome wothe marriage. Some women conclude that the marriage cannot be saved
and either return to family court or seek the peacemaker's assistance with a
divorce.3 1 The value Peacemaking places on relationships does not prevent
divorce,352 but it does allow women to feel that they have explored all ave-
nues for help, even if their partner simply will not change his behavior."
facilitate, rather than deter, future violence."); see also supra note 250 and accompanying text
(reporting that significant numbers of identified batterers report a history of child abuse).
346. See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988) (documenting the manner in which battered women devel-
oped and articulated a "right to not be beaten").
347. 1 do not mean to diminish the possibility that Peacemaking may so value relationships
as to punish battered women who desire separation. See infra notes 455-463 and accompanying
text (discussing the possibility of an antidivorce bias in Peacemaking).
348. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9. Conditions during the sepa-
ration generally include counseling for the man and sometimes for the woman as well. See id. Some
peacemakers encourage parties to develop detailed agreements of the kind encouraged by battered
women's activists for protection orders (e.g., child visitation exchange agreements, support agree-
ments, and stay-away provisions). See id. It may be that some peacemakers falsely believe, as do others,
that separation ensures safety. In fact, most female intimate homicide victims are separated at the
time of the killing. See Coker, supra note 182, at 87.
349. Of the 12 self-referred cases involving domestic violence whose files I reviewed, six
were originated by women. In three of the remaining six, I was unable to discern who the peti-
tioner was, but the case did not appear to be court-ordered because there were none of the usual
court documents in the file. Only three were clearly originated by men. See Shiprock File Review,
supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
350. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
351. Others go to Peacemaking knowing they desire a divorce and wanting the peacemaker's
help in reconciling issues related to the divorce. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window
Rock File Review, supra note 9.
352. Some battered women's advocates in the Navajo Nation expressed concern that
peacemakers are antidivorce. The evidence from the Peacemaking files I reviewed is mixed. Some
peacemakers do appear to have an antidivorce (or a promarriage) bias, while others do not. See dis-
cussion infra notes 455-463 and accompanying text. However, the overall point is important:
Many women feel free to pursue divorce and find Peacemaking helpful either in negotiating
divorce-related issues or in ensuring that divorce is their best option.
353. See supra note 216 (describing an example of such a reaction); see also Shiprock File
Review, supra note 9.
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II. PEACEMAKING AND THE PROBLEMS OF
INFORMAL ADJUDICATION
In this part, I discuss problems for battered women in informal adjudi-
cation contexts. Though I collectively refer to these processes as "informal
adjudication," there are important distinctions to be made between them. I
include civil court mediation, which most frequently deals with child cus-
tody and visitation issues,"' as well as restorative justice programs, which deal
with criminal charges.355 Restorative justice programs include victim-offender
mediation,5 6 family group conferencing357 (or community conferencing),"'
and sentencing circles.359 Restorative justice theory understands crime as
first and foremost "a conflict between individuals. The person who was vio-
lated is the primary victim, and the state is a secondary victim."3" The
purpose of restorative justice is not to punish the offender, but rather to
engage the offender in whatever measures are required to restore the vic-
tim. 61 There are problems for battered women that are common to all of the
354. See Fineman, supra note 333, at 731-32.
355. See generally MARK UMBREIT, CRIME AND RECONCILIATION: CREATIVE OPTIONS FOR
VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS (1985) [hereinafter UMBREIT, CRIME AND RECONCILIATION]; MARK
S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND
MEDIATION (1994) [hereinafter UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER]; Stuart, supra note 208.
356. See generally UMBREIT, CRIME AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 355; UMBREIT,
VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER, supra note 355.
357. See Mark Umbreit & Howard Zehr, Restorative Family Group Conferences: Differing
Models and Guidelines for Practice, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 24.
358. Braithwaite and Daly prefer the term "community conferencing" in order to denote
that the important criterion for inclusion is not blood relationship to one of the parties but rather
some strong relationship with one of the parties. See Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 195
(noting that "communities of concern" are gathered for community group conferencing).
359. Sentencing circles are similar to Peacemaking and are used in Canada with First
Nations offenders. See generally Goel, supra note 2; Stuart, supra note 208.
360. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER, supra note 355, at 2.
361. The results are processes that are not punitive, though they may require action on the
part of the offender. They are not retributive, because rather than focusing on what the defendant
deserves, they focus on what is required to make things right for the victim. See Umbreit, supra
note 6, at 203-04; see also McCold, supra note 55, at 86-87. McCold notes that
[tihe loss of control and orderliness experienced is often more damaging than any physical
or material loss suffered. [Therefore, restorative justice processes should] bring meaning
to the crime event in order to restore predictability and order in their lives. They need
vindication that what happened to them was wrong and undeserved, and opportunities
to express and have validated their anger and pain. Victims need to be restored to a
sense of control and safety in their lives.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added). In part, restorative justice measures have gained a limited momentum
in the United States because of the hegemony of the "new penology" described by Malcolm Feeley
and Jonathan Simon. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the
New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 454-55 (1998) (describing the transformation of
penology from an individual rehabilitative focus to one of risk management on the part of profes-
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informal processes, as well as problems that are primarily true of either media-
tion or restorative justice processes.
Family court mediation's focus on the future does not adequately
address the harms of violence and often results in "domesticating" '62 stories
of violence so that they become stories of conflict.363 The tie of restorative
justice processes to criminal adjudication generally means the process is more
directly focused on the violent behavior of the batterer than is true of fam-
ily court mediation. However, many restorative justice programs presume
a one-time victimization, rather than the ongoing victimization that charac-
terizes battering.3" The presumptions regarding a victim's needs, therefore,
fail to account for relationship-centered victimization in which the offender
repeatedly blames the victim for her victimization.365
This part examines Peacemaking in light of these informal justice
problems. I group the problems with the use of informal adjudication for
battered women into four types: the coercion problem, the cheap-justice
problem, the normative problem, and the communitarian, social-change
problem.
A. The Coercion Problem
The coercion problem has two different and equally important aspects:
coercion in the process and coercion through forcing victim participation.
Coercion in the process results from the ability of the batterer to intimidate
the woman or to wrest control of the mediation. The batterer's use of meth-
ods of intimidation, subtle or not, may continue his controlling behavior
sional institutional actors and "populist punitiveness" on the part of legislators). See generally
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Cor-
rection and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992).
362. Cobb, supra note 54, at 400, 436-37.
363. See Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2158. Further, the focus of mediation in custody
determinations is often the primacy of the parent-child relationship, particularly the relationship
with the noncustodial parent, rather than the battered woman's safety. See Fineman, supra note
333, at 769; Hart, supra note 26, at 326. Unlike most other informal adjudicative processes, the
originators of Navajo Peacemaking have, from its inception, conceived of it as an intervention in
domestic violence cases.
364. For example, McCold's understanding that victims need to restore "orderliness," and
Umbreit's understanding that victims need to understand "why meT' from their encounters in victim-
offender mediation, fail to deal with the nature of ongoing intimate abuse. See McCold, supra
note 55, at 87; Umbreit, supra note 6, at 203-04. Batterers are adept at repeatedly explaining
"why you" as they routinely tell their victims that it is the victims' fault they behave as they do.
See Adams, supra note 32, at 186. Further, unless there is a change in relative power between the
parties, the woman's victimization will likely continue either because of the batterer's ongoing
manipulation and control or because the devastating emotional and economic consequences of
abuse are long lasting.
365. See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
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through the mediation process and result in an unfair agreement.3 6   This
concern is underscored by the recognition that battering is not a one-time
incident but rather a controlling system of behaviors that constrains the vic-
tim's autonomy.367 Behaviors become symbols for past incidents of abuse and
serve to intimidate the woman: the way he rubs his forehead when he is really
angry or the flinty look in his eyes.16' Battered women in mediation may find
themselves negotiating for their safety. Battering relationships are frequently
marked by a history of such negotiations, prompted by the victim blaming
rules of the batterer: "I won't hit you if you'll have dinner ready on time; I
won't hit you if you're always sexually available; I won't hit you if you keep
the children from making a mess."369
366. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2158 (noting that any agreement will mirror
the rules of battering: the batterer makes and enforces the rules that the battered woman must
obey or be punished); Hooper & Busch, supra note 2, at 105-06 (noting that in both victim-
offender mediation and family group counseling, battered women cannot negotiate freely and
fairly with an abuser, and that the batterer's "pattern of dispute resolution is characterized by coer-
cion and intimidation").
367. See Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2128 ("[V]iolence does not need to be a constant
presence for the victims to feel threatened that it could erupt at any point .... "). Many battered
women live in a "state of siege" where the abuse and the threat of further abuse is chronic and
where the batteter exerts control over the everyday life of his partner and family. See Dutton,
supra note 274, at 1208.368. See Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2120 ("A gesture that seems innocent to an observer
is instantly transformed into a threatening symbol to the victim of abuse."). Particularly in cus-
tody mediation, a woman may be likely to make unfair agreements in order to maintain some con-
trol over the barterer's access to the children or in the hopes of maintaining an uneasy truce. See
Laura Crites & Donna Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss: A Unique Guide to Cus-
tody Decisions When Spouse Abuse Is Charged, JUDGES' J., Spring 1988, at 13; Hart, supra note 26.
Hart describes the experience of a battered woman in custody mediation:
"I thought it was bad when I was married. I was always tiptoeing around trying not to get
beaten; trying to keep my husband focused on me, so he wouldn't hurt my son .... I
guess you could say that I was terrified, but I was too numb to even realize it. I don't
know where I found the courage to leave. By the time I did, I was on disability because
of neurological problems-coming directly from the beatings.
Anyway, as soon as I left he filed for custody of our son. I had to go to mediation.
They told me I had to cooperate; we had to work out an agreement in mediation. If I didn't
cooperate I would lose my son because I couldn't afford an attorney to go to court.
I don't remember much of what happened there. I felt like I had no choice. The
mediator and my husband actually worked out the agreement. I signed it. They tell me I
agreed and that I'm stuck with it.
You know, in some ways I'm even less able to control my own life now. What I
mean is, I can't do anything about my son without his approval."
Hart, supra note 26, at 321 (quoting a battered woman interviewed by Hart in Arizona in 1989).
369. See, e.g., Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2159 (arguing that "any agreement that is
structured in the format of 'Mr. Abuser agrees to stop the abuse and Ms. Victim agrees to 'is con-
ceptually wrong" because the victim "should never be forced to engage in, abstain from, or surrender
anything to stop the abuse" and "should never leave mediation with [an] agreement[] that ha[s]
bargained away [her] safety rights and/or made these rights conditional on some necessary perform-
ance of [her] own"); Hart, supra note 26, at 318-19.
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Peacemaking's primary approach to coercion in the process is to rely on
the peacemaker and the victim's family to stand up for the victim. As noted
earlier, reliance on the victim's family to ensure that no "gang-ups" occur may
be misplaced where the family is frightened of the batterer or where the
family blames her for the batterer's violence.37 Additionally, the batterer's
family members may be instrumental in the development of a batterer's belief
that his violence is the result of his partner's victimization of him.
Peacemaking may provide a platform for the expression of those beliefs.37'
Further, the use (or lack of use) of criminal sanctions may be instrumental
in an individual batterer's understanding of the morality of his actions or
of their harm to the victim: "If this were a crime, it would be heard in a
criminal courtroom." '372 However, unlike the family court mediator, the
peacemaker may play a very interventionist role in the Peacemaking ses-
sion. 73 A peacemaker committed to gender fairness has the ability to con-
front victim-blaming statements and to increase the likelihood of fair
outcomes.
The second type of coercion problem arises when battered women are
forced to participate in informal adjudication. This is frequently an issue in
mediation related to family law issues, particularly child custody."7 Media-
tion gives the batterer access to the victim, which may allow for an additional
site for intimidation and physical abuse. The batterer may attack the woman
in the parking lot after the session, follow her home and learn where she
lives, or use the session to verbally abuse and blame her.375 The inattention
to safety is also found in what mediation does not do. As Barbara Hart notes,
370. See Hooper & Busch, supra note 2, at 120-21 (noting that if families or mediators in
family group conferencing are afraid of the batterer, they will not confront his violence, and ques-
tioning the message to the perpetrator and the victim if this happens).
371. See id. at 119.
372. For example, a study comparing nondetected rapists with convicted rapists found that
nondetected rapists believed that they were not guilty of a crime because the victim did not file a
police report. See Alberto Godenzi, What's the Big Deal? We Are Men and They Are Women, in
JUST BoYs DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIES, AND CRIME, supra note 1, at 135, 147-48.
373. See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text (describing the role of the peacemaker).
374. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 26, at 1551-52 (describing the increase in the use of man-
datory mediation in California family court, particularly to solve child custody and visitation
issues); Hooper & Busch, supra note 2, at 110 (noting that violence often escalates at the time of
separation, so divorce mediation may happen at a particularly dangerous time, and that the perpe-
trator may use mediation to gain access to the victim). This is not an issue, generally, in victim-
offender mediation in which victim participation is voluntary and the victim's preference
regarding the time and location of the session must be honored so that the victim feels safe. See
Umbreit, supra note 6, at 204.
375. See Astor, supra note 26, at 158 ("[Mediation] places fewer barriers between the perpe-
trator and the target of his violence. It offers opportunities for continued contact with the target
of his violence where she may be unprotected and where violence and coercion can continue.").
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mediation services seldom provide the strategic planning and legal interven-
tions that battered women most need to ensure their safety.376
In Peacemaking, this second kind of coercion is a particular problem in
the many self-referred cases.377 Initially, the Navajo judiciary anticipated
that most Peacemaking cases would be court referred.378 Safeguards for court-
referred cases include requiring party agreement 79 and, in the case of domes-
tic violence protection orders, requiring additional anti-domestic violence
training for the peacemaker.3" None of these protections apply, however, in
the more than 50%" s' of Peacemaking cases that are self-referred. 382 To file a
petition for Peacemaking, the petitioner must claim that she or he has been
"injured, hurt or aggrieved by the actions of another. ' 13 83 The petition is
reviewed by a district court judge, but there is seldom a hearing and, at any
rate, the hearing would involve only the petitioner. The practice after court
review may vary by district. Some peacemaker liaisons, who are employed
by the judiciary and administer Peacemaking in their districts, may rou-
tinely call respondents to get information about such matters as scheduling
and appropriate people to invite to attend the Peacemaking sessions.384 How-
ever, it is not clear that this practice is universal, and, more importantly,
376. See Hart, supra note 26, at 320. Similarly, Hooper and Busch note that family group
conferencing facilitators in New Zealand have found it difficult to "deal with ongoing issues [in
domestic violence cases], such as the distress arising from 'reliving' the experience of victimisa-
tion." Hooper & Busch, supra note 2, at 108.
377. The risks may outweigh the benefits of Peacemaking if there are no individual sessions
with battered women regarding safety planning and lethality assessment. See Hart, supra note 231, at
219 (describing the elements of a criminal justice response necessary to address the needs of bat-
tered women, including safety planning, lethality assessments, and referrals to domestic violence
programs).
378. See Zion, supra note 133, at 1.
379. Though the rules do not require the victim's consent if Peacemaking is made a condi-
tion of probation, my interviews with judges and peacemakers suggest that referrals are seldom made
without the victim's agreement, at least in domestic violence cases. See PEACEMAKER Cr. R. 6.3(d),
in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 109 (noting that a court may refer a case to Peacemaking as a
condition of probation "[when] appropriate ... for achieving harmony and reconciliation with the
victim"). Diversion to Peacemaking for cases that involve injury to a person or property require
the victim's consent. In civil cases, the court may order a case to Peacemaking for "good cause,"
but again the practice appears to be more protective of victims. See id. 6.2, at 109. The judges
I spoke with told me that domestic violence cases were never referred over the objections of
victims. See Interview with Marilou Begay, supra note 13; Interview with Mae Horseman, supra
note 13. Of course, there is always the danger that the court does not know of the domestic
violence in a family court case. I found no evidence of screening for domestic violence.
380. See Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1652 (Equity 1995).
381. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
382. See PEACEMAKER CT. R:3.2(a), in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 105.
383. Id.
384. This is the practice in Crownpoint, for example, where the peacemaker liaison always
calls the respondent. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
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I found no evidence that peacemaker liaisons routinely ask respondents
whether they feel safe attending Peacemaking or whether they have experi-
enced violence at the hands of the petitioners."' Additionally, if respondents
volunteer information regarding domestic violence, there appears to be no
guarantee that they will receive information about social services, alter-
native legal processes, or safety-related issues."8 The respondent and other
parties named by the petitioner as well as those named by the respondent,
if the liasion speaks with the respondent, receive a subpoena to attend
Peacemaking.387 The subpoena does not give information regarding the
possibility of resisting it on the basis of reasonable fear of domestic violence,3"'
385. In at least one peacemaker division, this kind of screening does appear to take place on
a regular basis. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9 (noting that at least
one peacemaker interviewed makes certain to talk to the respondent, at least on the phone, prior
to any Peacemaking session). Provided that the victim/respondent is encouraged to disclose the
level of violence, the peacemaker may determine whether the case is appropriate for Peacemaking.
Umbreit and Howard Zehr, leading proponents of victim-offender mediation and restorative jus-
tice in the United States, argue that one of the potential weaknesses of family group conferencing
is the usual lack of in-person contact with the victim and her supporters in which they are pre-
pared "for participation in a dialogue in which the mediator is not dominating the conversation,
assessing their needs/expectations, and gaining a far more human context of the crime." Umbreit
& Zehr, supra note 357, at 27.
386. Peacemakers may not receive adequate training in judging the dangerousness of an abuser.
Domestic violence training for peacemakers is now mandated. See Domestic Abuse Protection Act,
NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1652(c) (Equity 1995). However, both peacemakers and anti-domestic
violence advocates acknowledge that the training received thus far has been spotty, not attended by
all peacemakers, and brief in duration. See supra note 217. For a discussion of judging batterer
lethality, see Assessing Whether Batterers Will Kill, in CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
EFFECTIVE POLICE RESPONSE (Penn. Coalition Against Domestic Violence 1990). Barterer lethality
assessments are commonly used by battered women's advocates to assist them with safety planning.
Safety planning involves the woman's thinking through her options in various ways: How might she
change her routine (work arrival time, carpooling, living arrangements, social involvements) in order
to avoid the barterer? Can she ask her neighbors to alert the police if they see him in the neigh-
borhood? How should her children answer the door or phone if he violates the restraining order and
comes by or calls? Does she have a code word that, when given to a friend over the phone, means
"call the police"? Does she have someone who can check on her at regular times? Can she get a
security escort at work? Do the children's school authorities know not to release the children to him?
387. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 1.5, in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 102.
An order compelling individuals to submit to Peacemaker Court proceedings as parties,
witnesses or participants is binding upon any member of the Navajo Tribe and any Indian
living among the members of the Navajo Tribe. Non-Indians may be compelled to partici-
pate in Peacemaker Court proceedings as a witness or participant but not as a party.
Id.
388. Other than resistance based on the court's lack of jurisdiction, it is not clear what basis
a respondent or witness would have for resisting a duly authorized subpoena. Neither the Navajo
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Navajo Court Rules of Civil Procedure provide any.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 13(c) provides that a party who receives a subpoena for the produc-
tion of documentary evidence and objects may move to quash or modify the subpoena "if compliance
would be unreasonable or oppressive," but it does not describe the circumstances under which a
witness might resist a subpoena. See NAVAJO R. CRIM. P. 13(c).
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nor does it give any information regarding support services. Thus, battered
women respondents often assume they have no choice but to appear.389
The lack of screening for safety and the inability of respondents to
decline appearance for good cause-including fear of the petitioner-are
surely among Peacemaking's greatest weaknesses.39 Without safeguards, a ses-
sion may provide the abuser an opportunity to physically assault, threaten,
and intimidate his partner or ex-partner.39' This allows batterers to initiate
Peacemaking to flush a woman out of hiding.392 A petitioner may be prompted
by his partner's separation, his desire to see his children who are in hiding
with their mother, or in response to a partner's domestic violence protection
order. One petitioner whose file I reviewed explained his request for Peace-
making in the following language:
I want my relationship to last a life time no matter what bad things
I've done. I want her family to give me a chance. A chance to make
a living with their daughter. I've got nothing against her family, my
parents have nothing against them too. I want to show that I can do
it. Make a living with her.3 93
389. See Telephone Interview with Cecelia Lowe, Counselor with A.D.A.B.I., in Chinle,
Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 16, 1997). The Peacemaking respondent receives a subpoena that
states:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before the [above entitled] Peacemaker
Court of the Navajo Nation as indicated below [date and time], and to give all coopera-
tion to the named Peacemaker. You are required to provide whatever information you
have on the matter of the dispute of the individual named below and to produce any
documents or other items you may have in your possession which may assist in providing
such information.
DISOBEDIENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA IS A CONTEMPT OF COURT AND PUN-
ISHABLE AS A CRIME UNDER THE LAWS O[F] THE NAVAJO NATION.
ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 146.
390. This is not to say that respondents are never successful at stopping Peacemaking from
happening. Battered women's advocates relate that sometimes when women or shelter workers
have talked with the peacemaker or the peacemaker liaison, the session has been canceled. See
Telephone Interview with Cecelia Lowe, supra note 389. Other women, however, have not been
so fortunate. See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
391. Of course, all of the advocates' concerns could be called "safety concerns" in that they
all have implications for the recurrence of domestic violence.
392. Several advocates discussed conversations with women in which the women did not
feel that they had any choice regarding attendance in Peacemaking. See Interview with Anonymous
Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.) (notes on file with author); Telephone Inter-
view with Cecelia Lowe, supra note 389; see also PEACEMAKER CT. R. 3.8, in ZION & MCCABE,
supra note 56, at 106 ("The Peacemaker may obtain any necessary subpoena for the attendance
of parties, witnesses or other interested persons from the clerk of District Court. Such subpoenas
shall be served in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.").
393. Shiprock File Review, supra note 9 (noting that the petitioner's wife had filed a domes-
tic violence protection order against him and had requested that Peacemaking be postponed until
the results of her domestic violence protection order hearing were known).
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His petition was filed after his wife filed a petition for a domestic abuse
protection order in which she alleged that he had abused her "on several
occasions [both] before and after [she] had [their] child." '94 Some battered
women's advocates describe numerous phone calls they have received from
peacemaker liaisons urging them to encourage a battered woman to talk
directly with the liaison, even though she repeatedly communicated through
shelter staff that she had no desire to do so and was too frightened to attend
Peacemaking.395 As one battered women's advocate explained:
My clients get intimidating letters [from Peacemaker Court] saying
they have to come to Peacemaking. The women get really scared. The
women are forced to go. I've had two other clients who tried to get out
of Peacemaking. One had gone to the shelter and [her partner] filed
for Peacemaking. She was really scared. She had left the reservation
[to get away from him] and was living in another town. [The] Peace-
making liaison started coming to [the domestic violence program],
pushing [staff] to disclose the woman's location. The... staff replied
that the information was confidential. The [battered] woman asked
[the domestic violence program] staff to tell [the] liaison that she didn't
want to do this. The liaison kept telling staff that he just wanted to
talk with her, that he had to hear from her directly. So the staff rec-
ommended that she put her concerns in writing and the staff delivered
the letter. Even then the liaison still wanted "just a few minutes with
her.
, 396
Informal advocacy has worked to keep some battered women out of
Peacemaking, 97 and some peacemakers use informal screening mechanisms
to eliminate more severe domestic violence cases.398
I had to intervene in a similar case. I said, look there's something
weird about this situation where this man is insisting he has to see his
wife. He calls my office, he calls the peacemaker.... [W]e'd better
investigate and we need to confront him about why he's doing this.
Something is going on here... some stalking is going on, we need to
investigate deeper. If I was a peacemaker I would [not] be in a position
to protect that female. That's just my law enforcement background,
394. Id.
395. See Telephone Interview with Cecelia Lowe, supra note 389.
396. Id.
397. See supra note 390.
398. See Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15; see also Interview with Crown-
point Peacemakers, supra note 9. While every peacemaker I talked with believes that most
domestic violence cases can be handled in Peacemaking, some feel that the really severe cases should
not be. See Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15; see also Interview with Leo Natani,
supra note 12.
82 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (1999)
but whether some [other] peacemakers would sense that in that situa-
tion, I don't know.39
Some women have been attacked immediately following a Peacemaking
session:
[A woman who was ordered to attend Peacemaking] left her children
with [the battered women's program] while she was in Peacemaking
[nearby]. She didn't want to go, but felt pressured into going. Her
husband filed for Peacemaking. In Peacemaking, he agreed to no
abuse and counseling for alcohol and violent behavior and in the
meantime to leave her alone. She was afraid of him. He said that he
was a good father. They told her to stay with him. She agreed, [but
said,] "We're in a safe space now, we'll get back together later." She
left the court to get her children. He followed her and tried to run
her off the road. He jumped out of his truck and got into the back of
her truck and tried to grab her through the window. She drove to
the police station. The police didn't do anything.
400
Because Peacemaking is a "traditional" activity, some women may also feel
a more subtle form of coercion to attend out of respect for their elders and
for Navajo tradition."°
While battered women's advocates' stories of coercion undoubtedly rep-
resent the experience of some battered women, they do not represent the
experience of all. In my review of twelve self-referred cases, at least half of
399. Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15. Bluehouse followed with a comment
that suggests that the outcome might have been different had the petitioner's family been more
supportive of his efforts. "I can see that Peacemaking might work if his side of the family [were]
saying we need to deal with this issue; but this guy was running around like the Lone Ranger." Id.
Bluehouse also notes that with family members present, the lethality of the abuser will likely
emerge in Peacemaking.
[The peacemaker can discern dangerousness in a Peacemaking session because the family
will] tell you these things out front .... Somebody will say, "Yea, I know you've been
carrying a knife, been carrying a gun." ... In Peacemaking those self-incrimination issues
are not relevant: it just all comes out, and that's the opportunity.... [Although] you [do]
find those people who are intellectualizing and denying, [but] even those people become
very evident through the process and you have to have [a] strategy to deal with that.
Id.
400. See Telephone Interview with Cecelia Lowe, supra note 389. My review of the Peace-
making files found several cases involving severe violence. Further investigation is necessary to
determine whether court-referred cases or self-referred cases make up the greater percentage of those
involving severe violence.
401. See, e.g., Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation
(n.d.) (notes on file with author) (noting that many people do not want to criticize Peacemaking
because it is considered "traditional"). "Traditional" may have different meanings. On one under-
standing, "traditional" Navajo values are gender-egalitarian values; another might see traditional
values as those held by older Navajos, many of whom may be influenced by Christian views. See
supra note 311 and accompanying text.
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the petitioners were women. 2 In seven of the twenty confirmed domestic
violence cases, the couple reconciled, at least temporarily. 3 In four, the cou-
ple divorced." In three cases, either the peacemaker or one of the parties
indicated that the case would go to family court for a divorce or a protec-
tion order, or both."5 Thus, my preliminary review of Peacemaking files
suggests that a significant number of women were not intimidated into mak-
ing agreements or into reconciliation. For some, Peacemaking offered the
opportunity to express the reasons for ending their marriage. The following
notes expressing a petitioner's reason for filing for Peacemaking provide an
example.
[We've] been married for 14 years and 9 months, but... have only
lived under the same roof for about 6 or 7 years total .... We've got-
ten [into] many physical confrontations, both hurting the other, some
requiring [a] doctor's care .... So I am asking the [P]eacemaker [C]ourt
to assist us in resolving a termination of this marriage .... I believe
we have hurt, shamed, humiliated, and mistrusted each other long
enough. We both need to end this marriage to begin our healing-
healing emotionally, mentally, physically and spiritually in our own
ways. My [way] is with my faith in my higher power ....406
402. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
Three of the remaining petitioners were men, and in three cases I could not determine which
party was the petitioner. (These cases were counted as self-referred because they were listed as
such on the docket or the files did not contain the information normally found in a court-referred
case (e.g., court orders, petitions, and notes related to court disposition of the case).) In cases ini-
tiated by women, four described their husband's drinking as the reason for seeking Peacemaking,
and two said it was their husband's abuse ("to dissolve marriage due to [husband's] abuse"). See
Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
403. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9. In
six, either no agreement was reached or the resolution was unclear from the file. See Shiprock File
Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
404. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
Peacemakers hear a number of divorce cases, though many of them are default cases. Of the 192
cases heard in Peacemaking in Window Rock in 1996, 23 were recorded "divorce/abandoned/
separation," 12 as "marital dispute," and 22 as "family dispute/family harmony." Forty-five per cent
(87) were family-related, 11 were referred by family court, and 17 by criminal court. See Window
Rock File Review, supra note 9.
405. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9. In
six, either no agreement was reached or the resolution was unclear from the file. See Shiprock File
Review, supra note 9; Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
406. Window Rock File Review, supra note 9 (citing a peacemaker's notes recording a peti-
tioner's reason for seeking Peacemaking). The Alcoholics Anonymous language is probably no
accident. See Telephone Interview with Eileen Hudon, supra note 114 (explaining that because
chemical dependency treatment monies have been a major source of federal funding for services in
Indian nations, the models that dominate these programs have a significant influence in Indian
responses to domestic violence).
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For the most part, problems of coercion could be remedied with proce-
dural changes. In general, the coercion problems underscore the importance
of (a) allowing battered women to choose whether to participate; (b) giving
battered women information about Peacemaking's process as well as alterna-
tives to Peacemaking, about its strengths and limitations, and about available
services that will allow an informed choice; 7 (c) taking measures to ensure
the woman's safety through lethality assessments of the batterer, through
safety planning with the woman, and through declining to have a session
when it is too dangerous; and (d) the importance of a strong antisubordina-
tion, antisexist normative Peacemaking process.' ° I do not argue that the
courts or peacemakers should make unilateral determinations of which cases
are appropriate for Peacemaking and which are not.4" Instead, I urge aggres-
sive outreach to petitioners, respondents, and other parties with a sensitiv-
ity to the possible presence of domestic violence. The outreach should include
information regarding social services such as shelters. Additionally, battered
women should be able to move to quash a subpoena on the basis of domestic
violence, or fear of domestic violence, and this right should be prominently
displayed on the subpoena form.41 Peacemaking cases involving domestic
violence might be referred to family court for a domestic violence protec-
tion order that would remain in effect throughout Peacemaking.4 '
These changes may be problematic for some peacemakers who inter-
pret Peacemaking's tenet that parties must decide for themselves to pre-
clude the use of coercive state power." 2 Yet many peacemakers currently
rely on the coercive power of the state in order to push compliance and par-
407. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1695
(1997) (noting that participants in community-enhancing mediation should at a minimum be given
information about the values represented in the process so as to make an informed decision); Hart,
supra note 26, at 325-26 (describing criteria for a divorce process system that meets the needs of bat-
tered women).
408. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 of the use of traditional Navajo narratives in this endeavor.
409. See Crites & Coker, supra note 368, at 42 (describing a Honolulu mediation preparation
program in which program staff counsel battered women about mediation, and then program staff,
in consultation with the battered woman, determine whether her case is appropriate for mediation).
410. Peacemaker Court Rules provide that a party may file an injunction to stop Peace-
making on the basis of harassment. See PEACEMAKER CT. R. 4.1 (a), in ZION & MCCABE, supra note
56, at 107. This apparently only applies after the process has begun. Other than a challenge to per-
sonal jurisdiction, the Navajo Nation Code does not clearly address a respondent's right to resist a
duly authorized subpoena for Peacemaking. See id. 3.8-4.2, at 106-07.
411. This is already the situation in some number of cases. See Interview with Mae Horseman,
supra note 13.
412. See Interview with James W. Zion, Solicitor General of the Navajo Nation, in Window
Rock, Navajo Nation, Ariz. (Apr. 23, 1997) (notes on file with author).
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ticipation in Peacemaking." 3 Thus, use of these domestic violence inter-
vention strategies may be in keeping with the thoroughly pragmatic view
of many peacemakers: If fear of punitive measures will work to encourage
414behavior change, then use punitive measures.
B. The Cheap-Justice Problem
Restorative justice processes such as family group conferencing or
victim-offender mediation may place too much emphasis on the importance
of offender apology. This creates two kinds of cheap-justice problems: First,
an overemphasis on offender rehabilitation at the expense of expressions of
moral solidarity with the victim may ignore the victim's needs and coerce
the victim to forgive the offender; second, a sincere apology or reconcilia-
tion between the offender and the victim may fail to address the victim's
primary needs.41
Restorative justice programs are sometimes captured by a focus on
offender rehabilitation, which pressures victims to cooperate with offender-
centered measures and assumes that offender rehabilitation will meet the
victim's needs.416 The victim becomes merely a means to the end of "heal-
ing" the offender. In the most egregious cases, mediators may pressure vic-
tims to offer offenders forgiveness.4"7 If the victim is made to feel responsible
413. See Notes on Peacemaking Session, supra note 11 (noting that the peacemaker urged
the respondent to comply with the family's request that she seek addiction treatment and relied,
in part, on the threat of pending criminal charges and the threat of a child neglect complaint to
social services).
414. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9 (describing how the fact
that police are watching batterers ensures greater compliance with Peacemaking agreements);
Notes on Peacemaking Session, supra note 11 (noting that the peacemaker told the parties that
they could deal with their child neglect and drug abuse issues in Peacemaking or they could face
implicitly more punitive treatment in court).
415. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 1, at 194-96.
416. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Proce-
dural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1277-81 (1994) (describing the danger of focusing on the
offender in victim-offender mediation); Goel, supra note 2, at 26 (citing Crnkovich, supra note
25, passim) (noting that the victim was outnumbered, the greatest focus was on the offender and
how to help him and not on the impact of the abuse on the victim and her children, the victim
responded to the judge's direct questions and then only acknowledged the concerns and wishes of
the community leaders, and the victim spoke only three times and was nervous throughout).
417. See Suzanne M. Retzinger & Thomas J. Scheff, Strategy for Community Conferences:
Emotions and Social Bonds, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1,
at 315, 316 (noting that the "core sequence" of community conferencing is the offender's expression
of genuine shame and remorse and the victim's taking a step towards forgiving the offender). The
authors further write that the facilitator should rechannel the victim's moral indignation in order to
enable the victim to identify with the offender. See id. at 323. Moral lectures from the mediator,
victim, or the victim's supporters "signal[] the moral superiority of the instructor," which "disrupts
rather than builds the social bond" between the victim and the offender. Id. at 325.
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for forgiving or aiding the offender, the justice aspect of the process-the
recognition of the harm as unilateral rather than mutual and the recogni-
tion of the immorality of the offender's behavior and its harm to the vic-
tim-is in jeopardy.41 This apology focus may be particularly harmful for
battered women, or for any victim who has (or had) a close relationship
with the offender. Batterers are often adept at describing themselves as the
real victims419 and at explaining their abuse as an understandable response to
victims' provoking behavior."' These "explanations" may be couched in
terms of an apology: "I'm so sorry I hurt you. I didn't mean to do that. Why
do you get me so crazy? You know how upset I get." Such an apology is
coded: "I don't want to hit you, but you make me do so." It also suggests
a quid pro quo remedy: "You don't make me 'crazy,' and I won't hit you." An
informal justice process that pushes victims to accept the offender's apology
and forgive presents battered women with a similar quid pro quo: "In return
for his apology, you must forgive him." The coded message may be: "And if
you do not do your part and forgive him, how do you expect him to do his
part and stop the battering?" ''
A second concern arises when apologies are overvalued: Words are
cheap. Even when the focus is to make the victim whole, 22 rather than to
reform the batterer, facilitators may value apologies at the expense of more
material changes. Giving a privileged place to the apology of the abuser is
particularly problematic in battering relationships. It is wrong to think that
apologies are necessarily hard for abusers to make; abusive men often have
a history of making apologies for their behavior.423 Some batterers are par-
ticularly adept at using apologies to manipulate their partners and others.
Further, the batterer need not be insincere at the time of the apology for
the apology to be ineffective. Without changes in his belief system, in his
social networks, and often in his corollary behaviors such as drinking and
418. When the victim voluntarily comes to feel empathy towards the offender or wishes to aid
the offender, justice is not compromised. However, when the victim is made to feel that forgiveness
is the only morally justifiable position, or that the victim "owes" the offender anything-her
forgiveness, her time, her aid-justice is jeopardized. Braithwaite would refer to this as the blaming
aspect of the process. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 156 (1989).
419. See Adams, supra note 32, at 186; Coker, supra note 182, at 117-21 (describing batter-
ers' claims of emotional self-defense).
420. See Adams, supra note 32, at 186-87; Coker, supra note 182, at 71-72.
421. See Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2158-59, 2164. A focus on apology may also rein-
force social imperatives that punish women who refuse to forgive. Cf. Grillo, supra note 26, at
1550 (noting that women tend to be more relationship-focused than men).
422. See Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 77-79 (describing nalyeeh, or reparations, in Peace-
making as that which is necessary to make the victim whole).
423. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 96-97 (1984).
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drug use, he is likely to resort to battering again when faced with the inabil-
ity to get his wife to comply with his demands.4
As Eric Yamamoto notes in the context of "race apologies," 425 apologies
are empty if "they are based on inadequate acknowledgments or have no
material affect on the participants' relationship .... ,2 ' The abuser's apology
must be accompanied by changes in his underlying belief system that pro-
vides the context for a relationship of domination. If there is no commit-
ment to the restructuring of that relationship, it is "just talk" and "cheap
reconciliation.
4 27
Yamamoto argues that intergroup racial healing requires that the apolo-
gizing group study the history of the intergroup conflict, "interrogate" the
"stock stories that groups ... tell to explain the conflict and [to] justify the
groups' responses, 28 and take "active steps toward healing," which include "a
joint reframing of stories of group identities and intergroup relations. 429 Only
then is the group ready to make reparations. Further, reparations are not
merely the payment of money, but rather "acts of repairing damage to the
material conditions of racial group life-transferring money and land, build-
ing schools and medical clinics, allowing unfettered voting-and of restor-
ing injured human psyches-enabling those harmed to live with, but not
in, history.'43
It is this carefully considered form of apology followed by reparations
that is needed in battering cases. This requires a review of the harms that
the batterer's behavior has caused the victim. These harms far exceed the
physical trauma of violence and include psychological harms, economic
harms, political harms, and spiritual harms. Further, reparations do not mean
merely compensating the victim for such costs as lost wages or health-related
424. See supra Part I.C.l.a (discussing the multiple influences that support battering).
425. Race apologies are apologies from one group to another for collusion in racially subor-
dinating behavior. See YAMAMOTO, supra note 1, at 51. Yamamoto is concerned about the require-
ments for meaningful apologies between people of color. He seeks a method for answering the
question: "When do apologies lead to a meaningful restructuring of intergroup relations?" Id. at 58.
When are they simply masks for continuing status quo oppression? See id.; see also Eric K. Yamamoto,
Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 49 (1997) (examining South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in light of these elements of interracial justice).
426. YAMAMOTO, supra note 1, at 194-95.
427. Id. at 175. Yamamoto proposes four steps necessary for reconciliation: recognition,
responsibility, reconstruction, and reparations. See id. at 174-75. By recognition, Yamamoto
means that groups must "empathize with the anger and hope of those wounded." Id. at 174.
Taking responsibility requires one to "assess carefully the dynamics of race group agency in imposing
disabling constraints on others and ... accepting group responsibility for healing resulting wounds."
Id. at 174-75. Reconstruction involves "active steps ... toward healing." Id. at 175.
428. Id. at 179-80.
429. Id. at 175.
430. Id. at 203.
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expenses,43' but taking steps that "result over time in a restructuring of the insti-
tutions and relationships that gave rise to the underlying justice grievance.'32
In Peacemaking, the use of nalyeeh, the ability to encourage concrete
commitments to personal change (alcohol treatment and batterer's treat-
ment programs, and traditional healing ceremonies), coupled with a focus
on familial responsibility, may go a long way in ensuring that apologies are
accompanied by concrete changes in behavior.433
C. The Normative Problem
The normative problem that exists in mediation stems from the ideol-
ogy of mediator neutrality coupled with the hidden or informal rules that dis-
advantage women,434 enact gendered understandings of appropriate mediating
behavior,435 and largely ignore claims of past injustice between parties.436 In
family court mediation, the ideal mediator is supposed to be neutral, with
the sole purpose of effectuating the desires of the parties.37 As Trina Grillo
writes, this ideal of neutrality frequently masks mediation's informal rules of
behavior:438 Focus on the future and not the past, do not be too emotional,
and especially do not be too angry. 9 Sara Cobb similarly notes the manner
431. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-29 b(4) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing a court to
order the restraining order defendant to pay monetary compensation to the victim for losses suf-
fered as a direct result of the act of domestic violence).
432. YAMAMOTO, supra note 1, at 208.
433. Of course, weak enforcement of Peacemaking agreements seriously undermines the
ability of Peacemaking to be a catalyst for this kind of restructuring of relationships. See supra
notes 390-406 and accompanying text (discussing safety and coercion concerns for Peacemaking
that are related to weak enforcement mechanisms).
434. See Fineman, supra note 333, at 730-31, 759-60.
435. See Cobb, supra note 54, at 398; Grillo, supra note 26, at 1555-56.
436. See Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2160-61; Grillo, supra note 26, at 1563-64.
437. See Grillo, supra note 26, at 1587. Freshman describes this as the "private-ordering
understanding of mediatioin," in which "[the] mediator simply teases out the parties' values and
helps them craft a resolution that reflects their values." Freshman, supra note 407, at 1692
(emphasis omitted).
438. See Grillo, supra note 26, at 1550. Divorce mediation "imposes a rigid orthodoxy as to
how [participants] should speak, make decisions, and be. This orthodoxy is imposed through subtle
and not-so-subtle messages about appropriate conduct and about what may be said in mediation." Id.
Grillo notes that in the "informal law of mediation" there is the "good woman" who is cooperative,
does not deny her feelings, does not shift her feelings onto her children, believes that it is important
that her husband stay involved in her children's lives, is rational and not bitter or vengeful, and
understands that she played a role in harms that afflict her, believing that family problems are no
one person's fault. The "bad woman" is bitter, wants revenge, fights over trivial things, is greedy
and ready to sacrifice her children as a tool against her husband, is irrational, and vents her anger
rather than negotiating constructively. See id. at 1555.
439. See id. at 1574-81 (discussing how mediators often punish displays of anger, especially
when exhibited by women and most especially by women of color); Astor, supra note 26, at 153
(asserting that mediators judge anger displays by men differently from those by women). Cobb
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in which mediation "domesticates" stories of violence by moving the focus
from the victim's rights to the victim's needs."4 In part, this is a result of a
mediation methodology that eschews fact finding and blame. For battered
women, this creates the risk that mediation will reinforce the batterer's
belief in the rightness of his behavior, minimize the harm of his violence and
control, and undermine the victim's belief in her right not to be beaten."'
The insistence on a purportedly neutral mediator fails to identify the immor-
ality of the batterer's (past, present, ongoing) behavior442 and limits the
support a mediator can give a battered woman."'
Restorative justice programs do not prescribe a neutral mediator ideal,
but the difficulty in determining what norms to apply may be no less of a
problem. This difficulty is acknowledged by the more thoughtful proponents
of restorative justice measures."4 For example, while John Braithwaite and
notes that when mediation themes become dominant during mediation (rather than competing
moral ideals), '"responsibility,' 'resolution,' 'participation,' and 'peacemaking' are valorized. The
violence plot line does not extend beyond the session, so there is no plan for protection for the
victim and there are no apologies. Violence becomes mutualized as it is reformulated as a 'dispute."'
Cobb, supra note 54, at 416.
440. See Cobb, supra note 54, at 410 (resulting from an analysis of 30 community mediation
sessions). Mediation's privacy is also criticized both because it fails to hold mediators accountable
via public scrutiny and because it recreates the privacy of the family, thus recreating norms of denial
and minimization of abuse. See Astor, supra note 26, at 158-59, 163; see also Freshman, supra note
407, at 1734 (noting that even with the mediator neutrality ideal, "mediators [still] channel discus-
sion toward certain types of values rather than others by expressing varying degrees of approval or
disapproval for certain values" and that "mediators may [also] use certain kinds of values as limits
on the kinds of agreements possible, such as expressing disapproval for agreements that vary 'too
much' from what a court might do").
441. See GORDON, supra note 346, at 257-64 (describing battered women's development of
a "right to not be beaten").
442. See Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2160 (noting that mediation's focus on the future
denies the victim's experiences of domestic violence and deprives her of any redress for past wrongs
suffered). So strong is the presumption of neutrality that mediators in a mediation program that
instituted safeguards creating special obligations on mediators to protect victims from battering
complained that the safeguards compromised their neutrality. See Barsky, supra note 27, at 21.
443. As Astor notes, the mediator must not appear to be partisan, or else she risks problems
with compliance or with convincing parties to continue. Yet if she treats the parties "equally"-
meaning just the same-it will reinforce the existing inequality between the parties. See Astor,
supra note 26, at 153; see also Fischer et al., supra note 26, at 2163 ("The tenet [of not judging
blameworthiness] forces the mediator to treat spousal abuse and domination neutrally."). Cobb
notes that "because mediation celebrates relativism (there are multiple moral codes and all are
legitimate), all moral orders are legitimate in mediation. There is no way for mediation to
advance an absolute moral code that stands outside the moral code of the mediation process itself."
Cobb, supra note 54, at 402.
444. 1 refer to family group conferencing as a restorative justice program, as do many restora-
tive justice proponents. See, e.g., Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 357, at 24. However, Braithwaite
and Daly describe family group conferencing as an example of republican justice. See Braithwaite
& Daly, supra note 1, at 193. For a more thorough description of republican justice, see generally
BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 37.
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Kathleen Daly suggest using community conferencing in domestic violence
cases, they acknowledge that "[i]t would not be possible to have regulatory
institutions where only feminist voices were heard and misogynist voices
were completely silenced." '445 Conferencing, like Peacemaking, allows the
offender to tell his story, but in conferencing there is no guarantee that the
facilitator or others will challenge explanations for battering that are victim
blaming or gender biased.446 Without the guarantee that the process will be
guided by an antibattering norm, the victim of domestic violence takes a calcu-
lated risk that other participants in conferencing will support her claims.447
Peacemakers do not pretend to be neutral with regard to the application
of behavioral norms.448 Though the parties are never asked to agree explicitly
to the use of traditional Navajo norms and values, it is likely that all partici-
pants have some generally accurate expectation regarding those norms and
expect them to be applied in Peacemaking. 49 The role of the peacemaker
445. Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 208. They nonetheless believe that, given the fact
that a majority of people oppose domestic violence, community conferencing creates an opportunity
for dialogue about gender that is not available in formal adjudication. See id. ("[Community
conferencing can] create spaces to advance struggles for feminist voices to be heard against those of
misogynists.").
446. In addition to the harm done to the victim, if these statements are unchallenged they
may reinforce the batterer's belief in justifications for his violence. In turn, such a process cannot
create a safe space that allows the recognition that the batterer may himself be the victim of systems
of subordination, prejudice, and family histories of abuse while also being the victimizer. To allow
such a recognition, without assurances of an antimisogyny norm, is to invite the minimization of the
violence or to blame the victim for the violence.
447. Both family group conferencing and Peacemaking rely on the victim's family to provide
her with support. For a discussion of the problems with this reliance, see Hooper & Busch, supra
note 2, at 120-21.
448. They do strive to be neutral with regard to fairness to the parties. See Interview with
Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9. Freshman describes Peacemaking as a "community-
enhancing" process because it "should enhance the salience of a particular community in either,
or both, of two ways: (1) individuals should resolve disputes according to the community ... and
(2) individuals should leave the process more firmly incorporating that community in their sense
of who they are." Freshman, supra note 407, at 1749. Freshman argues for a third way, a "community-
enabling" model, which provides parties with information regarding the various normative options
and allows them to choose. See id. at 1761-66. The more difficult question may be what happens
when the parties disagree as to the norms that should apply. Who gets to decide? (And not deciding
is also a decision, because all options operate with some norms that more or less constrain choices.)
In the context of domestic violence, I would enlist clear antisubordination norms that would be
trumped only by the victim's autonomy and that would bar all other dissent to those norms. In this
regard, the process that I suggest-and that I argue Peacemaking approximates-is much closer to
the (supposed) norms of the judicial system than are other mediation processes.
449. This community-enhancing understanding, however, may be compromised by the
coercive nature of the respondent's participation. See Freshman, supra note 407, at 1758-60 (writing
that community-enhancing mediators may fail to provide participants with the information
needed to make an informed choice regarding participation). In self-referred cases, which are the
majority, a petitioner may initiate Peacemaking and force a respondent to engage in Peacemaking
even if the respondent objects. See the discussion of coercion supra Part II.A. While court rules
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(or naat'aanii) is to guide the parties to a decision rather than to tell them
what to do, but the "naat'aanii's opinion about the right way of doing things
is important to the parties. The 'lecture' or opinion [of the naat'aanii] is also
important for the process of naat'aah or planning.""' The peacemaker is an
interested person who instructs participants in appropriate Navajo behavior.
She may use Navajo creation stories and journey narratives to teach a moral
lesson.4"'
While Peacemaking does not subscribe to the ideal of a neutral media-
tor, there may be other normative problems in practice. Peacemaking's
fluidity and focus on restoring relationships creates the possibility of bias and
informal rule application. To some extent, this is an inherent danger in any
adjudicatory process.5 2 Judges and juries interpret facts and weigh evidence
filtered through bias and unexamined stereotypes."3 Common biases in the
Navajo context may be an overemphasis on the importance of alcohol in
explaining domestic violence4. and a promarriage (or antidivorce) bias.4"
My review of Peacemaking files found evidence that some peacemakers
hold an antidivorce bias,4"6 which I discuss below. However, I did not find
evidence that the problem was as widespread as battered women's advocates
and judicial practice protect the domestic violence victim from referral from court to Peacemaking
over his or her objection, there are no similar formal protections for the victim who is made a
respondent in a self-referred Peacemaking.
450.. Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 78.
451. See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of the use of Navajo traditional stories for teaching
purposes.
452. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current
Reform Proposas, 140 U. PA. L REV. 379, 434 (1991) (finding that appellate courts more frequently
reverse convictions of defendants who claimed self-defense in the homicides of their intimate
partners, because trial judges operate with bias against battered women defendants).
453. See, e.g., Ammons, supra note 343, at 1071 (asserting that racist stereotypes may pre-
vent jurors from believing that battered African American women can be helpless); Maguigan,
supra note 452, at 434; Mahoney, supra note 49, at 80.
454. See Telephone Interview with Eileen Hudon, supra note 114 (describing the influence
of the chemical dependency treatment paradigm in understanding domestic violence). Alcohol is
described (overtly or implicitly) as the real problem in a number of accounts of Peacemaking's use
in domestic violence cases; however, my own interviews with peacemakers suggested a more nuanced
view. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
The peacemakers stated that while situations vary, common themes in domestic violence
cases include jealousy, batterers' alcohol use, and how the individuals were raised as children. See id.
"[I]f you are not taught how to be a man, how to be a responsible person, then when you are faced
with all this responsibility once you get married, you can't handle it." Id. Imogene Long, one of
the peacemakers interviewed, explained that peacemakers take people back to their upbringing
and help them "reveal their inner feelings." Id.
455. Some of the battered women's advocates I spoke with were concerned that peacemakers
were antidivorce and that this bias would lead them to minimize the violence or treat it as mutual.
See Interviews with Battered Women's Advocates, supra note 17.
456. See infra notes 460-463 and accompanying text.
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fear. Peacemaking routinely handles uncontested divorces,457 and clearly there
is no formal policy of keeping marriages intact. Bluehouse tells peace-
makers in training, "I'd rather have these people separated as friends than
together as enemies. '  As noted previously, at least half of the self-referred
petitioners in the files I reviewed were women, and a significant number of
them were either seeking divorce or saw Peacemaking as a last effort to save
the marriage prior to divorce." 9
Yet some peacemakers do appear to have an antidivorce bias.46 For
example, one peacemaker expresses a sense of failure at the woman's insis-
tence that the marriage is over: "The peace making hearing didn't go well
to keep the marriage[,] as the woman doesn't want to go on... .""' The
peacemaker notes further that "the wife refused to consider stabilizing their
marriage because .. .she [has] given him chances . . .but it gets back to
being abused by him due to [his] jealousy. 4 62 The peacemaker's statement
implies not only that success means keeping a marriage together, but also
that a woman who does not desire to stay married is acting inappropriately.
Peacemakers in Crownpoint told me they frequently suggest temporary
separations of sixty to ninety days, during which time the parties are to seek
counseling and the abuser is to cease all acts of abuse and intimidation. 3
457. See Window Rock File Review, supra note 9.
458. Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15. It may be that some peacemakers
pressure parties to stay together when the parties have not been separated for long or when both
parties are available, but that they abandon this ideal when it seems impractical.
459. See supra notes 402-406 and accompanying text.
460. Five of the 11 domestic violence cases reviewed in Shiprock resulted in a reconcilia-
tion. See Shiprock File Review, supra note 9. Of the remaining six cases, the parties appeared to
be headed for divorce in three: In one, the wife withdrew her request for Peacemaking and asked
that the case be referred back to court for a domestic violence protection order hearing because
the husband continued to drink and abuse her; in the second, the wife stated that she had no
desire to continue with the marriage because of her husband's ongoing violence, jealousy, and
refusal to get work; in the third, no agreement was reached and the peacemaker referred the
couple to court for a divorce action. Two cases never reached Peacemaking: In one, the respon-
dent wife requested a postponement pending a domestic violence protection order hearing; in the
second, information in the file was inadequate to explain why the session never took place. No
agreement was reached in the remaining case. See id. Of the 11 domestic violence case files
reviewed in Window Rock, six initiated Peacemaking in order to complete divorce proceedings,
including one petitioner who dropped her case before Peacemaking took place. Only three
resulted in reconciliation agreements. In one of the three reconciliation cases, the wife later
wrote the Peacemaker that the husband had failed to keep his promise to attend alcohol counsel-
ing and she requested a referral to family court. In one case the resolution was unclear, and in
another, there was no agreement because the husband refused to participate. See Window Rock
Review File, supra note 9.
461. Shiprock File Review, supra note 9.
462. Id.
463. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
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At the end of that time period, the couple meets again to determine whether
or not to live together. Given the focus on repairing relationships, a woman
who has no desire to continue in a relationship with an abusive ex-partner
may be seen as acting inappropriately in Peacemaking.
Peacemaking may sometimes domesticate women's stories of violence
in the manner Cobb describes as true of mediation. For example, my review
of Peacemaking files found that some peacemakers treat domestic violence
as anecdotal or allow the violence to be framed as mutual when it clearly is
not.464 A criminal court referral case in Shiprock serves to illustrate this
domesticating effect.465 The criminal complaint noted that the defendant
stepped on the victim's neck, hit her in the face, and kicked her all over her
body. She had numerous visible injuries. In Peacemaking, the defendant
explained that sometimes he has to stay out of town for his job. After one
of those times, his wife asked him where he had been. An argument ensued
and she threw a flowerpot at him, that did not hit him. The defendant "was
mad [and] started fighting." After beating her, he stayed out of the house
for a week and then wrote a letter to her apologizing. They subsequently
resumed living together. According to the peacemaker's notes, the man
concluded by saying, "I'm really sorry for what happened. I care for you and
love you. I wouldn't hurt you in any way again. From now on we will live a
464. See infra notes 465-470 and accompanying text. I found evidence of domesticating by
peacemakers in a small number of Peacemaking files. For example, there is no evidence that the
peacemaker confronted the denial regarding the husband's abuse in the following case, in which
the respondent wife states:
Before he used to beat me up. He use to drink before also. He use to say that these are
not his kids.... He doesn't support his kids. He says he is gonna have to have blood
tests before he pays for his kids.... The kids have to make their own jewelry to make
money. I want to work, but he says no.... Our marriage will not work.
Shiprock File Review, supra note 9. The husband's mother focuses on the unfairness of the wife's
leaving with the children while the husband was away:
[Ilt is not right, [the wife] gets mad at him when she lived with us. I get up early in the
morning for him and send him off to work. One morning [the wife] had the stuff packed
up on the truck and said [she was] taking it some place else. [She] took everything
except his stuff....
Id. The peacemaker writes, "No agreement was reached. They are very upset with each other
along with family members from both. There were a lot of accusations and tension." Id. It is pos-
sible, of course, that the peacemaker instructed the husband regarding his support obligations and
nonviolence, but the peacemaker's statements that imply that the problems are mutual suggest
otherwise. The peacemaker's conclusion fails to address the impact of the husband's behavior:
The mother and the children appear to be homeless; the children feel hurt that their father denies
his paternity; and the children are forced to make jewelry to support themselves because their
father refuses to pay support. See id.
465. Though the file noted that the referral came from criminal court, it was impossible to
tell if it was diverted to Peacemaking or if Peacemaking was a condition of sentencing.
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good life. You will have to understand my work too." '466 The wife responds,
Yes[,] I threw things because I was mad. I care for him but it hap-
pened[.] ... We'll talk about this at home and not do it again.
Yes[,] I care for you and I'm sorry for what we did to each other. I
wouldn't do it again. I would be a good wife to take care of each
other.
467
The man's story ("you will have to understand my work too") as well
as the woman's story (equating throwing a flowerpot with a brutal beating)
domesticate468 the violence by implying that it is symptomatic of a conflict
and is therefore mutual. The peacemaker concludes: "They forgave each
other in Peace Making. They both agreed to love[,] trust and respect each
other so that the dispute would not reoccur again. 4 69 This conclusion not
only fails to controvert the view of mutual responsibility for the beating, but
it also suggests that the woman's lack of trust as reflected in her questions
about the man's whereabouts is somehow equivalent to his violence.470
In other files, the abuser's violence, even when not understood as the
central problem, was treated seriously. For example, a criminal case in which
the defendant attended Peacemaking as a condition of probation ends with
the following agreement: "The petitioner agrees that she will have an agree-
ment to file [a] criminal complaint against her partner and the woman he is
having an affair with, if he keeps on doing that. She is going to give him
another chance. 471 The respondent also agreed to stop having affairs.
One of Peacemaking's central strengths is its flexibility and its ability
to allow petitioners to define the problem in their own terms. On the other
hand, this may present problems for battered women when their abusive
partners are the petitioners. Unless the peacemaker liaison engages in signifi-
cant discussion with the respondent or conducts an independent investigation
466. Shiprock File Review, supra note 9.
467. Id.
468. See generally Cobb, supra note 54, at 416-19 (describing the domestication of violence
in mediation stories).
469. Shiprock File Review, supra note 9.
470. For a discussion of the manner in which women's "provoking" words are understood as
equivalent to a physical assault, see Coker, supra note 182, at 109-10.
471. Shiprock File Review, supra note 9. Note that in this case it is the victim who is
treated as the petitioner and thus allowed to be the first to describe the problem. The respondent
described the trouble he was in: He was on probation for six months and he had to report to his
probation officer every two weeks, and he had to pay the petitioner $300 in restitution. It may
be that the court-imposed criminal sanction was responsible for the difference in attitude of both
the victim and the defendant compared with that of the prior story. It is also just as probable that
the difference lay in the peacemaker. See supra notes 163-167 and accompanying text (discussing
the great flexibility of practice in Peacemaking, which allows for differing approaches and
viewpoints among peacemakers).
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prior to the Peacemaking session, 72 the petitioner's description of the prob-
lem may narrow the focus of the session.473
The manner in which a peacemaker frames the problem may serve to
limit the issues addressed in Peacemaking. For example, when an elderly
mother was referred to Peacemaking by a hospital social worker, the focus of
the session was on the mother's complaints about her two adult daughters'
substance abuse and neglect of their children.474 Family members, including
other daughters (sisters of the two), their husbands, and an elderly uncle
spoke movingly to the two about the impact of their behavior on the rest of
the family and their concerns for the daughters' children. All urged alcohol
treatment.475 Other issues, such as one daughter's claim that the petitioner
mother had abused her when she was a child or that the petitioner was
presently neglecting their severely incapacitated alcoholic father, were
acknowledged but were not the focus of the session.476
Barbara Wall describes a Peacemaking session initiated by a mother
with her adult son.477 The mother's focus was the son's alcoholism. Wall
describes the reconciliation between mother and son and the son's agreement
to seek help for his alcohol addiction. Nearly lost in Wall's account is a brief
mention of the son's abuse of his wife.478 From Wall's description, it appears
that the son's domestic violence was not envisioned as the focus of Peace-
making. The wife's need for protection and the son's need to seek
assistance with stopping his violence received relatively little attention.479
472. Some models of conferencing do this. See Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 192-93.
Many of these issues may be said to relate to any restorative justice measure or to the underpinnings
of restorative justice theory itself.
473. The impact of the domestic violence movement may be responsible for the limited
number of protection order or criminal domestic violence cases referred to Peacemaking. Cases of
parent-child, adult-child, sibling, or other familial or interfamilial violence are far more commonly
referred from protection order hearings than are intimate violence cases. The assumption that
dynamics of power, coercion, and intimidation are not at work in some of these relationships may
be problematic. In one case, adult sisters told the peacemaker that they did not want to meet
alone with their brother because of his past violence directed at them. Despite this request, the
Peacemaking resulted in further private sessions between the three. See Shiprock File Review,
supra note 9.
474. See Notes on Peacemaking Session, supra note 11.
475. One daughter agreed to go to treatment and the other refused. See id. It may be an
indication of the importance of outside coercive elements that the daughter who agreed to go to
treatment was facing criminal charges related to drug possession and was encouraged to believe
that cooperation in Peacemaking might assist her in the drug case. See id.
476. These issues were not entirely ignored. The peacemaker referred the elderly mother to
counseling and urged the father's presence at the follow-up Peacemaking session. See id.
477. See Barbara E. Wall, Navajo Conceptions of Justice in the Peacemaker Courts, J. Soc.
PHIL. (forthcoming 2001).
478. See id.
479. See id. It may be that the assumption that the son's alcoholism caused the violence was
a more important determinant of how domestic violence was treated in the session.
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D. The Communitarian/Social-Change Problem
Restorative justice processes such as victim-offender mediation and
family group conferencing are said to "elevat[e] the role of crime victims
and communities in the justice process.""48 Restorative justice processes are
then contrasted with processes that foreground the relationship between
the offender and the state, rather than the offender, the victim, and the
"community. 481  The communitarian problem with such processes is two-
fold, the first being closely related to the normative concern just discussed.
Just as restorative justice processes such as family group conferencing may
overrely on family members to invoke anti-domestic violence norms, such
processes may overrely on community members to do the same. The second
communitarian problem is the absence of a meaningful discussion of the
parameters of "community responsibility," both in terms of offender reha-
bilitation and in terms of crime creation or maintenance.482
While opinion polls may find significant opposition to domestic vio-
lence,483 such sentiment may not translate into support for the broader goals
of women's autonomy.484 Community members may condemn the violence
while still holding sympathy for "the hapless man who must defend against
a nagging, shrewish woman." '485 It is one thing to condemn a man's smash-
ing his wife's jaw; it is another to recognize the violent act's continuity with
his refusal to allow her to work or have access to the car.486 Similarly, it is
one thing to condemn a man who hits his wife "because" he is drunk or
"because" she questioned him about his extramarital affairs, but when the
man's violence is prompted by the wife's violation of norms that are widely
held to be appropriate for wives-e.g., sexual fidelity, adequate child care or
housework, sexual access-condemnation may not come so readily. Rather
than hold the abuser accountable, community values may be just as likely
to hold accountable the wife who fails or refuses to put dinner on the table
in a timely manner. The question, then, must be: Why is it that we trust com-
480. Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 357, at 24.
481. See id.
482. For a more thorough analysis of what community might mean in the context of media-
tion, see Freshman, supra note 407, at 1743-71.
483. See Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 208 (noting that recent opinion polls find that
most people oppose the use of violence against wives). Braithwaite and Daly also acknowledge that
this does not necessarily translate into antimisogynist views. See id.
484. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of autonomy).
485. Coker, supra note 182, at 110 (describing the manner in which the belief that "men are
emotionally victimized" by women with superior verbal skills serves to reinforce batterers' views
that their victims provoke the violence).
486. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 184, at 2-3 (describing the tactics of control used by
men who batter).
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munities in the context of restorative justice processes to invalidate the social
beliefs that underpin battering behavior more than we trust other community
representatives like judges, police, and juries?
The second communitarian problem with restorativ e justice processes
is that community responsibility is seldom understood in the affirmative
manner needed in domestic violence cases.487 Much of the restorative jus-
tice literature presents the community's role in the process as forgiving and
reintegrating the offender into the community and reassuring and reinrte-
grating the (now alienated) victim."' The community's role in crime crea-
tion is seldom addressed.489  While the issues of denial and responsibility
may be similar for the community and for the family, they are different in two
important ways: First, the responsibility of a more diffuse group for supporting
battering may appear even more attenuated and thus less credible, and
second, while the community may appear less responsible, it may be even
more important (for the victim) to cast a broader net of responsibility than
to establish familial responsibility.
Implicating the community serves to draw the connections between
women's economic and social conditions and battering.49 This analysis
then points to a wider view of remedies and a wider pool of resources to sup-
port those remedies. In addition, recognizing community responsibility pro-
vides a more complete description of the "gender entrapment"'49' to which
women are often subject and thus assists the woman in naming the some-
times invisible binds that make freedom so hard to find. Domestic violence
cases require a more expanded and clear notion of community responsibility
and the use of an antimisogyny norm. The failure to give the term "com-
munity responsibility" real content fails to account for structural disparities
in power--disparities that frame and provide context for the interactions
between participants in restorative justice processes.
487. See McCold, supra note 55, at 89 (noting that the emphasis of restorative justice proc-
esses on individual offenders and victims "may divert attention from the root causes that continu-
ously produce [crime]").
488. See, e.g., UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER, supra note 355, at 1-9.
489. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. A minority of restorative justice scholars
even attempt to define "community." See Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 192-93 (describing
community conferencing's use of "communities of concern" composed of people who care about
either the offender or the victim or both); McCold, supra note 55, at 91-92 ("Should the conflict
exist between married partners and the injury involved physical harm, the boundary of the inter-
ested community widens to include, at the least, other non-primary family members and associ-
ates."). Similarly, Braithwaite's concept of reintegrative shaming has also been criticized for his
failure to address "the key question he raises--how, if at all, can culture be changed." Robert Weisberg,
Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 521, 556 (1992).
490. See supra notes 185-198 and accompanying text; see also Schneider, supra note 55, at
534-35.
491. See generally RICHIE, supra note 259.
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Peacemaking differs from group conferencing, in part, because its nor-
mative community may be more clear.492 First, it identifies traditional Navajo
processes as best for Navajo problems. Community is thus defined as Navajo.4 93
However, the understanding of both "traditional" as well as "Navajo" may
be contested.494 For example, battered women's advocates worry that Peace-
making's reliance on clan and familial relationships is misplaced. These
advocates worry that the value of traditional stories and the importance of
clan and familial relationships are seriously undermined in a setting in which
many younger Navajo have little or no understanding of or respect for those
stories or values.
[The] Navajo value system has been so confused, has been so adulter-
ated by the dominant society .... [My aunt's] ... grown daughter was
getting beaten by her husband and the aunt.., didn't understand
why the daughter wasn't satisfied [with her marriage.] After all[, her
husband] didn't drink and he was a good provider. So people's expe-
riences make them put one thing as more important than anything
else. So maybe if you grew up in an alcoholic household, then you
think that if the husband doesn't drink, then that is the most impor-
tant thing.495
This general breakdown in clan relations is exacerbated by the inter-
generational effects of abusive boarding school experiences and by the advent
of a wage economy that gave Navajo men more economic power than Navajo
women.496 As one battered women's advocate told me, "They don't even
respect their parents[;] how can [peacemakers] expect them to ... [respect]
their spouse ... ?"9' Similarly, some battered women's advocates point to
492. See supra Part II.C (describing the normative problem in informal adjudication processes).
493. I do not mean to provide a jurisdictional rule here. Peacemaking is available to non-
Navajo including non-Indians. Rather, I am suggesting that the practice that is most referenced
in Peacemaking, the use of traditional Navajo stories and the traditional teachings of peacemak-
ers, represents an implicit definition of community. See Freshman, supra note 407, at 1749 (describ-
ing community-enhancing mediation).
494. For a related argument, see Freshman, supra note 407, at 1712 (writing that the prob-
lem with community enhancing that is aimed at serving the interests of the community is deter-
mining "which community has the best claim to represent or regulate a particular couple").
495. Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.) (notes
on file with author).
496. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing changes in the economy that
have undermined women's status).
497. Interview with Anonymous Battered Women's Advocate, in Navajo Nation (n.d.)
(notes on file with author). Other advocates stated that they believed a process such as Peace-
making might work when clan and familial relationships are strong but not when they have been
weakened by years of colonization, such as in the Navajo Nation; the necessary cultural context
simply no longer exists to ensure compliance. See Telephone Interview with Eileen Hudon, supra
note 114.
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the fact that significant numbers of Navajo are not fluent in the Navajo
language, and thus stories and teachings in Navajo do not carry either the lit-
eral meaning or the cultural resonance that peacemakers presume. Battered
women's advocates also worry that clan relationships that would ensure com-
pliance with Peacemaking agreements are seriously compromised.4 9
Criticisms of Peacemaking's reliance on fragile or nonexistent clan
relationships may fail to account for the diversity of Peacemaking practice
and the pragmatic practice of many peacemakers.499 Many spoke of the.
alienation of people and saw their role as trying to help people understand
the relevance of traditional teaching."a Peacemakers see their practice both
as (re)creating traditional concepts of clan and family responsibility and as util-
izing these relationships to reform behavior. This creates certain contradic-
tions. Many peacemakers agree with concerns regarding the loss of traditional
values but do not appear to share a uniform or fixed understanding of
traditionalism'01 or a belief that only those who are traditionalists will be
moved by Peacemaking."2 Some peacemakers seem to assume that parties
must have some basic understanding of traditional Navajo thinking, how-
ever tenuous or inchoate. Others seem to see Peacemaking as a vehicle for
restoring Navajo values, even for the completely ignorant, and particularly
498. They note that parent-child bonds are often stronger than clan bonds and that parent-
child bonds may foster denial and protection of an abuser son. See supra notes 211-212 and
accompanying text (discussing denial on the part of parents); see also Interview with Sharon
Tsingine & Donovan Brown, supra note 17 (describing their experiences with Navajo mothers
who protect their sons).
499. The ability to "Navajo-ize" new technologies is a significant strength of Navajo culture.
See Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note 17 (describing the batterer's
program as "Navajo-izing" concepts from other programs). Farella argues that Navajo adaptation
of new technologies, rather than proof of acculturation, is "an attempt to maintain a traditional
epistemology.... [A] labeling of the new as old and of change as an attempt to stay the same."
FARELLA, THE MAIN STALK, supra note 262, at 189-90. Farella concludes, "the Navajos are not
change oriented but rather... are changing in order to remain 'traditional.' Specifically, they are
altering their technology to maintain their epistemology." Id.; see also Austin, supra note 4, at 48
(advocating the use of Navajo common law as a "back to the future" movement).
500. The practice of Peacemaking appears to vary significantly. See supra notes 163-167
and accompanying text. For example, the film prepared by the Peacemaker Division presents a
session in which the parties speak hardly at all and the peacemaker speaks a great deal. In the session
that I observed, the participants were allowed a great deal of time to express their concerns, while
the peacemaker played the role of facilitator and guide. In yet another session, described to me
by a participant, the peacemaker lectured the parties at length and gave the battered woman
the opportunity to vent her feelings but did not encourage much talk from the batterer. While the
Peacemaking session that I observed was conducted in both Navajo and English, the peacemaker
spoke primarily in English to the younger Navajo, slipping into Navajo to speak with the older mem-
bers. In addition, prayers and teachings were conducted in a mix of Navajo and English.
501. See Nader & Ou, supra note 308, at 25-26 (describing the deployment of notions of
traditionalism).
502. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
among the young.5 3 In addition, some peacemakers are not at all hesitant
to use the coercion of Anglo adjudication or the threat of police action
when necessary to encouragecooperaton."
It is likely that some peacemakers overstate their ability to create from
these fragments a sense of cultural identification, and that they thus under-
state the difficulty in changing entrenched misogynist beliefs that are rein-
forced by dominant Anglo-European culture and that often reflect parental
modeling."'5 Thus the challenge to Peacemaking, if it is to make a real
change in domestic violence, is to call upon a definition of what it means to
be Navajo that is pro-gender egalitarian in a time in which there is much
evidence of an entrenched gender hierarchy and widespread denial regard-
ing the prevalence of domestic violence. The challenge for Peacemaking is
the challenge for all anti-domestic violence work: how to create social
change.0 6 It is in this regard that traditional gender-egalitarian stories may
act to transform not only the batterer's view of his relationship, but also his
view of himself.0 7
While some peacemakers may overstate their ability to change behav-
ior, others readily acknowledge that they are unable to control the behavior
of parties outside of Peacemaking.0 They believe, nonetheless, that what
happens in Peacemaking frequently has a significant impact on behavior.
To what extent do peacemakers address the second communitarian
problem, recognizing community responsibility in violence creation and
maintenance? I asked Bluehouse, "How does [Peacemaking] work if none
503. See Interview with Ruthie Alexis, supra note 12.
504. For example, when I asked peacemakers in Crownpoint how they ensured compliance
with Peacemaking agreements, they noted that usually the abuser who is in Peacemaking knows
that he is being watched by the police and is afraid of what will happen if he abuses again. It is not
clear if they were referring to all domestic violence cases, including self-referrals, or only to those
that are court-referred. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9. Peacemaker
Ruthie Alexis used a somewhat similar tactic in the Peacemaking session that I observed. Alexis
told two women, accused by their elderly mother of neglecting their children, that she could make
a call to the child protection agency and they could deal with this in court or they could agree to
work at it in Peacemaking. See Notes on Peacemaking Session, supra note 11.
505. See supra note 250 (describing research regarding the intergenerational aspect of
domestic violence).
506. If peacemakers and battered women's advocates join forces, they may both be strength-
ened in this endeavor. There are efforts underway to increase the cooperation between peace-
makers and anti-domestic violence advocates. The domestic violence training mandated by the
Domestic Abuse Protection Act, NATION CODE tit. 9, § 1652 (Equity 1995), has provided a forum
for discussion. See Telephone Interview with Gloria Champion, supra note 125. James Zion, an
outspoken advocate of Peacemaking, has actively sought the opinions of battered women's advocates
with regard to Peacemaking. See Interview with Cheryl Neskahi-Coan & Helen Muskett, supra note
17. However, the need for increased dialogue and joint anti-domestic violence efforts continues.
507. See supra notes 294-296 and accompanying text.
508. See Interview with Crownpoint Peacemakers, supra note 9.
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of the other kind of [traditional] mechanisms for enacting [gender harmony]
are in place ... ? How can Peacemaking as a process reinforce [or] recre-
ate gender harmony if... mechanisms [of clan relationships and gender
egalitarianism] have been so splintered?" Bluehouses's thoughtful and hon-
est response suggests the difficulty and challenge of linking Peacemaking to
larger goals of social change:
All I can say, I have to understand that that has happened, that one
of my jobs is to be an advocate to bring that to forefront. There's been
200 years of damage .... [One won't] see changes over night .... I
need to acknowledge that for some people [Peacemaking is] not going
to work, but for those for whoim] it works, my God it works! ... I
think that a lot of our traditional people still have those values. It's just
those of us who have gone off to school and become attorneys and stuff
like that. That may be the question in disguise: [I've] lost it all and how
do I find that? I have to keep plugging along. I've been known not to be
the favorite son of certain Christian types and not [to be the] favorite
son of certain traditional types, because I'm caught in between....
It's a good question. It's a dam good question. What other kinds
of mechanisms does Peacemaking want to be a part of? Well, natu-
rally, I'm not one to completely reject western [ways]. When [you] take
[a] look at lots of traditional ways there are lots of overlaps. My job is
to point out those overlaps and to say this is how we say it in Navajo
and this is how we say it in English.0 9
CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM NAVAJO PEACEMAKING
This Article moves back and forth between a study of the specifics of
Navajo Peacemaking in domestic violence cases and an exploration of Peace-
making's theory of adjudication and its lessons for intervention strategies
in domestic violence more generally-even when those possibilities are
imperfectly realized in current Navajo practice.
In the struggle for greater autonomy and for some measure of safety
against male violence, women choose methods and resources, discarding
those that fail to work and refining those that, while not perfect, provide
some advantage. Women's experiences of battering are framed by their
experiences of other subordinating experiences: racism, childhood abuse, and
economic deprivation."'0 These experiences are also framed by women's
509. Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15.
510. See DUrTON, supra note 34, at 12 (describing how a woman's responses to battering are
filtered through the experiences and circumstances of that woman, including her race, her economic
position, whether she is a survivor of childhood abuse, her health status, and whether she is gay or
straight).
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political and cultural ideals and commitments. While there is no one inter-
vention strategy that will work for all women, one critical measure of the
effectiveness of any strategy is its capacity for placing resources-material,
emotional, spiritual-in the hands of battered women. In some locales, this
may best be accomplished through informal mechanisms that engage inten-
tional communities, such as churches or civic organizations, in assisting bat-
tered women.
As developed in this Article, the Navajo Peacemaking model may
increase a woman's material resources through nalyeeh and referrals to social
services. "' It may increase her familial, emotional, and spiritual resources
through its assistance in reconnecting her with family, redefining for her in-
laws her relationship with their abusive son, providing referrals to counseling
(both secular and spiritual), and through demonstrating care and support."'
Peacemaking offers other potential benefits for some women. It may assist
in disrupting familial supports for battering because family members are
subpoenaed and peacemakers confront familial denial and minimizing. 1
Peacemaking may directly address the abuser's victim blaming, excusing, or
minimizing statements. 14 Peacemaking may allow for the recognition of the
impact of oppressive systems in the lives of men who batter without resort
to excuse or victim blaming."' Peacemaking thus avoids the "responsibility
versus description" dichotomy of formal adjudication that limits its ability
to address the complexity of battering behavior.
Peacemakers value relationships, even relationships with a batterer.
Because peacemakers do not presume that separation is the best course
of action, women are free to see Peacemaking as their last hope for saving a
marriage. Peacemaking may provide women with tools to change the balance
of power within their relationships.
Peacemaking also provides partial remedies for the problems that
plague other informal adjudication. Rather than mediation's neutral ideal,
peacemakers see themselves as fair but interested intervenors whose role is
to instruct and to guide."6 Thus, Peacemaking has the potential to operate
with a clear and overt antimisogyny norm.517 This antimisogyny norm may
511. See supra notes 217-245 and accompanying text.
512. See supra Part L.C (describing the benefits of Peacemaking).
513. See supra notes 206-215 and accompanying text (describing peacemakers who "cut
through" batterers' denial).
514. See supra notes 206-215 and accompanying text.
515. See supra Part I.C.l.b.
516. See supra notes 448-451 and accompanying text.
517. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the use of traditional Navajo stories to promote gender-
egalitarian relationships).
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be strengthened by the use of traditional Navajo stories that emphasize the
importance of gender balance and complementariness."5
The Navajo Peacemaking experience underscores the necessity of an
antimisogyny norm. Peacemakers who equate battering with a conflict or
disagreement may domesticate"9 the abuse. When peacemakers are clear
that the abuse is an important object of intervention and that it is harmful
and the responsibility of the abuser, it provides the possibility for real
change in the batterer's thinking.20  It can reframe the battering. It may
force the batterer to listen to "'his family tell of the ordeal and ... what they
went through during this time of terror.'
5 2
'
Despite these potential benefits, Peacemaking is no more ideal at
meeting the goal of promoting women's autonomy than are other imperfect
interventions. Indeed, as described in this Article in some detail, Peace-
making's current practice creates real dangers for some women, primarily
because it coerces participation in self-referred cases.522 Additionally, safety
is compromised because Peacemaking does not routinely provide battered
women with the information they need to make an informed decision about
whether to enter Peacemaking."' Some peacemakers appear biased against
divorce, thus sandwiching women between the separation focus524 of formal
adjudication and a stay-married focus 25 in Peacemaking. But this is not
always the case. Some peacemakers routinely assist women in obtaining a
divorce, some women come to Peacemaking expressly to use the process to
gain a divorce, and a significant number of women take their case to family
court when they are unhappy with Peacemaking's results (or with their
partners' failure to change).5 26
What are the lessons of Navajo Peacemaking for designing informal
domestic violence intervention strategies?27 First, such a process must have
518. See supra notes 287-296 and accompanying text.
519. See Cobb, supra note 54, at 410-13.
520. See Zion, supra note 150, at 18-19 (describing the importance of cognitive change in
Peacemaking's intervention with batterers).
521. Window Rock File Review, supra note 9 (quoting a peacemaker's description of a Peace-
making session).
522. See supra Part II.A.
523. See supra Part II.A.
524. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
525. See sup'ra notes 456-463 and accompanying text.
526. See supra note 460 and accompanying text.
527. This provisional description is not meant to provide a detailed blueprint but to offer
suggestions for further analysis and inquiry. I do not address here how such a process might
be invoked: whether through court referral, whether only in criminal cases following a guilty plea
(or at least a "no contest" plea), whether available by agreement of the parties regardless of court pro-
cess, or whether available through civil protection order hearings. Quite separately, such a process
may be organized informally, without any state role, by intentional communities such as churches.
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safeguards to limit the abuser's ability to use the process to locate and con-
tinue to abuse the woman. Cases should be screened to identify battering.
Respondent victims should be able to opt out. They should be given full
information regarding the pros and cons of the process (as compared with
others), and should be assisted with safety planning. Such a process would
borrow from Navajo Peacemaking the understanding that fairness need not
mean neutrality."'8 This is particularly true with regard to the facilitator's
understanding of violence and controlling behavior. The facilitator should use
not only an antiviolence norm but also an antimisogyny norm.529 Peacemaking
demonstrates the power of stories used in the furtherance of such a norm. In
pluralistic American culture, stories compete. 3 The facilitator in the infor-
mal process I imagine would, much as the most common batterer's treatment
programs now do,53' support a story that values women's autonomy.
532
Like Peacemaking, this process should allow for a description of the
oppressive structures that operate in the life of the batterer without rein-
forcing his sense of "vfctimhood" or entitlement.533 This underscores the
process's link to social justice, spirituality, and the capacity for individual
change.534 It allows women to affirm cultural and political identity-their
solidarity with men in antiracist, anticolonialist work-without sacrificing
528. See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
529. This distinguishes Peacemaking from Braithwaite and Daly's proposal for community
conferencing. See Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 192-94 (discussing normative problems in
their community conferencing proposal).
530. Of course, stories compete in the Navajo context as well. See supra note 308 (discussing
Laura Nader's work on the deployment of harmony ideologies to subordinate Native people).
531. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 184, at 30. 1 do not mean to suggest that this process
would replace batterer's treatment programs. In most circumstances, lengthier and more detailed
processes will be required for batterer reform.
532. For example, one story with some popular currency is that of marriage as a partnership
of equals. See June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New Model of Parental
Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1091, 1095 (1999) (arguing that social science research
demonstrates that "the parental model that produces the best [custody] outcomes for children is
one of supportive partnership"). In the context of intentional communities such as Christian
churches, the Biblical admonition to husbands to "love your wives, even as Christ also loved the
Church, and gave himself for it" may provide yet another story basis. Ephesians 5:25 (New Revised
Standard Version). Batterer's intervention programs encourage participants to rethink their under-
standings of gender relations and to adopt a different story. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note
184, at 78, 89-178 (describing a batterer's program that encourages abusers to replace attempts to
control women with elements of the "Equality Wheel," which includes nonviolence and the ability
to negotiate fairly).
533. See supra Part I.C.l.b.
534. See Harris, supra note 48, at 41. Harris notes that despite the 1995 Million Man
March's identification with "a patriarchal black nationalism that uses sexism and heterosexism,"
its theme of "'atonement' called attention to the need for struggle within the African American
community itself for greater integrity and self-awareness." Id.
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their right to be free of gender-related violence. Such a process should value
connection and relationships but should equally value choice--enlarging
women's ability to choose by increasing women's resources.
The remedies available might include those currently available in
restraining-order processes. For those who are separating, this might include
such remedies as stay-away provisions, child custody and visitation, and
child support. 3 For those who live together, it might include prohibitions
against violence, harassment, stalking, and phone calls at work. 36 It might
also include affirmative agreements to share housework or childcare, to
express anger in noncontrolling and nonthreatening ways,"' to seek alcohol
and batterer's treatment, and to cease certain battering-supporting friend-
ships."' As proposed by Braithwaite and Daly, it should include changes in
the distribution of family assets so as to provide the woman with greater
economic independence."'
Without a sense of clan and familial responsibility, it may be difficult to
persuade an abuser's family to provide the victim with goods and services.'
However, agreements involving victim reparations will often, in actuality, draw
on familial assets. The process should encourage the attendance of the
victim's family members as well, which will sometimes strengthen frayed fam-
ily relationships.
535. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 741.30 (West Supp. 1999) (providing that courts may
issue domestic violence protection orders that restrain the respondent from committing any acts
of domestic violence, award the petitioner exclusive use of the dwelling, award temporary child cus-
tody and/or visitation rights, establish child support, order the respondent to participate in treatment,
intervention or counseling services, and may provide "other relief as the court deems necessary").
536. See id. ch. 741.31.
537. Men in batterer's programs frequently are taught to take "time-outs" when they feel
angry. During a time-out, a person uses positive "self-talk" (statements that reorient from feeling
like a victim to feeling in control of oneself and not others) to "cool down." Time-outs are never
to take the place of real dialogue. There must be an agreement to return to the source of dis-
agreement at a certain time. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 184, at 56-58. Of course, time-
outs can become a way of controlling the conversation and ensuring that you never have to listen
to complaints or disagreements.
538. There may be a significant overlap between battering-supporting friendships and drink-
ing buddies. See BOWKER, supra note 200, at 54 (describing how frequency of contact with male
friends correlates with more serious violence among batterers); supra note 249 (describing research
on the correlation between drug and alcohol abuse and battering).
539. See Braithwaite & Daly, supra note 1, at 200.
540. Navajo Peacemaking may use the coercive power of the state to ensure family attendance
in Peacemaking. See PEACEMAKER Cr. R. 1.5, in ZION & MCCABE, supra note 56, at 102 ("An
order compelling individuals to submit to Peacemaker Court proceedings as parties, witnesses or
participants is binding upon any member of the Navajo Tribe and any Indian living among the
members of the Navajo Tribe."). While some family members may be subpoenaed as witnesses in
informal processes that operate under the direction of the judiciary, it is unlikely that state power
(outside American Indian nations) will have the same coercive reach as that of Navajo Peace-
maker courts.
Drawing on Yamamoto's work on intergroup race apologies"' as well as
Navajo Peacemaking theory, such a process should encourage the batterer
and his family and other support systems to recognize the harm caused by
his behavior.542 Peacemaking supports this recognition through the use of
the victim's stories and those of her family and friends.43 It also supports
this recognition through the peacemaker's confrontation of denying and
minimizing statements made by the batterer and his family."4 Yamamoto's
second step, "taking responsibility," '45 will often require more extensive
inquiry into the various tactics used by a batterer to control, intimidate, and
harm his partner or ex-partner. This requires confrontation not only of state-
ments that deny or minimize the violence, but also of statements that
attempt to excuse or blame the violence on the victim's bad behavior. It
requires a cataloguing of controlling behaviors. 46 This process cannot be
accomplished solely through the use of an informal process, but it can begin
there. Referrals to batterer's treatment, alcohol treatment, and spiritual
healers or counselors must continue the process. The third step, "recon-
struction," '47 requires the concrete measures described above. Nalyeeh, or
reparations after this thorough searching process, is much more than victim
compensation. Reparations should include the resources, within the limits
of availability, required to broaden the victim's autonomy.548 More than a
therapeutic intervention,549 such a process would seek to restructure the power
relationships between a man who batters and the woman he batters.
The Navajo "art and science of dealing with crime" ' provides some
valuable lessons for thinking about the future of anti-domestic violence
work. Intervention strategies that broaden women's choices, that address
their material and context-specific needs, are the strategies that will be most
effective. Peacemaking is not perfect-no domestic violence intervention
541. See generally YAMAMOTO, supra note 1. It is no accident that Yamamoto's model shares
elements with Navajo Peacemaking; his work draws on indigenous customary practices. See id. at
166-67.
542. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
544. See supra notes 208-215 and accompanying text.
545. YAMAMOTO, supra note 1, at 185.
546. Batterer's treatment programs frequently require abusive men to keep a log that records
their controlling behaviors. See PENCE & PAYMAR, supra note 184, at 35-37.
547. YAMAMOTO, supra note 1, at 190-91.
548. See id. at 203 (describing reparations that can be transformative when "coupled with
acknowledgment and apology" because they envision a "more just world").
549. Of course it is also a therapeutic intervention. See generally EDLESON & TOLMAN, supra
note 250, at 97-98 (explaining why couples therapy, where the barterer has demonstrated a com-
mitment to nonabuse over a period of time, may be helpful because it allows the woman to express
her resentment regarding the abuse and facilitates her healing process).
550. Yazzie, Navajo Peacekeeping, supra note 21, at 100-01.
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is perfect-but Peacemaking offers possibilities for women that are largely
unavailable in other intervention strategies.
APPENDIX: RESEARCH NOTE ON PROBLEMS OF IMPERIALISM
AND EMPIRICISM
There are two important concerns that constrain and potentially limit
this Article's analysis. I refer to them as the "imperialism problem" and the
"empiricism problem." The imperialism problem is that as an outsider, non-
Navajo woman, I may engage in "overextended borrowing" ' that either
ignores important cultural differences..2 or, in the other extreme, exoticizes5"
or romanticizes5 4 cultural difference.
Carole Goldberg warns that scholars who advocate the use of Peace-
making in non-Indian settings are engaged in "overextended borrowing"
when they fail to recognize the extent to which Peacemaking is grounded
in a Navajo spiritual world-view that is inapplicable in a "secular democratic
system" with "myriad religious traditions."5" I share Goldberg's skepticism
551. See generally Goldberg, supra note 43 (arguing that legal scholarship endorsing Peace-
making's use in non-Indian settings both romanticizes and ignores cultural distinctions critical to
Peacemaking's use).
552. See Lisa Aronson Fontes, Conducting Ethical Cross-Cultural Research on Family Violence,
in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 45, at
296, 298 (describing the "beta error" in family violence research whereby "members of all ethnic and
cultural groups were treated as if the manifestations, effects, prevention and recovery from various
types of family violence would follow from models and research developed for the most part by
and with White Americans").
553. See HILDEN, supra note 60, at 99, 180-81 (describing the popular exoticization of Indi-
anness in which Indians are questioned about the traditional or correct way to do daily activities
and white shamans masquerade as Indian).
554. See Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1018; infra notes 556-557 and accompanying text
(describing Renato Rosaldo's description of "imperial nostalgia"). The white invention of "Ameri-
can Indian Spiritualism" or new age Indian spiritualism provides a particular case in point of an
extreme romanticization. See, e.g., CHURCHILL, supra note 22, at 355-65 (describing "American
Indian Spiritualism"). One author notes that American Indian writers can, along with white writers,
be subject to "the Romantic Fallacy" and give the impression that
Indians are without fail innocent and magical beings who have run afoul of fate and that
the ways of tribal life were simple, stark, and pure, guided by a few simple philosophical
principles and a transcendent comprehension of the laws of the universe which the Indi-
ans, in their simple but pure way, adhered to unfailingly.
ALLEN, supra note 65, at 129.
555. See Goldberg, supra note 43, at 1016. I do not pretend to operate as an objective
observer. What I do hope for is to operate with some sense of the limitations of my awareness.
Goldberg expressed to me rather vividly just how difficult a task this can be. In response to what I
believed to be the exoticization of Native practices, I noted that most of the Peacemaking session
I observed was conducted in English and much of it felt, to me, like a directed therapy session.
The peacemaker occasionally spoke in Navajo, and the two elderly participants spoke only in
Navajo, with the peacemaker frequently translating for the benefit of younger participants whose
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about whether Peacemaking may simply be "lifted" for use in non-Navajo set-
tings. However, I am perhaps more optimistic that some of Peacemaking's
processes may be useful in other settings.
In addition to ignoring important cultural differences, my work runs
the risk of exoticizing or romanticizing difference. Anthropologist Renato
Rosaldo describes the manner in which culture is seen only in those per-
ceived as dissimilar and usually subordinate: "[Tihe more power one has, the
less culture one enjoys, and the more culture one has, the less power one
wields." '556 Those with the "most" culture are often those "confined to mar-
ginal lands. Their cultural distinctiveness derives from a lengthy historical
process of colonial domination; their quaint customs signal isolation, insula-
tion, and subordination within the nation-state.
557
I understand the Navajo judiciary's movement for greater reliance on
Navajo common law in legal decision making and its move to create traditional
methods of dispute resolution such as Peacemaking as overtly political acts,558
Navajo was limited. I also noted that my interview of the two peacemakers who participated in
the session seemed to confirm my understanding. Goldberg gently suggested that I might have
missed a great deal because of my inability to understand the statements made in Navajo, particu-
larly the prayers. My confidence in my understanding of what transpired rendered unimportant
the portion that I could least understand and, as Goldberg noted, these were perhaps the most
important portions of the session. See Telephone Interview with Carole Goldberg, Professor, UCLA
School of Law and Georgetown University Law Center (May 10, 1997) (notes on file with author).
556. RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE & TRUTH 202 (1989). Thus, "culture" extends along a
continuum from those at the lowest social rung, who do not have much of it, to those at the sub-
ordinate but slightly higher rungs, who have a great deal of it, to those at the "civilized" highest
rungs who do not have "culture" at all. See id. at 198-202.
557. Id. at 199. This process is particularly evident in the dominant U.S. cultural under-
standing of American Indians. The "imperialist nostalgia" for the "dying (or dead) culture" (which
stubbornly refuses to die) marks much of the popular understanding of Native practices, including
legal practices. See id. at 69 ("[A]gents of colonialism.., often display nostalgia for the colonized
culture as it was 'traditionally' (that is, when they first encountered it) .... [They yearn] for the
very forms of life they intentionally altered or destroyed."); see also ALLEN, supra note 65, at 78
("[Plopular and scholarly images of Indians as conquered, dying people had deeply affected
American Indian self-perception .... ). Justice Austin of the Supreme Court of the Navajo
Nation writes, "Navajo common law is not something quaint or curious-it is alive and vibrant.
It adapts to the present, and it will adapt to the future." Austin, supra note 4, at 48.
558. See, for example, Pommersheim, supra note 132, at 413, noting that:
[T]he greater necessity [for tribal courts] is that such decisionmaking craft a jurisprudence
reflecting the aspiration and wisdom of traditional cultures seeking a future of liberation
and self-realization in which age old values may continue to flourish in contemporary
circumstances. Much of this effort, if successful, will aid in both decolonizing federal Indian
law and building an indigenous vision of tribal sovereignty.
Id.; see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 135, at 245 ("The tribal courts creatively use indigenous
customs and usages that survived the five-hundred-year encounter and struggle with Euro-American
cultures. Despite the repeated efforts to destroy the cultural foundation of American Indian tribes,
important customary principles persisted."). Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Supreme Court of
the Navajo Nation and Justice Austin argue that Peacemaking is a part of this revival. See Interview
with Raymond Austin, supra note 14; Interview with Robert Yazzie, supra note 14.
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as well as acts of cultural and spiritual renewal.559 They are part of a series of
responses to the U.S. government's numerous intrusions on Navajo sover-
eignty.5" They are not cultural relics but rather are self-conscious responses
to the hegemony of U.S. culture and power. 61 Peacemaking addresses, in
part, the internalized colonial realities of Navajo political life: the overin-
carceration of Native men in federal and state prisons,562 the limits of Navajo
Nation criminal jurisdiction,563 the inadequate number of police and the
559. See, for example, An Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 21, at 169, noting that:
As Navajos, we are reviving some of the learning [such as Peacemaking] that has withered
away through our journey with the United States government.... We have got to go back
and rediscover kinship, respect for nature, respect for human beings. We can't be continu-
ing to go blindly down this path and fighting against each other.
Id. See also Interview with Raymond Austin, supra note 14, noting that:
[We] [ulse prayer in Peacemaking because prayer is part of the ceremony that comes from
the holy people. It helps to purify your mind so that you can focus on the problems at
hand.... You have to be in the right frame of mind to engage in prayer so that's why
Peacemaking begins with prayer. It helps to set the right frame of mind. It says, "We are
not here to find fault."
Id. See generally Chief Justice Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ.
L. REV. 225 (1989) (discussing current challenges for the Navajo that include sovereignty chal-
lenges and challenges to cultural identity and existence).
560. For example, the U.S. government imposed the current tribal court system. More
recently, the U.S. Congress imposed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994). See
Austin, supra note 4, at 11.
561. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How
the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 235,
305 (1997) (arguing for strengthening Peacemaking traditions as a means of strengthening sover-
eignty); Zion & Yazzie, supra note 5, at 56 ("[M]ethods of A.D.R. must not be forced on Indian
nations [by state and federal governments], as adjudication was.").
562. Just over 4% of the American Indian population is under correctional control. This
compares with 2% of white adults, 9.8% of black adults, and less than 0.5% of Asian adults. See
GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 110, at 26. Of those under correctional control, 46% are incar-
cerated: 25% in local jails, 18% in state prisons, and 3% in federal prisons. By contrast, less than
one third of correctional populations nationwide are confined in prisons or jails. See id. Programs
similar in some respects to Peacemaking have been developed in part as a response to the overin-
carceration of Native men. See, e.g., Carol LaPrairie, Conferencing in Aboriginal Communities in
Canada: Finding Middle Ground in Criminal Justice?, 6 CRIM. L.F. 576, 577 (1995) (noting that family
group conferencing seeks to remedy the high imprisonment rate for aboriginals in Australia, which is
more than 10 times that of nonaboriginals).
American Indian battered women's advocates warn that proponents of criminal justice inter-
vention fail to understand that sentencing, probation, or diversion decisions that rest on prior
convictions disproportionately affect Native men. Such convictions are often "alcohol related,
driving or vehicle offenses, or theft, [which] may in fact be a consequence of poverty." BALZER ET
AL., supra note 95, at 92.
563. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (stating that federal jurisdiction extends to the crimes of mur-
der, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape, incest,
assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious
bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny that occur on tribal lands). Tribal courts may
impose sentences no longer than six months and fines of no more than $500. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
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unavailability of jail space, 64 and social realities including alcoholism and
abusive childhood boarding school experiences.
A second imperialism problem arises from an instinct opposite to that
of ignoring or exoticizing cultural difference: I may presume that non-Navajo
expertise regarding domestic violence or adjudication is superior to Navajo
expertise."' In conducting interviews for this study, I was aware of the fel-
lowship among anti-domestic violence workers, a fellowship born in part by
a feminist vision and an anti-domestic violence activists' language.566
I attempt to mediate some of these limitations by incorporating differ-
ent perspectives and have succeeded, finally, in capturing at least two dis-
tinct perspectives: that of peacemakers and their allies (which are similar, but
not entirely uniform) and that of anti-domestic violence advocates and social
service providers who work with battered women and batterers 67 Unfortu-
nately, the stories of battered women and battering men who have participated
in Peacemaking are filtered through the reports of anti-domestic violence
advocates, peacemakers, and Peacemaking files. 6s Without first establishing
a safety protocol and prior permission from participants, I judged it poten-
tially too dangerous to victims for me to contact those participants whom
my Peacemaking file reviews identified as being involved in domestic vio-
lence cases."'
564. See Yazzie, Hozho Nahasdlii, supra note 21, at 118 ("[O]n any given night, there is only
one squad car to patrol an area as large as many counties of the American West.").
565. Indeed, the latter imperialist move marks the history of Navajo legal institutions. See,
e.g., Tso, supra note 559, at 225-26 ("The false assumption [of the Anglo world] is that the domi-
nant society operates from the vantage point of intellectual, moral and spiritual superiority. The
truth is that the dominant society became dominant because of military strength and power.").
566. It was easy for me to feel at home with the anti-domestic violence activists. At the
same time, I was eager to escape the limitations of this usual way of thinking in order to examine
Peacemaking's potential. I therefore attempted to approach this work with a consciousness about
myself. I found useful Rosaldo's advice to "explore ... subjects from a number of positions, rather
than being locked into any particular one." ROSALDO, supra note 556, at 169. Rosaldo also notes
that "the myth of detachment gives ethnographers an appearance of innocence, which distances
them from complicity with imperialist domination." Id. at 168-69. I did not pretend in my inter-
views to be a disinterested party. I presented myself as someone who had been involved in anti-
domestic violence work for many years and who was interested in learning how Peacemaking was
used in cases involving domestic violence.
567. See Interviews with Battered Women's Advocates, supra note 17 (describing women's
experiences in Peacemaking); supra note 9 (describing my method of review of Peacemaking files
in three locales). Other perspectives, including those of prosecutors and Navajo Nation court judges,
are represented but not fully developed.
568. See supra note 9 (describing my method of review of Peacemaking files in two locales).
569. Such a study could be done but would require, in my view, the following: (1) identifica-
tion of cases involving domestic violence; (2) a separate interview with the victim and the offender,
which would include a request for permission to do follow-up; (3) information from the victims
regarding "safe" follow-up, including phone numbers and addresses not shared with the abuser, or
times to call or visit when he is not at home; (4) a safety protocol for making the follow-up phone
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My final worry is empirical. Some of the benefits of Peacemaking that I
identify may exist more in theory than in practice at this moment in Peace-
making's history in the Navajo Nation. There is a danger that readers will
fasten on these potentials and support Peacemaking in domestic violence cases
without regard to the cautionary warnings of battered women's advocates or
without regard to whether the practice would further women's autonomy in a
particular setting.570
calls or visits; and (5) a meaningful assurance of confidentiality-a difficulty enhanced in rural
settings such as those found in the Navajo Nation. For me, it would also require an interpreter
who was not related to or known (or known well, at least) by either party. Additionally, I would
crosscheck recidivism data with police and protection order filing records. See Harrell & Smith,
supra note 324 (describing such a study of protection order effectiveness); see also Chaudhuri & Daly,
supra note 243. There are many other difficulties in gathering accurate information, including the
fact that some people will not want to be seen as critical of a traditional practice and so may not
reveal that Peacemaking failed to work. Despite these difficulties, some have expressed interest in
organizing such a study. See Interview with Philmer Bluehouse, supra note 15; Interview with James
W. Zion, supra note 412.
570. Simply put, I ask myself if I would recommend Peacemaking to a friend. The answer is:
It depends. I do not always recommend restraining orders or police complaints to friends who have
been battered. It is always a matter of weighing the particular situation-how this action will hurt or
help this woman.
